1 /*-
2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
3 *
4 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson
5 * All rights reserved.
6 *
7 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 *
18 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
19 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
21 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
22 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
23 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
24 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
25 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
26 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
27 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
28 * SUCH DAMAGE.
29 */
30 /*
31 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
32 *
33 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are
34 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e
35 * ACLs.
36 */
37
38 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
39 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD: releng/12.0/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c 326271 2017-11-27 15:20:12Z pfg $");
40
41 #include <sys/param.h>
42 #include <sys/kernel.h>
43 #include <sys/module.h>
44 #include <sys/systm.h>
45 #include <sys/mount.h>
46 #include <sys/priv.h>
47 #include <sys/vnode.h>
48 #include <sys/errno.h>
49 #include <sys/stat.h>
50 #include <sys/acl.h>
51
52 /*
53 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics;
54 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system
55 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an
56 * errno value.
57 */
58 int
59 vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
60 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
61 {
62 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
63 accmode_t dac_granted;
64 accmode_t priv_granted;
65 accmode_t acl_mask_granted;
66 int group_matched, i;
67
68 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0,
69 ("invalid bit in accmode"));
70 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE),
71 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE"));
72
73 /*
74 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
75 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to
76 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which
77 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which
78 * case fall back on first match for the time being.
79 */
80 if (privused != NULL)
81 *privused = 0;
82
83 /*
84 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC
85 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
86 *
87 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before
88 * asking for them.
89 */
90 priv_granted = 0;
91
92 if (type == VDIR) {
93 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred,
94 PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0))
95 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
96 } else {
97 /*
98 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise,
99 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want
100 * this to happen unless the file really is executable.
101 */
102 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) &
103 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 &&
104 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0))
105 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
106 }
107
108 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0))
109 priv_granted |= VREAD;
110
111 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) &&
112 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0))
113 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
114
115 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0))
116 priv_granted |= VADMIN;
117
118 /*
119 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
120 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
121 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and
122 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
123 */
124 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
125 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
126 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
127 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
128 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
129 break;
130 dac_granted = 0;
131 dac_granted |= VADMIN;
132 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
133 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
134 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
135 dac_granted |= VREAD;
136 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
137 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
138 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
139 return (0);
140
141 /*
142 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
143 */
144 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) ==
145 accmode) {
146 if (privused != NULL)
147 *privused = 1;
148 return (0);
149 }
150 goto error;
151
152 case ACL_MASK:
153 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
154 break;
155
156 case ACL_OTHER:
157 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
158 break;
159
160 default:
161 break;
162 }
163 }
164
165 /*
166 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If
167 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means
168 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably
169 * be a panic.
170 */
171 if (acl_other == NULL) {
172 /*
173 * XXX This should never happen
174 */
175 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
176 return (EPERM);
177 }
178
179 /*
180 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are
181 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the
182 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user
183 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that
184 * the mask allows all requests to succeed.
185 */
186 if (acl_mask != NULL) {
187 acl_mask_granted = 0;
188 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
189 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
190 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
191 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
192 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
193 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
194 } else
195 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;
196
197 /*
198 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no
199 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the
200 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups.
201 */
202 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
203 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
204 case ACL_USER:
205 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
206 break;
207 dac_granted = 0;
208 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
209 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
210 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
211 dac_granted |= VREAD;
212 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
213 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
214 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
215 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
216 return (0);
217 /*
218 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
219 */
220 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) !=
221 accmode)
222 goto error;
223
224 if (privused != NULL)
225 *privused = 1;
226 return (0);
227 }
228 }
229
230 /*
231 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best"
232 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make
233 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we
234 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we
235 * should move on to ACL_OTHER.
236 */
237 group_matched = 0;
238 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
239 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
240 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
241 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
242 break;
243 dac_granted = 0;
244 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
245 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
246 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
247 dac_granted |= VREAD;
248 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
249 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
250 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
251
252 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
253 return (0);
254
255 group_matched = 1;
256 break;
257
258 case ACL_GROUP:
259 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
260 break;
261 dac_granted = 0;
262 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
263 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
264 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
265 dac_granted |= VREAD;
266 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
267 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
268 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
269
270 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
271 return (0);
272
273 group_matched = 1;
274 break;
275
276 default:
277 break;
278 }
279 }
280
281 if (group_matched == 1) {
282 /*
283 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure
284 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
285 */
286 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
287 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
288 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
289 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
290 break;
291 dac_granted = 0;
292 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
293 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
294 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
295 dac_granted |= VREAD;
296 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
297 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
298 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
299
300 /*
301 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
302 */
303 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
304 != accmode)
305 break;
306
307 if (privused != NULL)
308 *privused = 1;
309 return (0);
310
311 case ACL_GROUP:
312 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
313 cred))
314 break;
315 dac_granted = 0;
316 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
317 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
318 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
319 dac_granted |= VREAD;
320 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
321 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
322 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
323
324 /*
325 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
326 */
327 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
328 != accmode)
329 break;
330
331 if (privused != NULL)
332 *privused = 1;
333 return (0);
334
335 default:
336 break;
337 }
338 }
339 /*
340 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
341 * Return failure.
342 */
343 goto error;
344 }
345
346 /*
347 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
348 */
349 dac_granted = 0;
350 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
351 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
352 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
353 dac_granted |= VREAD;
354 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
355 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
356
357 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode)
358 return (0);
359 /*
360 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
361 */
362 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) {
363 if (privused != NULL)
364 *privused = 1;
365 return (0);
366 }
367
368 error:
369 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
370 }
371
372 /*
373 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode
374 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an
375 * acl_perm_t.
376 */
377 acl_perm_t
378 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
379 {
380 acl_perm_t perm = 0;
381
382 switch(tag) {
383 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
384 if (mode & S_IXUSR)
385 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
386 if (mode & S_IRUSR)
387 perm |= ACL_READ;
388 if (mode & S_IWUSR)
389 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
390 return (perm);
391
392 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
393 if (mode & S_IXGRP)
394 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
395 if (mode & S_IRGRP)
396 perm |= ACL_READ;
397 if (mode & S_IWGRP)
398 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
399 return (perm);
400
401 case ACL_OTHER:
402 if (mode & S_IXOTH)
403 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
404 if (mode & S_IROTH)
405 perm |= ACL_READ;
406 if (mode & S_IWOTH)
407 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
408 return (perm);
409
410 default:
411 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
412 return (0);
413 }
414 }
415
416 /*
417 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
418 * appropriate type.
419 */
420 struct acl_entry
421 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
422 {
423 struct acl_entry acl_entry;
424
425 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
426 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
427 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0;
428 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0;
429 switch(tag) {
430 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
431 acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
432 break;
433
434 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
435 acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
436 break;
437
438 case ACL_OTHER:
439 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
440 break;
441
442 default:
443 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
444 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
445 }
446
447 return (acl_entry);
448 }
449
450 /*
451 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
452 */
453 mode_t
454 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
455 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
456 {
457 mode_t mode;
458
459 mode = 0;
460 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
461 mode |= S_IXUSR;
462 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
463 mode |= S_IRUSR;
464 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
465 mode |= S_IWUSR;
466 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
467 mode |= S_IXGRP;
468 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
469 mode |= S_IRGRP;
470 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
471 mode |= S_IWGRP;
472 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
473 mode |= S_IXOTH;
474 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
475 mode |= S_IROTH;
476 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
477 mode |= S_IWOTH;
478
479 return (mode);
480 }
481
482 /*
483 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access
484 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a
485 * panic.
486 */
487 mode_t
488 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl)
489 {
490 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other;
491 int i;
492
493 /*
494 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode.
495 */
496 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL;
497 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
498 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
499 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
500 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
501 break;
502
503 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
504 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
505 break;
506
507 case ACL_OTHER:
508 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
509 break;
510
511 case ACL_MASK:
512 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
513 break;
514
515 case ACL_USER:
516 case ACL_GROUP:
517 break;
518
519 default:
520 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag");
521 }
522 }
523
524 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL)
525 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags");
526
527 /*
528 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace
529 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we
530 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions.
531 */
532 if (acl_mask != NULL)
533 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask,
534 acl_other));
535 else
536 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj,
537 acl_other));
538 }
539
540 /*
541 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing
542 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e
543 * ACL properties.
544 */
545 int
546 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
547 {
548 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
549 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
550
551 /*
552 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
553 * defined for acl_t.
554 *
555 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
556 * present:
557 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
558 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
559 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER
560 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
561 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
562 *
563 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
564 *
565 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
566 *
567 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
568 */
569 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
570 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
571 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
572 return (EINVAL);
573 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
574 /*
575 * Check for a valid tag.
576 */
577 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
578 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
579 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
580 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
581 return (EINVAL);
582 num_acl_user_obj++;
583 break;
584 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
585 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
586 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
587 return (EINVAL);
588 num_acl_group_obj++;
589 break;
590 case ACL_USER:
591 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
592 return (EINVAL);
593 num_acl_user++;
594 break;
595 case ACL_GROUP:
596 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
597 return (EINVAL);
598 num_acl_group++;
599 break;
600 case ACL_OTHER:
601 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
602 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
603 return (EINVAL);
604 num_acl_other++;
605 break;
606 case ACL_MASK:
607 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
608 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
609 return (EINVAL);
610 num_acl_mask++;
611 break;
612 default:
613 return (EINVAL);
614 }
615 /*
616 * Check for valid perm entries.
617 */
618 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
619 ACL_PERM_BITS)
620 return (EINVAL);
621 }
622 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
623 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
624 return (EINVAL);
625 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
626 (num_acl_mask != 1))
627 return (EINVAL);
628 return (0);
629 }
630
631 /*
632 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the
633 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't
634 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also
635 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into
636 * per-filesystem-code.
637 */
638 mode_t
639 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl)
640 {
641 mode_t mode;
642
643 mode = cmode;
644 /*
645 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be
646 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to
647 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly
648 * effected bits, then reconstruct.
649 */
650 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK;
651 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl));
652
653 return (mode);
654 }
655
656
657 static int
658 acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg)
659 {
660 int ret;
661
662 ret = 0;
663
664 switch (what) {
665 case MOD_LOAD:
666 case MOD_SHUTDOWN:
667 break;
668
669 case MOD_QUIESCE:
670 /* XXX TODO */
671 ret = 0;
672 break;
673
674 case MOD_UNLOAD:
675 /* XXX TODO */
676 ret = 0;
677 break;
678 default:
679 ret = EINVAL;
680 break;
681 }
682
683 return (ret);
684 }
685
686 static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = {
687 "acl_posix1e",
688 acl_posix1e_modload,
689 NULL
690 };
691
692 DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST);
693 MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1);
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