1 /*-
2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
6 *
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15 *
16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
17 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
18 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
19 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
20 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
21 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
22 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
23 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
24 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
25 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
26 * SUCH DAMAGE.
27 */
28 /*
29 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
30 *
31 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are
32 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e
33 * ACLs.
34 */
35
36 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
37 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
38
39 #include <sys/param.h>
40 #include <sys/kernel.h>
41 #include <sys/module.h>
42 #include <sys/systm.h>
43 #include <sys/mount.h>
44 #include <sys/priv.h>
45 #include <sys/vnode.h>
46 #include <sys/errno.h>
47 #include <sys/stat.h>
48 #include <sys/acl.h>
49
50 /*
51 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics;
52 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system
53 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an
54 * errno value.
55 */
56 int
57 vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
58 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
59 {
60 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
61 accmode_t dac_granted;
62 accmode_t priv_granted;
63 accmode_t acl_mask_granted;
64 int group_matched, i;
65
66 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0,
67 ("invalid bit in accmode"));
68 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE),
69 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE"));
70
71 /*
72 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
73 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to
74 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which
75 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which
76 * case fall back on first match for the time being.
77 */
78 if (privused != NULL)
79 *privused = 0;
80
81 /*
82 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC
83 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
84 *
85 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before
86 * asking for them.
87 */
88 priv_granted = 0;
89
90 if (type == VDIR) {
91 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred,
92 PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0))
93 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
94 } else {
95 /*
96 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise,
97 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want
98 * this to happen unless the file really is executable.
99 */
100 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) &
101 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 &&
102 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0))
103 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
104 }
105
106 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0))
107 priv_granted |= VREAD;
108
109 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) &&
110 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0))
111 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
112
113 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0))
114 priv_granted |= VADMIN;
115
116 /*
117 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
118 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
119 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and
120 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
121 */
122 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
123 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
124 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
125 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
126 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
127 break;
128 dac_granted = 0;
129 dac_granted |= VADMIN;
130 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
131 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
132 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
133 dac_granted |= VREAD;
134 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
135 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
136 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
137 return (0);
138
139 /*
140 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
141 */
142 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) ==
143 accmode) {
144 if (privused != NULL)
145 *privused = 1;
146 return (0);
147 }
148 goto error;
149
150 case ACL_MASK:
151 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
152 break;
153
154 case ACL_OTHER:
155 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
156 break;
157
158 default:
159 break;
160 }
161 }
162
163 /*
164 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If
165 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means
166 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably
167 * be a panic.
168 */
169 if (acl_other == NULL) {
170 /*
171 * XXX This should never happen
172 */
173 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
174 return (EPERM);
175 }
176
177 /*
178 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are
179 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the
180 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user
181 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that
182 * the mask allows all requests to succeed.
183 */
184 if (acl_mask != NULL) {
185 acl_mask_granted = 0;
186 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
187 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
188 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
189 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
190 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
191 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
192 } else
193 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;
194
195 /*
196 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no
197 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the
198 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups.
199 */
200 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
201 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
202 case ACL_USER:
203 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
204 break;
205 dac_granted = 0;
206 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
207 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
208 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
209 dac_granted |= VREAD;
210 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
211 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
212 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
213 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
214 return (0);
215 /*
216 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
217 */
218 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) !=
219 accmode)
220 goto error;
221
222 if (privused != NULL)
223 *privused = 1;
224 return (0);
225 }
226 }
227
228 /*
229 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best"
230 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make
231 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we
232 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we
233 * should move on to ACL_OTHER.
234 */
235 group_matched = 0;
236 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
237 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
238 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
239 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
240 break;
241 dac_granted = 0;
242 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
243 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
244 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
245 dac_granted |= VREAD;
246 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
247 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
248 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
249
250 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
251 return (0);
252
253 group_matched = 1;
254 break;
255
256 case ACL_GROUP:
257 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
258 break;
259 dac_granted = 0;
260 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
261 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
262 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
263 dac_granted |= VREAD;
264 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
265 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
266 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
267
268 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
269 return (0);
270
271 group_matched = 1;
272 break;
273
274 default:
275 break;
276 }
277 }
278
279 if (group_matched == 1) {
280 /*
281 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure
282 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
283 */
284 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
285 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
286 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
287 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
288 break;
289 dac_granted = 0;
290 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
291 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
292 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
293 dac_granted |= VREAD;
294 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
295 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
296 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
297
298 /*
299 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
300 */
301 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
302 != accmode)
303 break;
304
305 if (privused != NULL)
306 *privused = 1;
307 return (0);
308
309 case ACL_GROUP:
310 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
311 cred))
312 break;
313 dac_granted = 0;
314 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
315 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
316 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
317 dac_granted |= VREAD;
318 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
319 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
320 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
321
322 /*
323 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
324 */
325 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
326 != accmode)
327 break;
328
329 if (privused != NULL)
330 *privused = 1;
331 return (0);
332
333 default:
334 break;
335 }
336 }
337 /*
338 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
339 * Return failure.
340 */
341 goto error;
342 }
343
344 /*
345 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
346 */
347 dac_granted = 0;
348 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
349 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
350 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
351 dac_granted |= VREAD;
352 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
353 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
354
355 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
356 return (0);
357 /*
358 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
359 */
360 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) {
361 if (privused != NULL)
362 *privused = 1;
363 return (0);
364 }
365
366 error:
367 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
368 }
369
370 /*
371 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode
372 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an
373 * acl_perm_t.
374 */
375 acl_perm_t
376 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
377 {
378 acl_perm_t perm = 0;
379
380 switch(tag) {
381 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
382 if (mode & S_IXUSR)
383 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
384 if (mode & S_IRUSR)
385 perm |= ACL_READ;
386 if (mode & S_IWUSR)
387 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
388 return (perm);
389
390 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
391 if (mode & S_IXGRP)
392 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
393 if (mode & S_IRGRP)
394 perm |= ACL_READ;
395 if (mode & S_IWGRP)
396 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
397 return (perm);
398
399 case ACL_OTHER:
400 if (mode & S_IXOTH)
401 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
402 if (mode & S_IROTH)
403 perm |= ACL_READ;
404 if (mode & S_IWOTH)
405 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
406 return (perm);
407
408 default:
409 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
410 return (0);
411 }
412 }
413
414 /*
415 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
416 * appropriate type.
417 */
418 struct acl_entry
419 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
420 {
421 struct acl_entry acl_entry;
422
423 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
424 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
425 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0;
426 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0;
427 switch(tag) {
428 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
429 acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
430 break;
431
432 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
433 acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
434 break;
435
436 case ACL_OTHER:
437 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
438 break;
439
440 default:
441 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
442 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
443 }
444
445 return (acl_entry);
446 }
447
448 /*
449 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
450 */
451 mode_t
452 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
453 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
454 {
455 mode_t mode;
456
457 mode = 0;
458 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
459 mode |= S_IXUSR;
460 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
461 mode |= S_IRUSR;
462 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
463 mode |= S_IWUSR;
464 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
465 mode |= S_IXGRP;
466 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
467 mode |= S_IRGRP;
468 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
469 mode |= S_IWGRP;
470 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
471 mode |= S_IXOTH;
472 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
473 mode |= S_IROTH;
474 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
475 mode |= S_IWOTH;
476
477 return (mode);
478 }
479
480 /*
481 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access
482 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a
483 * panic.
484 */
485 mode_t
486 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl)
487 {
488 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other;
489 int i;
490
491 /*
492 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode.
493 */
494 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL;
495 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
496 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
497 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
498 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
499 break;
500
501 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
502 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
503 break;
504
505 case ACL_OTHER:
506 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
507 break;
508
509 case ACL_MASK:
510 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
511 break;
512
513 case ACL_USER:
514 case ACL_GROUP:
515 break;
516
517 default:
518 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag");
519 }
520 }
521
522 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL)
523 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags");
524
525 /*
526 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace
527 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we
528 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions.
529 */
530 if (acl_mask != NULL)
531 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask,
532 acl_other));
533 else
534 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj,
535 acl_other));
536 }
537
538 /*
539 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing
540 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e
541 * ACL properties.
542 */
543 int
544 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
545 {
546 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
547 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
548
549 /*
550 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
551 * defined for acl_t.
552 *
553 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
554 * present:
555 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
556 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
557 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER
558 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
559 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
560 *
561 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
562 *
563 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
564 *
565 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
566 */
567 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
568 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
569 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
570 return (EINVAL);
571 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
572 /*
573 * Check for a valid tag.
574 */
575 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
576 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
577 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
578 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
579 return (EINVAL);
580 num_acl_user_obj++;
581 break;
582 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
583 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
584 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
585 return (EINVAL);
586 num_acl_group_obj++;
587 break;
588 case ACL_USER:
589 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
590 return (EINVAL);
591 num_acl_user++;
592 break;
593 case ACL_GROUP:
594 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
595 return (EINVAL);
596 num_acl_group++;
597 break;
598 case ACL_OTHER:
599 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
600 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
601 return (EINVAL);
602 num_acl_other++;
603 break;
604 case ACL_MASK:
605 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
606 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
607 return (EINVAL);
608 num_acl_mask++;
609 break;
610 default:
611 return (EINVAL);
612 }
613 /*
614 * Check for valid perm entries.
615 */
616 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
617 ACL_PERM_BITS)
618 return (EINVAL);
619 }
620 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
621 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
622 return (EINVAL);
623 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
624 (num_acl_mask != 1))
625 return (EINVAL);
626 return (0);
627 }
628
629 /*
630 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the
631 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't
632 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also
633 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into
634 * per-filesystem-code.
635 */
636 mode_t
637 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl)
638 {
639 mode_t mode;
640
641 mode = cmode;
642 /*
643 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be
644 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to
645 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly
646 * effected bits, then reconstruct.
647 */
648 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK;
649 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl));
650
651 return (mode);
652 }
653
654
655 static int
656 acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg)
657 {
658 int ret;
659
660 ret = 0;
661
662 switch (what) {
663 case MOD_LOAD:
664 case MOD_SHUTDOWN:
665 break;
666
667 case MOD_QUIESCE:
668 /* XXX TODO */
669 ret = 0;
670 break;
671
672 case MOD_UNLOAD:
673 /* XXX TODO */
674 ret = 0;
675 break;
676 default:
677 ret = EINVAL;
678 break;
679 }
680
681 return (ret);
682 }
683
684 static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = {
685 "acl_posix1e",
686 acl_posix1e_modload,
687 NULL
688 };
689
690 DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST);
691 MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1);
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