FreeBSD/Linux Kernel Cross Reference
sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c
1 /*-
2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
3 *
4 * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 Netflix Inc.
5 *
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
13 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
14 *
15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
16 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
18 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
19 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
20 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
21 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
22 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
23 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
24 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
25 * SUCH DAMAGE.
26 */
27
28 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
29 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
30
31 #include "opt_inet.h"
32 #include "opt_inet6.h"
33 #include "opt_kern_tls.h"
34 #include "opt_ratelimit.h"
35 #include "opt_rss.h"
36
37 #include <sys/param.h>
38 #include <sys/kernel.h>
39 #include <sys/domainset.h>
40 #include <sys/endian.h>
41 #include <sys/ktls.h>
42 #include <sys/lock.h>
43 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
44 #include <sys/mutex.h>
45 #include <sys/rmlock.h>
46 #include <sys/proc.h>
47 #include <sys/protosw.h>
48 #include <sys/refcount.h>
49 #include <sys/smp.h>
50 #include <sys/socket.h>
51 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
52 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
53 #include <sys/taskqueue.h>
54 #include <sys/kthread.h>
55 #include <sys/uio.h>
56 #include <sys/vmmeter.h>
57 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
58 #include <machine/pcb.h>
59 #endif
60 #include <machine/vmparam.h>
61 #include <net/if.h>
62 #include <net/if_var.h>
63 #ifdef RSS
64 #include <net/netisr.h>
65 #include <net/rss_config.h>
66 #endif
67 #include <net/route.h>
68 #include <net/route/nhop.h>
69 #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
70 #include <netinet/in.h>
71 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
72 #endif
73 #include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
74 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
75 #include <netinet/tcp_offload.h>
76 #endif
77 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
78 #include <opencrypto/ktls.h>
79 #include <vm/uma_dbg.h>
80 #include <vm/vm.h>
81 #include <vm/vm_pageout.h>
82 #include <vm/vm_page.h>
83 #include <vm/vm_pagequeue.h>
84
85 struct ktls_wq {
86 struct mtx mtx;
87 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) m_head;
88 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) so_head;
89 bool running;
90 int lastallocfail;
91 } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
92
93 struct ktls_alloc_thread {
94 uint64_t wakeups;
95 uint64_t allocs;
96 struct thread *td;
97 int running;
98 };
99
100 struct ktls_domain_info {
101 int count;
102 int cpu[MAXCPU];
103 struct ktls_alloc_thread alloc_td;
104 };
105
106 struct ktls_domain_info ktls_domains[MAXMEMDOM];
107 static struct ktls_wq *ktls_wq;
108 static struct proc *ktls_proc;
109 static uma_zone_t ktls_session_zone;
110 static uma_zone_t ktls_buffer_zone;
111 static uint16_t ktls_cpuid_lookup[MAXCPU];
112 static int ktls_init_state;
113 static struct sx ktls_init_lock;
114 SX_SYSINIT(ktls_init_lock, &ktls_init_lock, "ktls init");
115
116 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, tls, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
117 "Kernel TLS offload");
118 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, stats, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
119 "Kernel TLS offload stats");
120
121 #ifdef RSS
122 static int ktls_bind_threads = 1;
123 #else
124 static int ktls_bind_threads;
125 #endif
126 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, bind_threads, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
127 &ktls_bind_threads, 0,
128 "Bind crypto threads to cores (1) or cores and domains (2) at boot");
129
130 static u_int ktls_maxlen = 16384;
131 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, maxlen, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
132 &ktls_maxlen, 0, "Maximum TLS record size");
133
134 static int ktls_number_threads;
135 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RD,
136 &ktls_number_threads, 0,
137 "Number of TLS threads in thread-pool");
138
139 unsigned int ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct = 2;
140 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
141 &ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, 2,
142 "Max percent bytes retransmitted before ifnet TLS is disabled");
143
144 static bool ktls_offload_enable;
145 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
146 &ktls_offload_enable, 0,
147 "Enable support for kernel TLS offload");
148
149 static bool ktls_cbc_enable = true;
150 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, cbc_enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
151 &ktls_cbc_enable, 1,
152 "Enable support of AES-CBC crypto for kernel TLS");
153
154 static bool ktls_sw_buffer_cache = true;
155 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw_buffer_cache, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
156 &ktls_sw_buffer_cache, 1,
157 "Enable caching of output buffers for SW encryption");
158
159 static int ktls_max_alloc = 128;
160 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, max_alloc, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
161 &ktls_max_alloc, 128,
162 "Max number of 16k buffers to allocate in thread context");
163
164 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_tasks_active);
165 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, tasks_active, CTLFLAG_RD,
166 &ktls_tasks_active, "Number of active tasks");
167
168 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_pending);
169 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_pending, CTLFLAG_RD,
170 &ktls_cnt_tx_pending,
171 "Number of TLS 1.0 records waiting for earlier TLS records");
172
173 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_queued);
174 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
175 &ktls_cnt_tx_queued,
176 "Number of TLS records in queue to tasks for SW encryption");
177
178 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_rx_queued);
179 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_rx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
180 &ktls_cnt_rx_queued,
181 "Number of TLS sockets in queue to tasks for SW decryption");
182
183 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_total);
184 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, offload_total,
185 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_total,
186 "Total successful TLS setups (parameters set)");
187
188 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_enable_calls);
189 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, enable_calls,
190 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_enable_calls,
191 "Total number of TLS enable calls made");
192
193 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_active);
194 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, active, CTLFLAG_RD,
195 &ktls_offload_active, "Total Active TLS sessions");
196
197 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_corrupted_records);
198 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, corrupted_records, CTLFLAG_RD,
199 &ktls_offload_corrupted_records, "Total corrupted TLS records received");
200
201 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_failed_crypto);
202 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, failed_crypto, CTLFLAG_RD,
203 &ktls_offload_failed_crypto, "Total TLS crypto failures");
204
205 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_ifnet);
206 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD,
207 &ktls_switch_to_ifnet, "TLS sessions switched from SW to ifnet");
208
209 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_sw);
210 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_sw, CTLFLAG_RD,
211 &ktls_switch_to_sw, "TLS sessions switched from ifnet to SW");
212
213 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_failed);
214 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
215 &ktls_switch_failed, "TLS sessions unable to switch between SW and ifnet");
216
217 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail);
218 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
219 &ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, "TLS sessions unable to switch to SW from ifnet");
220
221 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok);
222 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_ok, CTLFLAG_RD,
223 &ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, "TLS sessions able to switch to SW from ifnet");
224
225 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
226 "Software TLS session stats");
227 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
228 "Hardware (ifnet) TLS session stats");
229 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
230 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, toe, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
231 "TOE TLS session stats");
232 #endif
233
234 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_cbc);
235 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_cbc,
236 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
237
238 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_gcm);
239 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_gcm,
240 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
241
242 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_chacha20);
243 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
244 &ktls_sw_chacha20,
245 "Active number of software TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
246
247 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_cbc);
248 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
249 &ktls_ifnet_cbc,
250 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
251
252 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_gcm);
253 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
254 &ktls_ifnet_gcm,
255 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
256
257 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_chacha20);
258 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
259 &ktls_ifnet_chacha20,
260 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
261
262 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset);
263 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset, CTLFLAG_RD,
264 &ktls_ifnet_reset, "TLS sessions updated to a new ifnet send tag");
265
266 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped);
267 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_dropped, CTLFLAG_RD,
268 &ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped,
269 "TLS sessions dropped after failing to update ifnet send tag");
270
271 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed);
272 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
273 &ktls_ifnet_reset_failed,
274 "TLS sessions that failed to allocate a new ifnet send tag");
275
276 static int ktls_ifnet_permitted;
277 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, permitted, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
278 &ktls_ifnet_permitted, 1,
279 "Whether to permit hardware (ifnet) TLS sessions");
280
281 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
282 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_cbc);
283 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
284 &ktls_toe_cbc,
285 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
286
287 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_gcm);
288 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
289 &ktls_toe_gcm,
290 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
291
292 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_chacha20);
293 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
294 &ktls_toe_chacha20,
295 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
296 #endif
297
298 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTLS, "ktls", "Kernel TLS");
299
300 #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
301 static void ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending);
302 static void ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending);
303 #endif
304 static void ktls_work_thread(void *ctx);
305 static void ktls_alloc_thread(void *ctx);
306
307 #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
308 static u_int
309 ktls_get_cpu(struct socket *so)
310 {
311 struct inpcb *inp;
312 #ifdef NUMA
313 struct ktls_domain_info *di;
314 #endif
315 u_int cpuid;
316
317 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
318 #ifdef RSS
319 cpuid = rss_hash2cpuid(inp->inp_flowid, inp->inp_flowtype);
320 if (cpuid != NETISR_CPUID_NONE)
321 return (cpuid);
322 #endif
323 /*
324 * Just use the flowid to shard connections in a repeatable
325 * fashion. Note that TLS 1.0 sessions rely on the
326 * serialization provided by having the same connection use
327 * the same queue.
328 */
329 #ifdef NUMA
330 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1 && inp->inp_numa_domain != M_NODOM) {
331 di = &ktls_domains[inp->inp_numa_domain];
332 cpuid = di->cpu[inp->inp_flowid % di->count];
333 } else
334 #endif
335 cpuid = ktls_cpuid_lookup[inp->inp_flowid % ktls_number_threads];
336 return (cpuid);
337 }
338 #endif
339
340 static int
341 ktls_buffer_import(void *arg, void **store, int count, int domain, int flags)
342 {
343 vm_page_t m;
344 int i, req;
345
346 KASSERT((ktls_maxlen & PAGE_MASK) == 0,
347 ("%s: ktls max length %d is not page size-aligned",
348 __func__, ktls_maxlen));
349
350 req = VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_NODUMP | malloc2vm_flags(flags);
351 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
352 m = vm_page_alloc_noobj_contig_domain(domain, req,
353 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
354 VM_MEMATTR_DEFAULT);
355 if (m == NULL)
356 break;
357 store[i] = (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(m));
358 }
359 return (i);
360 }
361
362 static void
363 ktls_buffer_release(void *arg __unused, void **store, int count)
364 {
365 vm_page_t m;
366 int i, j;
367
368 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
369 m = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)store[i]));
370 for (j = 0; j < atop(ktls_maxlen); j++) {
371 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(m + j);
372 vm_page_free(m + j);
373 }
374 }
375 }
376
377 static void
378 ktls_free_mext_contig(struct mbuf *m)
379 {
380 M_ASSERTEXTPG(m);
381 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(m->m_epg_pa[0]));
382 }
383
384 static int
385 ktls_init(void)
386 {
387 struct thread *td;
388 struct pcpu *pc;
389 int count, domain, error, i;
390
391 ktls_wq = malloc(sizeof(*ktls_wq) * (mp_maxid + 1), M_KTLS,
392 M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
393
394 ktls_session_zone = uma_zcreate("ktls_session",
395 sizeof(struct ktls_session),
396 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
397 UMA_ALIGN_CACHE, 0);
398
399 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
400 ktls_buffer_zone = uma_zcache_create("ktls_buffers",
401 roundup2(ktls_maxlen, PAGE_SIZE), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
402 ktls_buffer_import, ktls_buffer_release, NULL,
403 UMA_ZONE_FIRSTTOUCH);
404 }
405
406 /*
407 * Initialize the workqueues to run the TLS work. We create a
408 * work queue for each CPU.
409 */
410 CPU_FOREACH(i) {
411 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].m_head);
412 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].so_head);
413 mtx_init(&ktls_wq[i].mtx, "ktls work queue", NULL, MTX_DEF);
414 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
415 pc = pcpu_find(i);
416 domain = pc->pc_domain;
417 count = ktls_domains[domain].count;
418 ktls_domains[domain].cpu[count] = i;
419 ktls_domains[domain].count++;
420 }
421 ktls_cpuid_lookup[ktls_number_threads] = i;
422 ktls_number_threads++;
423 }
424
425 /*
426 * If we somehow have an empty domain, fall back to choosing
427 * among all KTLS threads.
428 */
429 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
430 for (i = 0; i < vm_ndomains; i++) {
431 if (ktls_domains[i].count == 0) {
432 ktls_bind_threads = 1;
433 break;
434 }
435 }
436 }
437
438 /* Start kthreads for each workqueue. */
439 CPU_FOREACH(i) {
440 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_work_thread, &ktls_wq[i],
441 &ktls_proc, &td, 0, 0, "KTLS", "thr_%d", i);
442 if (error) {
443 printf("Can't add KTLS thread %d error %d\n", i, error);
444 return (error);
445 }
446 }
447
448 /*
449 * Start an allocation thread per-domain to perform blocking allocations
450 * of 16k physically contiguous TLS crypto destination buffers.
451 */
452 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
453 for (domain = 0; domain < vm_ndomains; domain++) {
454 if (VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain))
455 continue;
456 if (CPU_EMPTY(&cpuset_domain[domain]))
457 continue;
458 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_alloc_thread,
459 &ktls_domains[domain], &ktls_proc,
460 &ktls_domains[domain].alloc_td.td,
461 0, 0, "KTLS", "alloc_%d", domain);
462 if (error) {
463 printf("Can't add KTLS alloc thread %d error %d\n",
464 domain, error);
465 return (error);
466 }
467 }
468 }
469
470 if (bootverbose)
471 printf("KTLS: Initialized %d threads\n", ktls_number_threads);
472 return (0);
473 }
474
475 static int
476 ktls_start_kthreads(void)
477 {
478 int error, state;
479
480 start:
481 state = atomic_load_acq_int(&ktls_init_state);
482 if (__predict_true(state > 0))
483 return (0);
484 if (state < 0)
485 return (ENXIO);
486
487 sx_xlock(&ktls_init_lock);
488 if (ktls_init_state != 0) {
489 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
490 goto start;
491 }
492
493 error = ktls_init();
494 if (error == 0)
495 state = 1;
496 else
497 state = -1;
498 atomic_store_rel_int(&ktls_init_state, state);
499 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
500 return (error);
501 }
502
503 #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
504 static int
505 ktls_create_session(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en,
506 struct ktls_session **tlsp, int direction)
507 {
508 struct ktls_session *tls;
509 int error;
510
511 /* Only TLS 1.0 - 1.3 are supported. */
512 if (en->tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE)
513 return (EINVAL);
514 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO ||
515 en->tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
516 return (EINVAL);
517
518 if (en->auth_key_len < 0 || en->auth_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
519 return (EINVAL);
520 if (en->cipher_key_len < 0 || en->cipher_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
521 return (EINVAL);
522 if (en->iv_len < 0 || en->iv_len > sizeof(tls->params.iv))
523 return (EINVAL);
524
525 /* All supported algorithms require a cipher key. */
526 if (en->cipher_key_len == 0)
527 return (EINVAL);
528
529 /* No flags are currently supported. */
530 if (en->flags != 0)
531 return (EINVAL);
532
533 /* Common checks for supported algorithms. */
534 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
535 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
536 /*
537 * auth_algorithm isn't used, but permit GMAC values
538 * for compatibility.
539 */
540 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
541 case 0:
542 #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD12
543 /* XXX: Really 13.0-current COMPAT. */
544 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
545 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
546 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
547 #endif
548 break;
549 default:
550 return (EINVAL);
551 }
552 if (en->auth_key_len != 0)
553 return (EINVAL);
554 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
555 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
556 if (en->iv_len != TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN)
557 return (EINVAL);
558 break;
559 case TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE:
560 if (en->iv_len != TLS_1_3_GCM_IV_LEN)
561 return (EINVAL);
562 break;
563 default:
564 return (EINVAL);
565 }
566 break;
567 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
568 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
569 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
570 break;
571 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
572 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
573 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
574 return (EINVAL);
575 break;
576 default:
577 return (EINVAL);
578 }
579 if (en->auth_key_len == 0)
580 return (EINVAL);
581
582 /*
583 * TLS 1.0 requires an implicit IV. TLS 1.1 and 1.2
584 * use explicit IVs.
585 */
586 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
587 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO:
588 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CBC_IMPLICIT_IV_LEN)
589 return (EINVAL);
590 break;
591 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE:
592 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
593 /* Ignore any supplied IV. */
594 en->iv_len = 0;
595 break;
596 default:
597 return (EINVAL);
598 }
599 break;
600 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
601 if (en->auth_algorithm != 0 || en->auth_key_len != 0)
602 return (EINVAL);
603 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO &&
604 en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
605 return (EINVAL);
606 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CHACHA20_IV_LEN)
607 return (EINVAL);
608 break;
609 default:
610 return (EINVAL);
611 }
612
613 error = ktls_start_kthreads();
614 if (error != 0)
615 return (error);
616
617 tls = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
618
619 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
620
621 refcount_init(&tls->refcount, 1);
622 if (direction == KTLS_RX)
623 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag, tls);
624 else
625 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag, tls);
626
627 tls->wq_index = ktls_get_cpu(so);
628
629 tls->params.cipher_algorithm = en->cipher_algorithm;
630 tls->params.auth_algorithm = en->auth_algorithm;
631 tls->params.tls_vmajor = en->tls_vmajor;
632 tls->params.tls_vminor = en->tls_vminor;
633 tls->params.flags = en->flags;
634 tls->params.max_frame_len = min(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2, ktls_maxlen);
635
636 /* Set the header and trailer lengths. */
637 tls->params.tls_hlen = sizeof(struct tls_record_layer);
638 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
639 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
640 /*
641 * TLS 1.2 uses a 4 byte implicit IV with an explicit 8 byte
642 * nonce. TLS 1.3 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
643 */
644 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
645 tls->params.tls_hlen += sizeof(uint64_t);
646 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
647 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
648 break;
649 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
650 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
651 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
652 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) {
653 /* Implicit IV, no nonce. */
654 tls->sequential_records = true;
655 tls->next_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
656 STAILQ_INIT(&tls->pending_records);
657 } else {
658 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
659 }
660 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
661 SHA1_HASH_LEN;
662 break;
663 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
664 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
665 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
666 SHA2_256_HASH_LEN;
667 break;
668 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
669 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
670 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
671 SHA2_384_HASH_LEN;
672 break;
673 default:
674 panic("invalid hmac");
675 }
676 tls->params.tls_bs = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
677 break;
678 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
679 /*
680 * Chacha20 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
681 */
682 tls->params.tls_tlen = POLY1305_HASH_LEN;
683 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
684 break;
685 default:
686 panic("invalid cipher");
687 }
688
689 /*
690 * TLS 1.3 includes optional padding which we do not support,
691 * and also puts the "real" record type at the end of the
692 * encrypted data.
693 */
694 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
695 tls->params.tls_tlen += sizeof(uint8_t);
696
697 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_hlen <= MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN,
698 ("TLS header length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_hlen));
699 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_tlen <= MBUF_PEXT_TRAIL_LEN,
700 ("TLS trailer length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_tlen));
701
702 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) {
703 tls->params.auth_key_len = en->auth_key_len;
704 tls->params.auth_key = malloc(en->auth_key_len, M_KTLS,
705 M_WAITOK);
706 error = copyin(en->auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
707 en->auth_key_len);
708 if (error)
709 goto out;
710 }
711
712 tls->params.cipher_key_len = en->cipher_key_len;
713 tls->params.cipher_key = malloc(en->cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK);
714 error = copyin(en->cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
715 en->cipher_key_len);
716 if (error)
717 goto out;
718
719 /*
720 * This holds the implicit portion of the nonce for AEAD
721 * ciphers and the initial implicit IV for TLS 1.0. The
722 * explicit portions of the IV are generated in ktls_frame().
723 */
724 if (en->iv_len != 0) {
725 tls->params.iv_len = en->iv_len;
726 error = copyin(en->iv, tls->params.iv, en->iv_len);
727 if (error)
728 goto out;
729
730 /*
731 * For TLS 1.2 with GCM, generate an 8-byte nonce as a
732 * counter to generate unique explicit IVs.
733 *
734 * Store this counter in the last 8 bytes of the IV
735 * array so that it is 8-byte aligned.
736 */
737 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
738 en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
739 arc4rand(tls->params.iv + 8, sizeof(uint64_t), 0);
740 }
741
742 *tlsp = tls;
743 return (0);
744
745 out:
746 ktls_free(tls);
747 return (error);
748 }
749
750 static struct ktls_session *
751 ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
752 {
753 struct ktls_session *tls_new;
754
755 tls_new = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
756
757 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
758
759 refcount_init(&tls_new->refcount, 1);
760 if (direction == KTLS_RX)
761 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag,
762 tls_new);
763 else
764 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag,
765 tls_new);
766
767 /* Copy fields from existing session. */
768 tls_new->params = tls->params;
769 tls_new->wq_index = tls->wq_index;
770
771 /* Deep copy keys. */
772 if (tls_new->params.auth_key != NULL) {
773 tls_new->params.auth_key = malloc(tls->params.auth_key_len,
774 M_KTLS, M_WAITOK);
775 memcpy(tls_new->params.auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
776 tls->params.auth_key_len);
777 }
778
779 tls_new->params.cipher_key = malloc(tls->params.cipher_key_len, M_KTLS,
780 M_WAITOK);
781 memcpy(tls_new->params.cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
782 tls->params.cipher_key_len);
783
784 return (tls_new);
785 }
786
787 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
788 static int
789 ktls_try_toe(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
790 {
791 struct inpcb *inp;
792 struct tcpcb *tp;
793 int error;
794
795 inp = so->so_pcb;
796 INP_WLOCK(inp);
797 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
798 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
799 return (ECONNRESET);
800 }
801 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
802 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
803 return (ECONNRESET);
804 }
805 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
806 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_TOE)) {
807 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
808 return (EOPNOTSUPP);
809 }
810
811 error = tcp_offload_alloc_tls_session(tp, tls, direction);
812 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
813 if (error == 0) {
814 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE;
815 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
816 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
817 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, 1);
818 break;
819 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
820 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, 1);
821 break;
822 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
823 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, 1);
824 break;
825 }
826 }
827 return (error);
828 }
829 #endif
830
831 /*
832 * Common code used when first enabling ifnet TLS on a connection or
833 * when allocating a new ifnet TLS session due to a routing change.
834 * This function allocates a new TLS send tag on whatever interface
835 * the connection is currently routed over.
836 */
837 static int
838 ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls, bool force,
839 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
840 {
841 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
842 struct ifnet *ifp;
843 struct nhop_object *nh;
844 struct tcpcb *tp;
845 int error;
846
847 INP_RLOCK(inp);
848 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
849 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
850 return (ECONNRESET);
851 }
852 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
853 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
854 return (ECONNRESET);
855 }
856 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
857
858 /*
859 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
860 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
861 *
862 * - Always permit 'force' requests.
863 * - ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0: always deny.
864 */
865 if (!force && ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
866 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
867 return (ENXIO);
868 }
869
870 /*
871 * XXX: Use the cached route in the inpcb to find the
872 * interface. This should perhaps instead use
873 * rtalloc1_fib(dst, 0, 0, fibnum). Since KTLS is only
874 * enabled after a connection has completed key negotiation in
875 * userland, the cached route will be present in practice.
876 */
877 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
878 if (nh == NULL) {
879 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
880 return (ENXIO);
881 }
882 ifp = nh->nh_ifp;
883 if_ref(ifp);
884
885 /*
886 * Allocate a TLS + ratelimit tag if the connection has an
887 * existing pacing rate.
888 */
889 if (tp->t_pacing_rate != -1 &&
890 (ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_TXTLS_RTLMT) != 0) {
891 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT;
892 params.tls_rate_limit.inp = inp;
893 params.tls_rate_limit.tls = tls;
894 params.tls_rate_limit.max_rate = tp->t_pacing_rate;
895 } else {
896 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS;
897 params.tls.inp = inp;
898 params.tls.tls = tls;
899 }
900 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
901 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
902 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
903 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
904
905 if ((ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_MEXTPG) == 0) {
906 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
907 goto out;
908 }
909 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
910 if ((ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_TXTLS6) == 0) {
911 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
912 goto out;
913 }
914 } else {
915 if ((ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_TXTLS4) == 0) {
916 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
917 goto out;
918 }
919 }
920 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
921 out:
922 if_rele(ifp);
923 return (error);
924 }
925
926 /*
927 * Allocate an initial TLS receive tag for doing HW decryption of TLS
928 * data.
929 *
930 * This function allocates a new TLS receive tag on whatever interface
931 * the connection is currently routed over. If the connection ends up
932 * using a different interface for receive this will get fixed up via
933 * ktls_input_ifp_mismatch as future packets arrive.
934 */
935 static int
936 ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls,
937 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
938 {
939 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
940 struct ifnet *ifp;
941 struct nhop_object *nh;
942 int error;
943
944 if (!ktls_ocf_recrypt_supported(tls))
945 return (ENXIO);
946
947 INP_RLOCK(inp);
948 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
949 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
950 return (ECONNRESET);
951 }
952 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
953 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
954 return (ECONNRESET);
955 }
956
957 /*
958 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
959 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
960 */
961 if (ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
962 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
963 return (ENXIO);
964 }
965
966 /*
967 * XXX: As with ktls_alloc_snd_tag, use the cached route in
968 * the inpcb to find the interface.
969 */
970 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
971 if (nh == NULL) {
972 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
973 return (ENXIO);
974 }
975 ifp = nh->nh_ifp;
976 if_ref(ifp);
977 tls->rx_ifp = ifp;
978
979 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
980 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
981 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
982 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
983 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
984 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
985 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = 0;
986
987 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
988
989 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
990 if ((ifp->if_capenable2 & IFCAP2_RXTLS6) == 0) {
991 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
992 goto out;
993 }
994 } else {
995 if ((ifp->if_capenable2 & IFCAP2_RXTLS4) == 0) {
996 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
997 goto out;
998 }
999 }
1000 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
1001
1002 /*
1003 * If this connection is over a vlan, vlan_snd_tag_alloc
1004 * rewrites vlan_id with the saved interface. Save the VLAN
1005 * ID for use in ktls_reset_receive_tag which allocates new
1006 * receive tags directly from the leaf interface bypassing
1007 * if_vlan.
1008 */
1009 if (error == 0)
1010 tls->rx_vlan_id = params.tls_rx.vlan_id;
1011 out:
1012 return (error);
1013 }
1014
1015 static int
1016 ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction,
1017 bool force)
1018 {
1019 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1020 int error;
1021
1022 switch (direction) {
1023 case KTLS_TX:
1024 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, force, &mst);
1025 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1026 goto done;
1027 break;
1028 case KTLS_RX:
1029 KASSERT(!force, ("%s: forced receive tag", __func__));
1030 error = ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, &mst);
1031 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1032 goto done;
1033 break;
1034 default:
1035 __assert_unreachable();
1036 }
1037
1038 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET;
1039 tls->snd_tag = mst;
1040
1041 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1042 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1043 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, 1);
1044 break;
1045 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1046 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, 1);
1047 break;
1048 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1049 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, 1);
1050 break;
1051 default:
1052 break;
1053 }
1054 done:
1055 return (error);
1056 }
1057
1058 static void
1059 ktls_use_sw(struct ktls_session *tls)
1060 {
1061 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_SW;
1062 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1063 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1064 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, 1);
1065 break;
1066 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1067 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, 1);
1068 break;
1069 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1070 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, 1);
1071 break;
1072 }
1073 }
1074
1075 static int
1076 ktls_try_sw(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
1077 {
1078 int error;
1079
1080 error = ktls_ocf_try(so, tls, direction);
1081 if (error)
1082 return (error);
1083 ktls_use_sw(tls);
1084 return (0);
1085 }
1086
1087 /*
1088 * KTLS RX stores data in the socket buffer as a list of TLS records,
1089 * where each record is stored as a control message containg the TLS
1090 * header followed by data mbufs containing the decrypted data. This
1091 * is different from KTLS TX which always uses an mb_ext_pgs mbuf for
1092 * both encrypted and decrypted data. TLS records decrypted by a NIC
1093 * should be queued to the socket buffer as records, but encrypted
1094 * data which needs to be decrypted by software arrives as a stream of
1095 * regular mbufs which need to be converted. In addition, there may
1096 * already be pending encrypted data in the socket buffer when KTLS RX
1097 * is enabled.
1098 *
1099 * To manage not-yet-decrypted data for KTLS RX, the following scheme
1100 * is used:
1101 *
1102 * - A single chain of NOTREADY mbufs is hung off of sb_mtls.
1103 *
1104 * - ktls_check_rx checks this chain of mbufs reading the TLS header
1105 * from the first mbuf. Once all of the data for that TLS record is
1106 * queued, the socket is queued to a worker thread.
1107 *
1108 * - The worker thread calls ktls_decrypt to decrypt TLS records in
1109 * the TLS chain. Each TLS record is detached from the TLS chain,
1110 * decrypted, and inserted into the regular socket buffer chain as
1111 * record starting with a control message holding the TLS header and
1112 * a chain of mbufs holding the encrypted data.
1113 */
1114
1115 static void
1116 sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf *sb)
1117 {
1118 struct mbuf *m;
1119
1120 m = sb->sb_mb;
1121 sb->sb_mtls = m;
1122 sb->sb_mb = NULL;
1123 sb->sb_mbtail = NULL;
1124 sb->sb_lastrecord = NULL;
1125 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1126 KASSERT(m->m_nextpkt == NULL, ("%s: m_nextpkt != NULL",
1127 __func__));
1128 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_NOTAVAIL) == 0, ("%s: mbuf not avail",
1129 __func__));
1130 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc >= m->m_len, ("%s: sb_acc < m->m_len",
1131 __func__));
1132 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
1133 sb->sb_acc -= m->m_len;
1134 sb->sb_tlscc += m->m_len;
1135 sb->sb_mtlstail = m;
1136 }
1137 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc == 0 && sb->sb_tlscc == sb->sb_ccc,
1138 ("%s: acc %u tlscc %u ccc %u", __func__, sb->sb_acc, sb->sb_tlscc,
1139 sb->sb_ccc));
1140 }
1141
1142 /*
1143 * Return information about the pending TLS data in a socket
1144 * buffer. On return, 'seqno' is set to the sequence number
1145 * of the next TLS record to be received, 'resid' is set to
1146 * the amount of bytes still needed for the last pending
1147 * record. The function returns 'false' if the last pending
1148 * record contains a partial TLS header. In that case, 'resid'
1149 * is the number of bytes needed to complete the TLS header.
1150 */
1151 bool
1152 ktls_pending_rx_info(struct sockbuf *sb, uint64_t *seqnop, size_t *residp)
1153 {
1154 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
1155 struct mbuf *m;
1156 uint64_t seqno;
1157 size_t resid;
1158 u_int offset, record_len;
1159
1160 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1161 MPASS(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX);
1162 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1163 resid = sb->sb_tlscc;
1164 m = sb->sb_mtls;
1165 offset = 0;
1166
1167 if (resid == 0) {
1168 *seqnop = seqno;
1169 *residp = 0;
1170 return (true);
1171 }
1172
1173 for (;;) {
1174 seqno++;
1175
1176 if (resid < sizeof(hdr)) {
1177 *seqnop = seqno;
1178 *residp = sizeof(hdr) - resid;
1179 return (false);
1180 }
1181
1182 m_copydata(m, offset, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
1183
1184 record_len = sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length);
1185 if (resid <= record_len) {
1186 *seqnop = seqno;
1187 *residp = record_len - resid;
1188 return (true);
1189 }
1190 resid -= record_len;
1191
1192 while (record_len != 0) {
1193 if (m->m_len - offset > record_len) {
1194 offset += record_len;
1195 break;
1196 }
1197
1198 record_len -= (m->m_len - offset);
1199 offset = 0;
1200 m = m->m_next;
1201 }
1202 }
1203 }
1204
1205 int
1206 ktls_enable_rx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1207 {
1208 struct ktls_session *tls;
1209 int error;
1210
1211 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1212 return (ENOTSUP);
1213 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1214 return (EINVAL);
1215
1216 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1217
1218 /*
1219 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1220 * invokes this function.
1221 */
1222 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1223 return (EINVAL);
1224
1225 /*
1226 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1227 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1228 */
1229 if (so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1230 return (EALREADY);
1231
1232 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1233 return (ENOTSUP);
1234
1235 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_RX);
1236 if (error)
1237 return (error);
1238
1239 error = ktls_ocf_try(so, tls, KTLS_RX);
1240 if (error) {
1241 ktls_free(tls);
1242 return (error);
1243 }
1244
1245 /* Mark the socket as using TLS offload. */
1246 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1247 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1248 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info = tls;
1249 so->so_rcv.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX;
1250
1251 /* Mark existing data as not ready until it can be decrypted. */
1252 sb_mark_notready(&so->so_rcv);
1253 ktls_check_rx(&so->so_rcv);
1254 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1255
1256 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1257 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1258 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_RX);
1259 if (error)
1260 #endif
1261 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_RX, false);
1262 if (error)
1263 ktls_use_sw(tls);
1264
1265 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1266
1267 return (0);
1268 }
1269
1270 int
1271 ktls_enable_tx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1272 {
1273 struct ktls_session *tls;
1274 struct inpcb *inp;
1275 int error;
1276
1277 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1278 return (ENOTSUP);
1279 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1280 return (EINVAL);
1281
1282 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1283
1284 /*
1285 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1286 * invokes this function.
1287 */
1288 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1289 return (EINVAL);
1290
1291 /*
1292 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1293 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1294 */
1295 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1296 return (EALREADY);
1297
1298 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1299 return (ENOTSUP);
1300
1301 /* TLS requires ext pgs */
1302 if (mb_use_ext_pgs == 0)
1303 return (ENXIO);
1304
1305 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_TX);
1306 if (error)
1307 return (error);
1308
1309 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1310 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1311 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_TX);
1312 if (error)
1313 #endif
1314 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_TX, false);
1315 if (error)
1316 error = ktls_try_sw(so, tls, KTLS_TX);
1317
1318 if (error) {
1319 ktls_free(tls);
1320 return (error);
1321 }
1322
1323 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1324 if (error) {
1325 ktls_free(tls);
1326 return (error);
1327 }
1328
1329 /*
1330 * Write lock the INP when setting sb_tls_info so that
1331 * routines in tcp_ratelimit.c can read sb_tls_info while
1332 * holding the INP lock.
1333 */
1334 inp = so->so_pcb;
1335 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1336 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1337 so->so_snd.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1338 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls;
1339 if (tls->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW)
1340 so->so_snd.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_IFNET;
1341 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1342 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1343 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1344
1345 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1346
1347 return (0);
1348 }
1349
1350 int
1351 ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1352 {
1353 struct ktls_session *tls;
1354 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1355
1356 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1357 return (EINVAL);
1358 inp = so->so_pcb;
1359 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1360 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
1361 tls = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info;
1362 if (tls == NULL)
1363 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1364 else
1365 *modep = tls->mode;
1366 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1367 return (0);
1368 }
1369
1370 /*
1371 * ktls_get_rx_sequence - get the next TCP- and TLS- sequence number.
1372 *
1373 * This function gets information about the next TCP- and TLS-
1374 * sequence number to be processed by the TLS receive worker
1375 * thread. The information is extracted from the given "inpcb"
1376 * structure. The values are stored in host endian format at the two
1377 * given output pointer locations. The TCP sequence number points to
1378 * the beginning of the TLS header.
1379 *
1380 * This function returns zero on success, else a non-zero error code
1381 * is returned.
1382 */
1383 int
1384 ktls_get_rx_sequence(struct inpcb *inp, uint32_t *tcpseq, uint64_t *tlsseq)
1385 {
1386 struct socket *so;
1387 struct tcpcb *tp;
1388
1389 INP_RLOCK(inp);
1390 so = inp->inp_socket;
1391 if (__predict_false(so == NULL)) {
1392 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1393 return (EINVAL);
1394 }
1395 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1396 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1397 return (ECONNRESET);
1398 }
1399
1400 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1401 MPASS(tp != NULL);
1402
1403 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1404 *tcpseq = tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc;
1405 *tlsseq = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno;
1406 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1407
1408 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1409
1410 return (0);
1411 }
1412
1413 int
1414 ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1415 {
1416 struct ktls_session *tls;
1417 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1418
1419 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1420 return (EINVAL);
1421 inp = so->so_pcb;
1422 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1423 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so);
1424 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1425 if (tls == NULL)
1426 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1427 else
1428 *modep = tls->mode;
1429 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1430 return (0);
1431 }
1432
1433 /*
1434 * Switch between SW and ifnet TLS sessions as requested.
1435 */
1436 int
1437 ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int mode)
1438 {
1439 struct ktls_session *tls, *tls_new;
1440 struct inpcb *inp;
1441 int error;
1442
1443 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1444 return (EINVAL);
1445 switch (mode) {
1446 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1447 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1448 break;
1449 default:
1450 return (EINVAL);
1451 }
1452
1453 inp = so->so_pcb;
1454 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1455 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1456 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1457 if (tls == NULL) {
1458 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1459 return (0);
1460 }
1461
1462 if (tls->mode == mode) {
1463 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1464 return (0);
1465 }
1466
1467 tls = ktls_hold(tls);
1468 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1469 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1470
1471 tls_new = ktls_clone_session(tls, KTLS_TX);
1472
1473 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1474 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX, true);
1475 else
1476 error = ktls_try_sw(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX);
1477 if (error) {
1478 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1479 ktls_free(tls_new);
1480 ktls_free(tls);
1481 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1482 return (error);
1483 }
1484
1485 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1486 if (error) {
1487 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1488 ktls_free(tls_new);
1489 ktls_free(tls);
1490 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1491 return (error);
1492 }
1493
1494 /*
1495 * If we raced with another session change, keep the existing
1496 * session.
1497 */
1498 if (tls != so->so_snd.sb_tls_info) {
1499 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1500 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1501 ktls_free(tls_new);
1502 ktls_free(tls);
1503 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1504 return (EBUSY);
1505 }
1506
1507 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1508 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1509 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls_new;
1510 if (tls_new->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW)
1511 so->so_snd.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_IFNET;
1512 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1513 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1514
1515 /*
1516 * Drop two references on 'tls'. The first is for the
1517 * ktls_hold() above. The second drops the reference from the
1518 * socket buffer.
1519 */
1520 KASSERT(tls->refcount >= 2, ("too few references on old session"));
1521 ktls_free(tls);
1522 ktls_free(tls);
1523
1524 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1525 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_ifnet, 1);
1526 else
1527 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_sw, 1);
1528
1529 return (0);
1530 }
1531
1532 /*
1533 * Try to allocate a new TLS receive tag. This task is scheduled when
1534 * sbappend_ktls_rx detects an input path change. If a new tag is
1535 * allocated, replace the tag in the TLS session. If a new tag cannot
1536 * be allocated, let the session fall back to software decryption.
1537 */
1538 static void
1539 ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending)
1540 {
1541 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
1542 struct ktls_session *tls;
1543 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1544 struct inpcb *inp;
1545 struct ifnet *ifp;
1546 struct socket *so;
1547 int error;
1548
1549 MPASS(pending == 1);
1550
1551 tls = context;
1552 so = tls->so;
1553 inp = so->so_pcb;
1554 ifp = NULL;
1555
1556 INP_RLOCK(inp);
1557 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1558 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1559 goto out;
1560 }
1561
1562 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1563 mst = tls->snd_tag;
1564 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1565 if (mst != NULL)
1566 m_snd_tag_rele(mst);
1567
1568 ifp = tls->rx_ifp;
1569 if_ref(ifp);
1570 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1571
1572 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
1573 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
1574 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
1575 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
1576 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
1577 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
1578 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = tls->rx_vlan_id;
1579 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1580
1581 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
1582 if ((ifp->if_capenable2 & IFCAP2_RXTLS6) == 0)
1583 goto out;
1584 } else {
1585 if ((ifp->if_capenable2 & IFCAP2_RXTLS4) == 0)
1586 goto out;
1587 }
1588
1589 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, &mst);
1590 if (error == 0) {
1591 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1592 tls->snd_tag = mst;
1593 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1594
1595 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1596 } else {
1597 /*
1598 * Just fall back to software decryption if a tag
1599 * cannot be allocated leaving the connection intact.
1600 * If a future input path change switches to another
1601 * interface this connection will resume ifnet TLS.
1602 */
1603 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1604 }
1605
1606 out:
1607 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1608 tls->reset_pending = false;
1609 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1610
1611 if (ifp != NULL)
1612 if_rele(ifp);
1613 sorele(so);
1614 ktls_free(tls);
1615 }
1616
1617 /*
1618 * Try to allocate a new TLS send tag. This task is scheduled when
1619 * ip_output detects a route change while trying to transmit a packet
1620 * holding a TLS record. If a new tag is allocated, replace the tag
1621 * in the TLS session. Subsequent packets on the connection will use
1622 * the new tag. If a new tag cannot be allocated, drop the
1623 * connection.
1624 */
1625 static void
1626 ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending)
1627 {
1628 struct epoch_tracker et;
1629 struct ktls_session *tls;
1630 struct m_snd_tag *old, *new;
1631 struct inpcb *inp;
1632 struct tcpcb *tp;
1633 int error;
1634
1635 MPASS(pending == 1);
1636
1637 tls = context;
1638 inp = tls->inp;
1639
1640 /*
1641 * Free the old tag first before allocating a new one.
1642 * ip[6]_output_send() will treat a NULL send tag the same as
1643 * an ifp mismatch and drop packets until a new tag is
1644 * allocated.
1645 *
1646 * Write-lock the INP when changing tls->snd_tag since
1647 * ip[6]_output_send() holds a read-lock when reading the
1648 * pointer.
1649 */
1650 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1651 old = tls->snd_tag;
1652 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1653 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1654 if (old != NULL)
1655 m_snd_tag_rele(old);
1656
1657 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(inp, tls, true, &new);
1658
1659 if (error == 0) {
1660 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1661 tls->snd_tag = new;
1662 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1663 tls->reset_pending = false;
1664 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1665 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp))
1666 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1667
1668 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1669
1670 /*
1671 * XXX: Should we kick tcp_output explicitly now that
1672 * the send tag is fixed or just rely on timers?
1673 */
1674 } else {
1675 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
1676 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1677 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp)) {
1678 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
1679 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1680 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
1681 tp = tcp_drop(tp, ECONNABORTED);
1682 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1683 if (tp != NULL)
1684 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1685 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 1);
1686 } else
1687 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1688 }
1689 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et);
1690
1691 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1692
1693 /*
1694 * Leave reset_pending true to avoid future tasks while
1695 * the socket goes away.
1696 */
1697 }
1698
1699 ktls_free(tls);
1700 }
1701
1702 void
1703 ktls_input_ifp_mismatch(struct sockbuf *sb, struct ifnet *ifp)
1704 {
1705 struct ktls_session *tls;
1706 struct socket *so;
1707
1708 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1709 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
1710 __func__, sb));
1711 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
1712
1713 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
1714 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1715 if_ref(ifp);
1716 tls->rx_ifp = ifp;
1717
1718 /*
1719 * See if we should schedule a task to update the receive tag for
1720 * this session.
1721 */
1722 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1723 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1724 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1725 soref(so);
1726 tls->so = so;
1727 tls->reset_pending = true;
1728 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1729 }
1730 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1731 }
1732
1733 int
1734 ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls)
1735 {
1736
1737 if (inp == NULL)
1738 return (ENOBUFS);
1739
1740 INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1741
1742 /*
1743 * See if we should schedule a task to update the send tag for
1744 * this session.
1745 */
1746 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1747 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1748 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1749 in_pcbref(inp);
1750 tls->inp = inp;
1751 tls->reset_pending = true;
1752 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1753 }
1754 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1755 return (ENOBUFS);
1756 }
1757
1758 #ifdef RATELIMIT
1759 int
1760 ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session *tls, uint64_t max_pacing_rate)
1761 {
1762 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params = {
1763 .rate_limit.max_rate = max_pacing_rate,
1764 .rate_limit.flags = M_NOWAIT,
1765 };
1766 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1767
1768 /* Can't get to the inp, but it should be locked. */
1769 /* INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); */
1770
1771 MPASS(tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET);
1772
1773 if (tls->snd_tag == NULL) {
1774 /*
1775 * Resetting send tag, ignore this change. The
1776 * pending reset may or may not see this updated rate
1777 * in the tcpcb. If it doesn't, we will just lose
1778 * this rate change.
1779 */
1780 return (0);
1781 }
1782
1783 mst = tls->snd_tag;
1784
1785 MPASS(mst != NULL);
1786 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT);
1787
1788 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
1789 }
1790 #endif
1791 #endif
1792
1793 void
1794 ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session *tls)
1795 {
1796 MPASS(tls->refcount == 0);
1797
1798 if (tls->sequential_records) {
1799 struct mbuf *m, *n;
1800 int page_count;
1801
1802 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq, n) {
1803 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
1804 while (page_count > 0) {
1805 KASSERT(page_count >= m->m_epg_nrdy,
1806 ("%s: too few pages", __func__));
1807 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
1808 m = m_free(m);
1809 }
1810 }
1811 }
1812
1813 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, -1);
1814 switch (tls->mode) {
1815 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1816 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1817 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1818 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, -1);
1819 break;
1820 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1821 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, -1);
1822 break;
1823 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1824 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, -1);
1825 break;
1826 }
1827 break;
1828 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1829 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1830 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1831 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, -1);
1832 break;
1833 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1834 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, -1);
1835 break;
1836 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1837 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, -1);
1838 break;
1839 }
1840 if (tls->snd_tag != NULL)
1841 m_snd_tag_rele(tls->snd_tag);
1842 if (tls->rx_ifp != NULL)
1843 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1844 break;
1845 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1846 case TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE:
1847 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1848 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1849 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, -1);
1850 break;
1851 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1852 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, -1);
1853 break;
1854 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1855 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, -1);
1856 break;
1857 }
1858 break;
1859 #endif
1860 }
1861 if (tls->ocf_session != NULL)
1862 ktls_ocf_free(tls);
1863 if (tls->params.auth_key != NULL) {
1864 zfree(tls->params.auth_key, M_KTLS);
1865 tls->params.auth_key = NULL;
1866 tls->params.auth_key_len = 0;
1867 }
1868 if (tls->params.cipher_key != NULL) {
1869 zfree(tls->params.cipher_key, M_KTLS);
1870 tls->params.cipher_key = NULL;
1871 tls->params.cipher_key_len = 0;
1872 }
1873 explicit_bzero(tls->params.iv, sizeof(tls->params.iv));
1874
1875 uma_zfree(ktls_session_zone, tls);
1876 }
1877
1878 void
1879 ktls_seq(struct sockbuf *sb, struct mbuf *m)
1880 {
1881
1882 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1883 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
1884 ("ktls_seq: mapped mbuf %p", m));
1885
1886 m->m_epg_seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1887 sb->sb_tls_seqno++;
1888 }
1889 }
1890
1891 /*
1892 * Add TLS framing (headers and trailers) to a chain of mbufs. Each
1893 * mbuf in the chain must be an unmapped mbuf. The payload of the
1894 * mbuf must be populated with the payload of each TLS record.
1895 *
1896 * The record_type argument specifies the TLS record type used when
1897 * populating the TLS header.
1898 *
1899 * The enq_count argument on return is set to the number of pages of
1900 * payload data for this entire chain that need to be encrypted via SW
1901 * encryption. The returned value should be passed to ktls_enqueue
1902 * when scheduling encryption of this chain of mbufs. To handle the
1903 * special case of empty fragments for TLS 1.0 sessions, an empty
1904 * fragment counts as one page.
1905 */
1906 void
1907 ktls_frame(struct mbuf *top, struct ktls_session *tls, int *enq_cnt,
1908 uint8_t record_type)
1909 {
1910 struct tls_record_layer *tlshdr;
1911 struct mbuf *m;
1912 uint64_t *noncep;
1913 uint16_t tls_len;
1914 int maxlen __diagused;
1915
1916 maxlen = tls->params.max_frame_len;
1917 *enq_cnt = 0;
1918 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1919 /*
1920 * All mbufs in the chain should be TLS records whose
1921 * payload does not exceed the maximum frame length.
1922 *
1923 * Empty TLS 1.0 records are permitted when using CBC.
1924 */
1925 KASSERT(m->m_len <= maxlen && m->m_len >= 0 &&
1926 (m->m_len > 0 || ktls_permit_empty_frames(tls)),
1927 ("ktls_frame: m %p len %d", m, m->m_len));
1928
1929 /*
1930 * TLS frames require unmapped mbufs to store session
1931 * info.
1932 */
1933 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
1934 ("ktls_frame: mapped mbuf %p (top = %p)", m, top));
1935
1936 tls_len = m->m_len;
1937
1938 /* Save a reference to the session. */
1939 m->m_epg_tls = ktls_hold(tls);
1940
1941 m->m_epg_hdrlen = tls->params.tls_hlen;
1942 m->m_epg_trllen = tls->params.tls_tlen;
1943 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC) {
1944 int bs, delta;
1945
1946 /*
1947 * AES-CBC pads messages to a multiple of the
1948 * block size. Note that the padding is
1949 * applied after the digest and the encryption
1950 * is done on the "plaintext || mac || padding".
1951 * At least one byte of padding is always
1952 * present.
1953 *
1954 * Compute the final trailer length assuming
1955 * at most one block of padding.
1956 * tls->params.tls_tlen is the maximum
1957 * possible trailer length (padding + digest).
1958 * delta holds the number of excess padding
1959 * bytes if the maximum were used. Those
1960 * extra bytes are removed.
1961 */
1962 bs = tls->params.tls_bs;
1963 delta = (tls_len + tls->params.tls_tlen) & (bs - 1);
1964 m->m_epg_trllen -= delta;
1965 }
1966 m->m_len += m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen;
1967
1968 /* Populate the TLS header. */
1969 tlshdr = (void *)m->m_epg_hdr;
1970 tlshdr->tls_vmajor = tls->params.tls_vmajor;
1971
1972 /*
1973 * TLS 1.3 masquarades as TLS 1.2 with a record type
1974 * of TLS_RLTYPE_APP.
1975 */
1976 if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE &&
1977 tls->params.tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) {
1978 tlshdr->tls_vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
1979 tlshdr->tls_type = TLS_RLTYPE_APP;
1980 /* save the real record type for later */
1981 m->m_epg_record_type = record_type;
1982 m->m_epg_trail[0] = record_type;
1983 } else {
1984 tlshdr->tls_vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
1985 tlshdr->tls_type = record_type;
1986 }
1987 tlshdr->tls_length = htons(m->m_len - sizeof(*tlshdr));
1988
1989 /*
1990 * Store nonces / explicit IVs after the end of the
1991 * TLS header.
1992 *
1993 * For GCM with TLS 1.2, an 8 byte nonce is copied
1994 * from the end of the IV. The nonce is then
1995 * incremented for use by the next record.
1996 *
1997 * For CBC, a random nonce is inserted for TLS 1.1+.
1998 */
1999 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
2000 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) {
2001 noncep = (uint64_t *)(tls->params.iv + 8);
2002 be64enc(tlshdr + 1, *noncep);
2003 (*noncep)++;
2004 } else if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2005 tls->params.tls_vminor >= TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE)
2006 arc4rand(tlshdr + 1, AES_BLOCK_LEN, 0);
2007
2008 /*
2009 * When using SW encryption, mark the mbuf not ready.
2010 * It will be marked ready via sbready() after the
2011 * record has been encrypted.
2012 *
2013 * When using ifnet TLS, unencrypted TLS records are
2014 * sent down the stack to the NIC.
2015 */
2016 if (tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
2017 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
2018 if (__predict_false(tls_len == 0)) {
2019 /* TLS 1.0 empty fragment. */
2020 m->m_epg_nrdy = 1;
2021 } else
2022 m->m_epg_nrdy = m->m_epg_npgs;
2023 *enq_cnt += m->m_epg_nrdy;
2024 }
2025 }
2026 }
2027
2028 bool
2029 ktls_permit_empty_frames(struct ktls_session *tls)
2030 {
2031 return (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2032 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO);
2033 }
2034
2035 void
2036 ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf *sb)
2037 {
2038 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
2039 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2040 struct socket *so;
2041 bool running;
2042
2043 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2044 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
2045 __func__, sb));
2046 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
2047
2048 if (sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING)
2049 return;
2050
2051 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2052 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr)) {
2053 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc != 0)
2054 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2055 return;
2056 }
2057
2058 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
2059
2060 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2061 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length)) {
2062 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0)
2063 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2064 return;
2065 }
2066
2067 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2068
2069 soref(so);
2070 wq = &ktls_wq[so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->wq_index];
2071 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2072 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->so_head, so, so_ktls_rx_list);
2073 running = wq->running;
2074 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2075 if (!running)
2076 wakeup(wq);
2077 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 1);
2078 }
2079
2080 static struct mbuf *
2081 ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf *sb, int len)
2082 {
2083 struct mbuf *m, *n, *top;
2084 int remain;
2085
2086 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2087 MPASS(len <= sb->sb_tlscc);
2088
2089 /*
2090 * If TLS chain is the exact size of the record,
2091 * just grab the whole record.
2092 */
2093 top = sb->sb_mtls;
2094 if (sb->sb_tlscc == len) {
2095 sb->sb_mtls = NULL;
2096 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2097 goto out;
2098 }
2099
2100 /*
2101 * While it would be nice to use m_split() here, we need
2102 * to know exactly what m_split() allocates to update the
2103 * accounting, so do it inline instead.
2104 */
2105 remain = len;
2106 for (m = top; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next)
2107 remain -= m->m_len;
2108
2109 /* Easy case: don't have to split 'm'. */
2110 if (remain == m->m_len) {
2111 sb->sb_mtls = m->m_next;
2112 if (sb->sb_mtls == NULL)
2113 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2114 m->m_next = NULL;
2115 goto out;
2116 }
2117
2118 /*
2119 * Need to allocate an mbuf to hold the remainder of 'm'. Try
2120 * with M_NOWAIT first.
2121 */
2122 n = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
2123 if (n == NULL) {
2124 /*
2125 * Use M_WAITOK with socket buffer unlocked. If
2126 * 'sb_mtls' changes while the lock is dropped, return
2127 * NULL to force the caller to retry.
2128 */
2129 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2130
2131 n = m_get(M_WAITOK, MT_DATA);
2132
2133 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2134 if (sb->sb_mtls != top) {
2135 m_free(n);
2136 return (NULL);
2137 }
2138 }
2139 n->m_flags |= (m->m_flags & (M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED));
2140
2141 /* Store remainder in 'n'. */
2142 n->m_len = m->m_len - remain;
2143 if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) {
2144 n->m_data = m->m_data + remain;
2145 mb_dupcl(n, m);
2146 } else {
2147 bcopy(mtod(m, caddr_t) + remain, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len);
2148 }
2149
2150 /* Trim 'm' and update accounting. */
2151 m->m_len -= n->m_len;
2152 sb->sb_tlscc -= n->m_len;
2153 sb->sb_ccc -= n->m_len;
2154
2155 /* Account for 'n'. */
2156 sballoc_ktls_rx(sb, n);
2157
2158 /* Insert 'n' into the TLS chain. */
2159 sb->sb_mtls = n;
2160 n->m_next = m->m_next;
2161 if (sb->sb_mtlstail == m)
2162 sb->sb_mtlstail = n;
2163
2164 /* Detach the record from the TLS chain. */
2165 m->m_next = NULL;
2166
2167 out:
2168 MPASS(m_length(top, NULL) == len);
2169 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next)
2170 sbfree_ktls_rx(sb, m);
2171 sb->sb_tlsdcc = len;
2172 sb->sb_ccc += len;
2173 SBCHECK(sb);
2174 return (top);
2175 }
2176
2177 /*
2178 * Determine the length of the trailing zero padding and find the real
2179 * record type in the byte before the padding.
2180 *
2181 * Walking the mbuf chain backwards is clumsy, so another option would
2182 * be to scan forwards remembering the last non-zero byte before the
2183 * trailer. However, it would be expensive to scan the entire record.
2184 * Instead, find the last non-zero byte of each mbuf in the chain
2185 * keeping track of the relative offset of that nonzero byte.
2186 *
2187 * trail_len is the size of the MAC/tag on input and is set to the
2188 * size of the full trailer including padding and the record type on
2189 * return.
2190 */
2191 static int
2192 tls13_find_record_type(struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, int tls_len,
2193 int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_typep)
2194 {
2195 char *cp;
2196 u_int digest_start, last_offset, m_len, offset;
2197 uint8_t record_type;
2198
2199 digest_start = tls_len - *trailer_len;
2200 last_offset = 0;
2201 offset = 0;
2202 for (; m != NULL && offset < digest_start;
2203 offset += m->m_len, m = m->m_next) {
2204 /* Don't look for padding in the tag. */
2205 m_len = min(digest_start - offset, m->m_len);
2206 cp = mtod(m, char *);
2207
2208 /* Find last non-zero byte in this mbuf. */
2209 while (m_len > 0 && cp[m_len - 1] == 0)
2210 m_len--;
2211 if (m_len > 0) {
2212 record_type = cp[m_len - 1];
2213 last_offset = offset + m_len;
2214 }
2215 }
2216 if (last_offset < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2217 return (EBADMSG);
2218
2219 *record_typep = record_type;
2220 *trailer_len = tls_len - last_offset + 1;
2221 return (0);
2222 }
2223
2224 /*
2225 * Check if a mbuf chain is fully decrypted at the given offset and
2226 * length. Returns KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED if all data is
2227 * decrypted. KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED if there is a mix of encrypted
2228 * and decrypted data. Else KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED if all data
2229 * is encrypted.
2230 */
2231 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t
2232 ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(struct mbuf *mb, int offset, int len)
2233 {
2234 int m_flags_ored = 0;
2235 int m_flags_anded = -1;
2236
2237 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2238 if (offset < mb->m_len)
2239 break;
2240 offset -= mb->m_len;
2241 }
2242 offset += len;
2243
2244 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2245 m_flags_ored |= mb->m_flags;
2246 m_flags_anded &= mb->m_flags;
2247
2248 if (offset <= mb->m_len)
2249 break;
2250 offset -= mb->m_len;
2251 }
2252 MPASS(mb != NULL || offset == 0);
2253
2254 if ((m_flags_ored ^ m_flags_anded) & M_DECRYPTED)
2255 return (KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED);
2256 else
2257 return ((m_flags_ored & M_DECRYPTED) ?
2258 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED :
2259 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED);
2260 }
2261
2262 /*
2263 * ktls_resync_ifnet - get HW TLS RX back on track after packet loss
2264 */
2265 static int
2266 ktls_resync_ifnet(struct socket *so, uint32_t tls_len, uint64_t tls_rcd_num)
2267 {
2268 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params;
2269 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
2270 struct inpcb *inp;
2271 struct tcpcb *tp;
2272
2273 mst = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->snd_tag;
2274 if (__predict_false(mst == NULL))
2275 return (EINVAL);
2276
2277 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2278 if (__predict_false(inp == NULL))
2279 return (EINVAL);
2280
2281 INP_RLOCK(inp);
2282 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
2283 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
2284 return (ECONNRESET);
2285 }
2286
2287 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2288 MPASS(tp != NULL);
2289
2290 /* Get the TCP sequence number of the next valid TLS header. */
2291 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2292 params.tls_rx.tls_hdr_tcp_sn =
2293 tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc - tls_len;
2294 params.tls_rx.tls_rec_length = tls_len;
2295 params.tls_rx.tls_seq_number = tls_rcd_num;
2296 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2297
2298 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
2299
2300 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX);
2301 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
2302 }
2303
2304 static void
2305 ktls_drop(struct socket *so, int error)
2306 {
2307 struct epoch_tracker et;
2308 struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2309 struct tcpcb *tp;
2310
2311 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
2312 INP_WLOCK(inp);
2313 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
2314 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2315 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
2316 tp = tcp_drop(tp, error);
2317 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2318 if (tp != NULL)
2319 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
2320 } else {
2321 so->so_error = error;
2322 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
2323 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2324 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
2325 }
2326 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et);
2327 }
2328
2329 static void
2330 ktls_decrypt(struct socket *so)
2331 {
2332 char tls_header[MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN];
2333 struct ktls_session *tls;
2334 struct sockbuf *sb;
2335 struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
2336 struct tls_get_record tgr;
2337 struct mbuf *control, *data, *m;
2338 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t state;
2339 uint64_t seqno;
2340 int error, remain, tls_len, trail_len;
2341 bool tls13;
2342 uint8_t vminor, record_type;
2343
2344 hdr = (struct tls_record_layer *)tls_header;
2345 sb = &so->so_rcv;
2346 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2347 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING,
2348 ("%s: socket %p not running", __func__, so));
2349
2350 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
2351 MPASS(tls != NULL);
2352
2353 tls13 = (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE);
2354 if (tls13)
2355 vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
2356 else
2357 vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
2358 for (;;) {
2359 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2360 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2361 break;
2362
2363 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, tls->params.tls_hlen, tls_header);
2364 tls_len = sizeof(*hdr) + ntohs(hdr->tls_length);
2365
2366 if (hdr->tls_vmajor != tls->params.tls_vmajor ||
2367 hdr->tls_vminor != vminor)
2368 error = EINVAL;
2369 else if (tls13 && hdr->tls_type != TLS_RLTYPE_APP)
2370 error = EINVAL;
2371 else if (tls_len < tls->params.tls_hlen || tls_len >
2372 tls->params.tls_hlen + TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 +
2373 tls->params.tls_tlen)
2374 error = EMSGSIZE;
2375 else
2376 error = 0;
2377 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2378 /*
2379 * We have a corrupted record and are likely
2380 * out of sync. The connection isn't
2381 * recoverable at this point, so abort it.
2382 */
2383 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2384 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_corrupted_records, 1);
2385
2386 ktls_drop(so, error);
2387 goto deref;
2388 }
2389
2390 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2391 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls_len)
2392 break;
2393
2394 /*
2395 * Split out the portion of the mbuf chain containing
2396 * this TLS record.
2397 */
2398 data = ktls_detach_record(sb, tls_len);
2399 if (data == NULL)
2400 continue;
2401 MPASS(sb->sb_tlsdcc == tls_len);
2402
2403 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
2404 sb->sb_tls_seqno++;
2405 SBCHECK(sb);
2406 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2407
2408 /* get crypto state for this TLS record */
2409 state = ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(data, 0, tls_len);
2410
2411 switch (state) {
2412 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED:
2413 error = ktls_ocf_recrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno);
2414 if (error)
2415 break;
2416 /* FALLTHROUGH */
2417 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED:
2418 error = ktls_ocf_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno,
2419 &trail_len);
2420 if (__predict_true(error == 0)) {
2421 if (tls13) {
2422 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2423 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2424 } else {
2425 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2426 }
2427 }
2428 break;
2429 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED:
2430 /*
2431 * NIC TLS is only supported for AEAD
2432 * ciphersuites which used a fixed sized
2433 * trailer.
2434 */
2435 if (tls13) {
2436 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen - 1;
2437 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2438 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2439 } else {
2440 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen;
2441 error = 0;
2442 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2443 }
2444 break;
2445 default:
2446 error = EINVAL;
2447 break;
2448 }
2449 if (error) {
2450 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2451
2452 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2453 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2454 /*
2455 * sbcut/drop/flush discarded these
2456 * mbufs.
2457 */
2458 m_freem(data);
2459 break;
2460 }
2461
2462 /*
2463 * Drop this TLS record's data, but keep
2464 * decrypting subsequent records.
2465 */
2466 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2467 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0;
2468
2469 if (error != EMSGSIZE)
2470 error = EBADMSG;
2471 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2472 so->so_error = error;
2473 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2474 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2475
2476 m_freem(data);
2477
2478 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2479 continue;
2480 }
2481
2482 /* Allocate the control mbuf. */
2483 memset(&tgr, 0, sizeof(tgr));
2484 tgr.tls_type = record_type;
2485 tgr.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
2486 tgr.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
2487 tgr.tls_length = htobe16(tls_len - tls->params.tls_hlen -
2488 trail_len);
2489 control = sbcreatecontrol(&tgr, sizeof(tgr),
2490 TLS_GET_RECORD, IPPROTO_TCP, M_WAITOK);
2491
2492 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2493 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2494 /* sbcut/drop/flush discarded these mbufs. */
2495 MPASS(sb->sb_tlscc == 0);
2496 m_freem(data);
2497 m_freem(control);
2498 break;
2499 }
2500
2501 /*
2502 * Clear the 'dcc' accounting in preparation for
2503 * adding the decrypted record.
2504 */
2505 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2506 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0;
2507 SBCHECK(sb);
2508
2509 /* If there is no payload, drop all of the data. */
2510 if (tgr.tls_length == htobe16(0)) {
2511 m_freem(data);
2512 data = NULL;
2513 } else {
2514 /* Trim header. */
2515 remain = tls->params.tls_hlen;
2516 while (remain > 0) {
2517 if (data->m_len > remain) {
2518 data->m_data += remain;
2519 data->m_len -= remain;
2520 break;
2521 }
2522 remain -= data->m_len;
2523 data = m_free(data);
2524 }
2525
2526 /* Trim trailer and clear M_NOTREADY. */
2527 remain = be16toh(tgr.tls_length);
2528 m = data;
2529 for (m = data; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) {
2530 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2531 remain -= m->m_len;
2532 }
2533 m->m_len = remain;
2534 m_freem(m->m_next);
2535 m->m_next = NULL;
2536 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2537
2538 /* Set EOR on the final mbuf. */
2539 m->m_flags |= M_EOR;
2540 }
2541
2542 sbappendcontrol_locked(sb, data, control, 0);
2543
2544 if (__predict_false(state != KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED)) {
2545 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2546 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2547 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, tls_len, seqno);
2548 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2549 } else if (__predict_false(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC)) {
2550 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2551 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2552 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, 0, seqno);
2553 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2554 }
2555 }
2556
2557 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2558
2559 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc > 0)
2560 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2561
2562 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2563
2564 deref:
2565 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2566
2567 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2568 sorele(so);
2569 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2570 }
2571
2572 void
2573 ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf *m)
2574 {
2575 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2576 bool running;
2577
2578 /* Mark it for freeing. */
2579 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_2FREE;
2580 wq = &ktls_wq[m->m_epg_tls->wq_index];
2581 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2582 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2583 running = wq->running;
2584 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2585 if (!running)
2586 wakeup(wq);
2587 }
2588
2589 static void *
2590 ktls_buffer_alloc(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m)
2591 {
2592 void *buf;
2593 int domain, running;
2594
2595 if (m->m_epg_npgs <= 2)
2596 return (NULL);
2597 if (ktls_buffer_zone == NULL)
2598 return (NULL);
2599 if ((u_int)(ticks - wq->lastallocfail) < hz) {
2600 /*
2601 * Rate-limit allocation attempts after a failure.
2602 * ktls_buffer_import() will acquire a per-domain mutex to check
2603 * the free page queues and may fail consistently if memory is
2604 * fragmented.
2605 */
2606 return (NULL);
2607 }
2608 buf = uma_zalloc(ktls_buffer_zone, M_NOWAIT | M_NORECLAIM);
2609 if (buf == NULL) {
2610 domain = PCPU_GET(domain);
2611 wq->lastallocfail = ticks;
2612
2613 /*
2614 * Note that this check is "racy", but the races are
2615 * harmless, and are either a spurious wakeup if
2616 * multiple threads fail allocations before the alloc
2617 * thread wakes, or waiting an extra second in case we
2618 * see an old value of running == true.
2619 */
2620 if (!VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain)) {
2621 running = atomic_load_int(&ktls_domains[domain].alloc_td.running);
2622 if (!running)
2623 wakeup(&ktls_domains[domain].alloc_td);
2624 }
2625 }
2626 return (buf);
2627 }
2628
2629 static int
2630 ktls_encrypt_record(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m,
2631 struct ktls_session *tls, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2632 {
2633 vm_page_t pg;
2634 int error, i, len, off;
2635
2636 KASSERT((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY),
2637 ("%p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2638 KASSERT(ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs) <= ktls_maxlen,
2639 ("page count %d larger than maximum frame length %d", m->m_epg_npgs,
2640 ktls_maxlen));
2641
2642 /* Anonymous mbufs are encrypted in place. */
2643 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) != 0)
2644 return (ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, NULL, 0));
2645
2646 /*
2647 * For file-backed mbufs (from sendfile), anonymous wired
2648 * pages are allocated and used as the encryption destination.
2649 */
2650 if ((state->cbuf = ktls_buffer_alloc(wq, m)) != NULL) {
2651 len = ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs - 1) + m->m_epg_last_len -
2652 m->m_epg_1st_off;
2653 state->dst_iov[0].iov_base = (char *)state->cbuf +
2654 m->m_epg_1st_off;
2655 state->dst_iov[0].iov_len = len;
2656 state->parray[0] = DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)state->cbuf);
2657 i = 1;
2658 } else {
2659 off = m->m_epg_1st_off;
2660 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++, off = 0) {
2661 pg = vm_page_alloc_noobj(VM_ALLOC_NODUMP |
2662 VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_WAITOK);
2663 len = m_epg_pagelen(m, i, off);
2664 state->parray[i] = VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg);
2665 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base =
2666 (char *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(state->parray[i]) + off;
2667 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = len;
2668 }
2669 }
2670 KASSERT(i + 1 <= nitems(state->dst_iov), ("dst_iov is too small"));
2671 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base = m->m_epg_trail;
2672 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = m->m_epg_trllen;
2673
2674 error = ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, state->dst_iov, i + 1);
2675
2676 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2677 /* Free the anonymous pages. */
2678 if (state->cbuf != NULL)
2679 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, state->cbuf);
2680 else {
2681 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) {
2682 pg = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(state->parray[i]);
2683 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(pg);
2684 vm_page_free(pg);
2685 }
2686 }
2687 }
2688 return (error);
2689 }
2690
2691 /* Number of TLS records in a batch passed to ktls_enqueue(). */
2692 static u_int
2693 ktls_batched_records(struct mbuf *m)
2694 {
2695 int page_count, records;
2696
2697 records = 0;
2698 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2699 while (page_count > 0) {
2700 records++;
2701 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
2702 m = m->m_next;
2703 }
2704 KASSERT(page_count == 0, ("%s: mismatched page count", __func__));
2705 return (records);
2706 }
2707
2708 void
2709 ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, int page_count)
2710 {
2711 struct ktls_session *tls;
2712 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2713 int queued;
2714 bool running;
2715
2716 KASSERT(((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) ==
2717 (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)),
2718 ("ktls_enqueue: %p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2719 KASSERT(page_count != 0, ("enqueueing TLS mbuf with zero page count"));
2720
2721 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW, ("!SW TLS mbuf"));
2722
2723 m->m_epg_enc_cnt = page_count;
2724
2725 /*
2726 * Save a pointer to the socket. The caller is responsible
2727 * for taking an additional reference via soref().
2728 */
2729 m->m_epg_so = so;
2730
2731 queued = 1;
2732 tls = m->m_epg_tls;
2733 wq = &ktls_wq[tls->wq_index];
2734 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2735 if (__predict_false(tls->sequential_records)) {
2736 /*
2737 * For TLS 1.0, records must be encrypted
2738 * sequentially. For a given connection, all records
2739 * queued to the associated work queue are processed
2740 * sequentially. However, sendfile(2) might complete
2741 * I/O requests spanning multiple TLS records out of
2742 * order. Here we ensure TLS records are enqueued to
2743 * the work queue in FIFO order.
2744 *
2745 * tls->next_seqno holds the sequence number of the
2746 * next TLS record that should be enqueued to the work
2747 * queue. If this next record is not tls->next_seqno,
2748 * it must be a future record, so insert it, sorted by
2749 * TLS sequence number, into tls->pending_records and
2750 * return.
2751 *
2752 * If this TLS record matches tls->next_seqno, place
2753 * it in the work queue and then check
2754 * tls->pending_records to see if any
2755 * previously-queued records are now ready for
2756 * encryption.
2757 */
2758 if (m->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno) {
2759 struct mbuf *n, *p;
2760
2761 p = NULL;
2762 STAILQ_FOREACH(n, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq) {
2763 if (n->m_epg_seqno > m->m_epg_seqno)
2764 break;
2765 p = n;
2766 }
2767 if (n == NULL)
2768 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tls->pending_records, m,
2769 m_epg_stailq);
2770 else if (p == NULL)
2771 STAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m,
2772 m_epg_stailq);
2773 else
2774 STAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(&tls->pending_records, p, m,
2775 m_epg_stailq);
2776 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2777 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, 1);
2778 return;
2779 }
2780
2781 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(m);
2782 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2783
2784 while (!STAILQ_EMPTY(&tls->pending_records)) {
2785 struct mbuf *n;
2786
2787 n = STAILQ_FIRST(&tls->pending_records);
2788 if (n->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno)
2789 break;
2790
2791 queued++;
2792 STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq);
2793 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(n);
2794 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, n, m_epg_stailq);
2795 }
2796 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, -(queued - 1));
2797 } else
2798 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2799
2800 running = wq->running;
2801 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2802 if (!running)
2803 wakeup(wq);
2804 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, queued);
2805 }
2806
2807 /*
2808 * Once a file-backed mbuf (from sendfile) has been encrypted, free
2809 * the pages from the file and replace them with the anonymous pages
2810 * allocated in ktls_encrypt_record().
2811 */
2812 static void
2813 ktls_finish_nonanon(struct mbuf *m, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2814 {
2815 int i;
2816
2817 MPASS((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0);
2818
2819 /* Free the old pages. */
2820 m->m_ext.ext_free(m);
2821
2822 /* Replace them with the new pages. */
2823 if (state->cbuf != NULL) {
2824 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2825 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[0] + ptoa(i);
2826
2827 /* Contig pages should go back to the cache. */
2828 m->m_ext.ext_free = ktls_free_mext_contig;
2829 } else {
2830 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2831 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[i];
2832
2833 /* Use the basic free routine. */
2834 m->m_ext.ext_free = mb_free_mext_pgs;
2835 }
2836
2837 /* Pages are now writable. */
2838 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_ANON;
2839 }
2840
2841 static __noinline void
2842 ktls_encrypt(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
2843 {
2844 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state state;
2845 struct ktls_session *tls;
2846 struct socket *so;
2847 struct mbuf *m;
2848 int error, npages, total_pages;
2849
2850 so = top->m_epg_so;
2851 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
2852 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2853 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2854 #ifdef INVARIANTS
2855 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
2856 #endif
2857 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2858 npages = 0;
2859
2860 /*
2861 * Encrypt the TLS records in the chain of mbufs starting with
2862 * 'top'. 'total_pages' gives us a total count of pages and is
2863 * used to know when we have finished encrypting the TLS
2864 * records originally queued with 'top'.
2865 *
2866 * NB: These mbufs are queued in the socket buffer and
2867 * 'm_next' is traversing the mbufs in the socket buffer. The
2868 * socket buffer lock is not held while traversing this chain.
2869 * Since the mbufs are all marked M_NOTREADY their 'm_next'
2870 * pointers should be stable. However, the 'm_next' of the
2871 * last mbuf encrypted is not necessarily NULL. It can point
2872 * to other mbufs appended while 'top' was on the TLS work
2873 * queue.
2874 *
2875 * Each mbuf holds an entire TLS record.
2876 */
2877 error = 0;
2878 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = m->m_next) {
2879 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
2880 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
2881 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
2882 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
2883 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
2884 total_pages, m));
2885
2886 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, &state);
2887 if (error) {
2888 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2889 break;
2890 }
2891
2892 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
2893 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, &state);
2894
2895 npages += m->m_epg_nrdy;
2896
2897 /*
2898 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no
2899 * longer needed. Existing code depends on encrypted
2900 * records having no associated session vs
2901 * yet-to-be-encrypted records having an associated
2902 * session.
2903 */
2904 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
2905 ktls_free(tls);
2906 }
2907
2908 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2909 if (error == 0) {
2910 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, top, npages);
2911 } else {
2912 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
2913 mb_free_notready(top, total_pages);
2914 }
2915
2916 sorele(so);
2917 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2918 }
2919
2920 void
2921 ktls_encrypt_cb(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state, int error)
2922 {
2923 struct ktls_session *tls;
2924 struct socket *so;
2925 struct mbuf *m;
2926 int npages;
2927
2928 m = state->m;
2929
2930 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
2931 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, state);
2932
2933 so = state->so;
2934 free(state, M_KTLS);
2935
2936 /*
2937 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no longer
2938 * needed. Existing code depends on encrypted records having
2939 * no associated session vs yet-to-be-encrypted records having
2940 * an associated session.
2941 */
2942 tls = m->m_epg_tls;
2943 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
2944 ktls_free(tls);
2945
2946 if (error != 0)
2947 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2948
2949 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2950 npages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
2951
2952 if (error == 0) {
2953 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, m, npages);
2954 } else {
2955 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
2956 mb_free_notready(m, npages);
2957 }
2958
2959 sorele(so);
2960 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2961 }
2962
2963 /*
2964 * Similar to ktls_encrypt, but used with asynchronous OCF backends
2965 * (coprocessors) where encryption does not use host CPU resources and
2966 * it can be beneficial to queue more requests than CPUs.
2967 */
2968 static __noinline void
2969 ktls_encrypt_async(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
2970 {
2971 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state;
2972 struct ktls_session *tls;
2973 struct socket *so;
2974 struct mbuf *m, *n;
2975 int error, mpages, npages, total_pages;
2976
2977 so = top->m_epg_so;
2978 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
2979 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2980 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2981 #ifdef INVARIANTS
2982 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
2983 #endif
2984 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2985 npages = 0;
2986
2987 error = 0;
2988 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = n) {
2989 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
2990 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
2991 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
2992 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
2993 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
2994 total_pages, m));
2995
2996 state = malloc(sizeof(*state), M_KTLS, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
2997 soref(so);
2998 state->so = so;
2999 state->m = m;
3000
3001 mpages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
3002 n = m->m_next;
3003
3004 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, state);
3005 if (error) {
3006 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3007 free(state, M_KTLS);
3008 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3009 sorele(so);
3010 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3011 break;
3012 }
3013
3014 npages += mpages;
3015 }
3016
3017 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3018 if (error != 0) {
3019 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
3020 mb_free_notready(m, total_pages - npages);
3021 }
3022
3023 sorele(so);
3024 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3025 }
3026
3027 static int
3028 ktls_bind_domain(int domain)
3029 {
3030 int error;
3031
3032 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &cpuset_domain[domain]);
3033 if (error != 0)
3034 return (error);
3035 curthread->td_domain.dr_policy = DOMAINSET_PREF(domain);
3036 return (0);
3037 }
3038
3039 static void
3040 ktls_alloc_thread(void *ctx)
3041 {
3042 struct ktls_domain_info *ktls_domain = ctx;
3043 struct ktls_alloc_thread *sc = &ktls_domain->alloc_td;
3044 void **buf;
3045 struct sysctl_oid *oid;
3046 char name[80];
3047 int domain, error, i, nbufs;
3048
3049 domain = ktls_domain - ktls_domains;
3050 if (bootverbose)
3051 printf("Starting KTLS alloc thread for domain %d\n", domain);
3052 error = ktls_bind_domain(domain);
3053 if (error)
3054 printf("Unable to bind KTLS alloc thread for domain %d: error %d\n",
3055 domain, error);
3056 snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "domain%d", domain);
3057 oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(NULL, SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_ipc_tls), OID_AUTO,
3058 name, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, "");
3059 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "allocs",
3060 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->allocs, 0, "buffers allocated");
3061 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "wakeups",
3062 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->wakeups, 0, "thread wakeups");
3063 SYSCTL_ADD_INT(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "running",
3064 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->running, 0, "thread running");
3065
3066 buf = NULL;
3067 nbufs = 0;
3068 for (;;) {
3069 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 0);
3070 tsleep(sc, PZERO | PNOLOCK, "-", 0);
3071 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 1);
3072 sc->wakeups++;
3073 if (nbufs != ktls_max_alloc) {
3074 free(buf, M_KTLS);
3075 nbufs = atomic_load_int(&ktls_max_alloc);
3076 buf = malloc(sizeof(void *) * nbufs, M_KTLS,
3077 M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
3078 }
3079 /*
3080 * Below we allocate nbufs with different allocation
3081 * flags than we use when allocating normally during
3082 * encryption in the ktls worker thread. We specify
3083 * M_NORECLAIM in the worker thread. However, we omit
3084 * that flag here and add M_WAITOK so that the VM
3085 * system is permitted to perform expensive work to
3086 * defragment memory. We do this here, as it does not
3087 * matter if this thread blocks. If we block a ktls
3088 * worker thread, we risk developing backlogs of
3089 * buffers to be encrypted, leading to surges of
3090 * traffic and potential NIC output drops.
3091 */
3092 for (i = 0; i < nbufs; i++) {
3093 buf[i] = uma_zalloc(ktls_buffer_zone, M_WAITOK);
3094 sc->allocs++;
3095 }
3096 for (i = 0; i < nbufs; i++) {
3097 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, buf[i]);
3098 buf[i] = NULL;
3099 }
3100 }
3101 }
3102
3103 static void
3104 ktls_work_thread(void *ctx)
3105 {
3106 struct ktls_wq *wq = ctx;
3107 struct mbuf *m, *n;
3108 struct socket *so, *son;
3109 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) local_m_head;
3110 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) local_so_head;
3111 int cpu;
3112
3113 cpu = wq - ktls_wq;
3114 if (bootverbose)
3115 printf("Starting KTLS worker thread for CPU %d\n", cpu);
3116
3117 /*
3118 * Bind to a core. If ktls_bind_threads is > 1, then
3119 * we bind to the NUMA domain instead.
3120 */
3121 if (ktls_bind_threads) {
3122 int error;
3123
3124 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
3125 struct pcpu *pc = pcpu_find(cpu);
3126
3127 error = ktls_bind_domain(pc->pc_domain);
3128 } else {
3129 cpuset_t mask;
3130
3131 CPU_SETOF(cpu, &mask);
3132 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &mask);
3133 }
3134 if (error)
3135 printf("Unable to bind KTLS worker thread for CPU %d: error %d\n",
3136 cpu, error);
3137 }
3138 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
3139 fpu_kern_thread(0);
3140 #endif
3141 for (;;) {
3142 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
3143 while (STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->m_head) &&
3144 STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->so_head)) {
3145 wq->running = false;
3146 mtx_sleep(wq, &wq->mtx, 0, "-", 0);
3147 wq->running = true;
3148 }
3149
3150 STAILQ_INIT(&local_m_head);
3151 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_m_head, &wq->m_head);
3152 STAILQ_INIT(&local_so_head);
3153 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_so_head, &wq->so_head);
3154 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
3155
3156 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &local_m_head, m_epg_stailq, n) {
3157 if (m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_2FREE) {
3158 ktls_free(m->m_epg_tls);
3159 m_free_raw(m);
3160 } else {
3161 if (m->m_epg_tls->sync_dispatch)
3162 ktls_encrypt(wq, m);
3163 else
3164 ktls_encrypt_async(wq, m);
3165 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, -1);
3166 }
3167 }
3168
3169 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(so, &local_so_head, so_ktls_rx_list, son) {
3170 ktls_decrypt(so);
3171 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, -1);
3172 }
3173 }
3174 }
3175
3176 #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
3177 static void
3178 ktls_disable_ifnet_help(void *context, int pending __unused)
3179 {
3180 struct ktls_session *tls;
3181 struct inpcb *inp;
3182 struct tcpcb *tp;
3183 struct socket *so;
3184 int err;
3185
3186 tls = context;
3187 inp = tls->inp;
3188 if (inp == NULL)
3189 return;
3190 INP_WLOCK(inp);
3191 so = inp->inp_socket;
3192 MPASS(so != NULL);
3193 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
3194 goto out;
3195 }
3196
3197 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
3198 err = ktls_set_tx_mode(so, TCP_TLS_MODE_SW);
3199 else
3200 err = ENXIO;
3201 if (err == 0) {
3202 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, 1);
3203 /* ktls_set_tx_mode() drops inp wlock, so recheck flags */
3204 if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) == 0 &&
3205 (tp = intotcpcb(inp)) != NULL &&
3206 tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
3207 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 0);
3208 } else {
3209 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, 1);
3210 }
3211
3212 out:
3213 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3214 sorele(so);
3215 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3216 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp))
3217 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
3218 ktls_free(tls);
3219 }
3220
3221 /*
3222 * Called when re-transmits are becoming a substantial portion of the
3223 * sends on this connection. When this happens, we transition the
3224 * connection to software TLS. This is needed because most inline TLS
3225 * NICs keep crypto state only for in-order transmits. This means
3226 * that to handle a TCP rexmit (which is out-of-order), the NIC must
3227 * re-DMA the entire TLS record up to and including the current
3228 * segment. This means that when re-transmitting the last ~1448 byte
3229 * segment of a 16KB TLS record, we could wind up re-DMA'ing an order
3230 * of magnitude more data than we are sending. This can cause the
3231 * PCIe link to saturate well before the network, which can cause
3232 * output drops, and a general loss of capacity.
3233 */
3234 void
3235 ktls_disable_ifnet(void *arg)
3236 {
3237 struct tcpcb *tp;
3238 struct inpcb *inp;
3239 struct socket *so;
3240 struct ktls_session *tls;
3241
3242 tp = arg;
3243 inp = tptoinpcb(tp);
3244 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
3245 so = inp->inp_socket;
3246 SOCK_LOCK(so);
3247 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
3248 if (tls->disable_ifnet_pending) {
3249 SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
3250 return;
3251 }
3252
3253 /*
3254 * note that disable_ifnet_pending is never cleared; disabling
3255 * ifnet can only be done once per session, so we never want
3256 * to do it again
3257 */
3258
3259 (void)ktls_hold(tls);
3260 in_pcbref(inp);
3261 soref(so);
3262 tls->disable_ifnet_pending = true;
3263 tls->inp = inp;
3264 SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
3265 TASK_INIT(&tls->disable_ifnet_task, 0, ktls_disable_ifnet_help, tls);
3266 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->disable_ifnet_task);
3267 }
3268 #endif
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