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sys/netinet6/ah_input.c
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1 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.1.2.6 2002/04/28 05:40:26 suz Exp $ */ 2 /* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.67 2002/01/07 11:39:56 kjc Exp $ */ 3 4 /* 5 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. 6 * All rights reserved. 7 * 8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 10 * are met: 11 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 16 * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors 17 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software 18 * without specific prior written permission. 19 * 20 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 21 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 22 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 23 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 24 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 25 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 26 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 27 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 28 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 29 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 30 * SUCH DAMAGE. 31 */ 32 33 /* 34 * RFC1826/2402 authentication header. 35 */ 36 37 #include "opt_inet.h" 38 #include "opt_inet6.h" 39 40 #include <sys/param.h> 41 #include <sys/systm.h> 42 #include <sys/malloc.h> 43 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 44 #include <sys/domain.h> 45 #include <sys/protosw.h> 46 #include <sys/socket.h> 47 #include <sys/errno.h> 48 #include <sys/time.h> 49 #include <sys/syslog.h> 50 51 #include <net/if.h> 52 #include <net/route.h> 53 #include <net/netisr.h> 54 #include <machine/cpu.h> 55 #include <machine/stdarg.h> 56 57 #include <netinet/in.h> 58 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 59 #include <netinet/in_var.h> 60 #include <netinet/ip.h> 61 #include <netinet/ip_var.h> 62 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 63 #ifdef INET6 64 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 65 #endif 66 67 #ifdef INET6 68 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 69 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 70 #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h> 71 #include <netinet/icmp6.h> 72 #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h> 73 #endif 74 75 #include <netinet6/ipsec.h> 76 #ifdef INET6 77 #include <netinet6/ipsec6.h> 78 #endif 79 #include <netinet6/ah.h> 80 #ifdef INET6 81 #include <netinet6/ah6.h> 82 #endif 83 #include <netproto/key/key.h> 84 #include <netproto/key/keydb.h> 85 #ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 86 #include <netproto/key/key_debug.h> 87 #else 88 #define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg) 89 #endif 90 91 #include <net/net_osdep.h> 92 93 #define IPLEN_FLIPPED 94 95 #ifdef INET 96 extern struct protosw inetsw[]; 97 98 int 99 ah4_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto) 100 { 101 int off; 102 struct mbuf *m; 103 struct ip *ip; 104 struct ah *ah; 105 u_int32_t spi; 106 const struct ah_algorithm *algo; 107 size_t siz; 108 size_t siz1; 109 u_char *cksum; 110 struct secasvar *sav = NULL; 111 u_int16_t nxt; 112 size_t hlen; 113 size_t stripsiz = 0; 114 115 off = *offp; 116 m = *mp; 117 *mp = NULL; 118 119 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST 120 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) { 121 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah)); 122 if (!m) { 123 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;" 124 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n")); 125 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 126 goto fail; 127 } 128 } 129 130 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 131 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off); 132 #else 133 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 134 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah)); 135 if (ah == NULL) { 136 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;" 137 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n")); 138 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 139 goto fail; 140 } 141 #endif 142 nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 143 #ifdef _IP_VHL 144 hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; 145 #else 146 hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; 147 #endif 148 149 /* find the sassoc. */ 150 spi = ah->ah_spi; 151 152 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET, 153 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst, 154 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == NULL) { 155 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 156 "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n", 157 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); 158 ipsecstat.in_nosa++; 159 goto fail; 160 } 161 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, 162 kprintf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav)); 163 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE 164 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { 165 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, 166 "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n", 167 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); 168 ipsecstat.in_badspi++; 169 goto fail; 170 } 171 172 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 173 if (!algo) { 174 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: " 175 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n", 176 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); 177 ipsecstat.in_badspi++; 178 goto fail; 179 } 180 181 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); 182 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); 183 184 /* 185 * sanity checks for header, 1. 186 */ 187 { 188 int sizoff; 189 190 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; 191 192 /* 193 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way 194 * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation 195 * to 96 bits. 196 * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of 197 * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1, 198 * 32 bits of padding is attached. 199 * 200 * There are two downsides to this specification. 201 * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling. 202 * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH, 203 * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue 204 * intermediate nodes. 205 * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes 206 * no real issue, however, it is wacky. 207 * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never 208 * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just 209 * work. 210 * 211 * We may need some clarification in the spec. 212 */ 213 if (siz1 < siz) { 214 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input " 215 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n", 216 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz, 217 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi))); 218 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 219 goto fail; 220 } 221 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) { 222 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input " 223 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n", 224 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1, 225 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi))); 226 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 227 goto fail; 228 } 229 230 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST 231 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) { 232 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1); 233 if (!m) { 234 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); 235 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 236 goto fail; 237 } 238 239 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 240 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off); 241 } 242 #else 243 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, 244 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1); 245 if (ah == NULL) { 246 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); 247 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 248 goto fail; 249 } 250 #endif 251 } 252 253 /* 254 * check for sequence number. 255 */ 256 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { 257 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) 258 ; /* okey */ 259 else { 260 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++; 261 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 262 "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", 263 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 264 goto fail; 265 } 266 } 267 268 /* 269 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the 270 * cryptographic checksum. 271 */ 272 cksum = kmalloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); 273 if (!cksum) { 274 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: " 275 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n")); 276 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 277 goto fail; 278 } 279 280 /* 281 * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian. 282 * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid. 283 */ 284 ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen); 285 ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off); 286 if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) { 287 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP); 288 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 289 goto fail; 290 } 291 ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++; 292 /* 293 * flip them back. 294 */ 295 ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen; 296 ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off); 297 298 { 299 caddr_t sumpos = NULL; 300 301 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { 302 /* RFC 1826 */ 303 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1); 304 } else { 305 /* RFC 2402 */ 306 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1); 307 } 308 309 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) { 310 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 311 "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", 312 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 313 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP); 314 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++; 315 goto fail; 316 } 317 } 318 319 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP); 320 321 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR; 322 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; 323 324 #if 0 325 /* 326 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check. 327 * XXX should elaborate. 328 */ 329 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) { 330 struct ip *nip; 331 size_t sizoff; 332 333 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; 334 335 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) { 336 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) 337 + sizoff + siz1 + hlen); 338 if (!m) { 339 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, 340 "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); 341 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 342 goto fail; 343 } 344 } 345 346 nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1); 347 if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr 348 || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) { 349 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; 350 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; 351 } 352 } 353 #ifdef INET6 354 else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) { 355 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; 356 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; 357 } 358 #endif /* INET6 */ 359 #endif /* 0 */ 360 361 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR 362 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) { 363 #if 0 364 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, 365 "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n")); 366 #endif 367 ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++; 368 } else { 369 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 370 "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", 371 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 372 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++; 373 goto fail; 374 } 375 376 /* 377 * update sequence number. 378 */ 379 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { 380 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) { 381 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++; 382 goto fail; 383 } 384 } 385 386 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ 387 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { 388 /* RFC 1826 */ 389 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1; 390 } else { 391 /* RFC 2402 */ 392 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1; 393 } 394 if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) { 395 /* 396 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH. 397 * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload 398 * 399 * XXX more sanity checks 400 * XXX relationship with gif? 401 */ 402 u_int8_t tos; 403 404 tos = ip->ip_tos; 405 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz); 406 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { 407 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); 408 if (!m) { 409 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 410 goto fail; 411 } 412 } 413 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 414 /* ECN consideration. */ 415 ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos); 416 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET, 417 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) { 418 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " 419 "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", 420 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 421 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 422 goto fail; 423 } 424 425 #if 1 426 /* 427 * Should the inner packet be considered authentic? 428 * My current answer is: NO. 429 * 430 * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2 431 * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the 432 * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered 433 * between host1 and gw1. 434 * 435 * host1 -- gw1 === host2 436 * This case falls into the same scenario as above. 437 * 438 * host1 === host2 439 * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave 440 * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set. 441 * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows 442 * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and 443 * dst=host2, you are in risk. 444 */ 445 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; 446 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; 447 #endif 448 449 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); 450 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 || 451 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) { 452 ipsecstat.in_nomem++; 453 goto fail; 454 } 455 456 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IP, m)) { 457 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 458 m = NULL; 459 goto fail; 460 } 461 462 nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; 463 } else { 464 /* 465 * strip off AH. 466 */ 467 468 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 469 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST 470 /* 471 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that 472 * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf. 473 */ 474 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off); 475 m->m_data += stripsiz; 476 m->m_len -= stripsiz; 477 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; 478 #else 479 /* 480 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that 481 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly. 482 */ 483 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) { 484 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, ((caddr_t)ip) + stripsiz, off); 485 m->m_data += stripsiz; 486 m->m_len -= stripsiz; 487 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; 488 } else { 489 /* 490 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on 491 * cluster 492 */ 493 struct mbuf *n; 494 495 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT); 496 if (n == NULL) { 497 /* m is retained by m_split */ 498 goto fail; 499 } 500 m_adj(n, stripsiz); 501 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */ 502 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len; 503 m_cat(m, n); 504 } 505 #endif 506 507 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { 508 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); 509 if (m == NULL) { 510 ipsecstat.in_inval++; 511 goto fail; 512 } 513 } 514 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 515 #ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED 516 ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz; 517 #else 518 ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz); 519 #endif 520 ip->ip_p = nxt; 521 /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */ 522 523 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); 524 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) { 525 ipsecstat.in_nomem++; 526 goto fail; 527 } 528 529 if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) { 530 if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) && 531 ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) { 532 ipsecstat.in_polvio++; 533 goto fail; 534 } 535 if (!ip_lengthcheck(&m, 0)) { 536 /* freed in ip_lengthcheck() */ 537 goto fail; 538 } 539 *mp = m; 540 *offp = off; 541 (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(mp, offp, nxt); 542 } else { 543 m_freem(m); 544 } 545 m = NULL; 546 } 547 548 if (sav) { 549 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, 550 kprintf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); 551 key_freesav(sav); 552 } 553 ipsecstat.in_success++; 554 return(IPPROTO_DONE); 555 556 fail: 557 if (sav) { 558 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, 559 kprintf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); 560 key_freesav(sav); 561 } 562 if (m) 563 m_freem(m); 564 return(IPPROTO_DONE); 565 } 566 #endif /* INET */ 567 568 #ifdef INET6 569 int 570 ah6_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto) 571 { 572 struct mbuf *m = *mp; 573 int off = *offp; 574 struct ip6_hdr *ip6; 575 struct ah *ah; 576 u_int32_t spi; 577 const struct ah_algorithm *algo; 578 size_t siz; 579 size_t siz1; 580 u_char *cksum; 581 struct secasvar *sav = NULL; 582 u_int16_t nxt; 583 size_t stripsiz = 0; 584 585 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST 586 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE); 587 ah = (struct ah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); 588 #else 589 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah)); 590 if (ah == NULL) { 591 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: can't pullup\n")); 592 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 593 return IPPROTO_DONE; 594 } 595 #endif 596 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); 597 nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 598 599 /* find the sassoc. */ 600 spi = ah->ah_spi; 601 602 if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) { 603 ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: " 604 "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n")); 605 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 606 goto fail; 607 } 608 609 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, 610 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst, 611 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == NULL) { 612 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 613 "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n", 614 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); 615 ipsec6stat.in_nosa++; 616 goto fail; 617 } 618 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, 619 kprintf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav)); 620 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE 621 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { 622 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, 623 "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ", 624 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); 625 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++; 626 goto fail; 627 } 628 629 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 630 if (!algo) { 631 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: " 632 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n", 633 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); 634 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++; 635 goto fail; 636 } 637 638 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); 639 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); 640 641 /* 642 * sanity checks for header, 1. 643 */ 644 { 645 int sizoff; 646 647 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; 648 649 /* 650 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete 651 * description. 652 */ 653 if (siz1 < siz) { 654 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input " 655 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n", 656 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz, 657 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi))); 658 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 659 goto fail; 660 } 661 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) { 662 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input " 663 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n", 664 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1, 665 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi))); 666 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 667 goto fail; 668 } 669 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST 670 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE); 671 #else 672 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, 673 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1); 674 if (ah == NULL) { 675 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "couldn't pullup gather IPv6 AH checksum part")); 676 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 677 m = NULL; 678 goto fail; 679 } 680 #endif 681 } 682 683 /* 684 * check for sequence number. 685 */ 686 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { 687 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) 688 ; /* okey */ 689 else { 690 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++; 691 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 692 "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", 693 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), 694 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 695 goto fail; 696 } 697 } 698 699 /* 700 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the 701 * cryptographic checksum. 702 */ 703 cksum = kmalloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); 704 if (!cksum) { 705 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: " 706 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n")); 707 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 708 goto fail; 709 } 710 711 if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) { 712 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP); 713 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 714 goto fail; 715 } 716 ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++; 717 718 { 719 caddr_t sumpos = NULL; 720 721 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { 722 /* RFC 1826 */ 723 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1); 724 } else { 725 /* RFC 2402 */ 726 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1); 727 } 728 729 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) { 730 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 731 "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", 732 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 733 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP); 734 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++; 735 goto fail; 736 } 737 } 738 739 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP); 740 741 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR; 742 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; 743 744 #if 0 745 /* 746 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check. 747 * XXX should elaborate. 748 */ 749 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) { 750 struct ip6_hdr *nip6; 751 size_t sizoff; 752 753 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; 754 755 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 756 + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), IPPROTO_DONE); 757 758 nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1); 759 if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src) 760 || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) { 761 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; 762 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; 763 } 764 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) { 765 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; 766 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; 767 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) { 768 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; 769 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; 770 } 771 #endif 772 773 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR 774 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) { 775 #if 0 776 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, 777 "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n")); 778 #endif 779 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++; 780 } else { 781 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, 782 "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", 783 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 784 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++; 785 goto fail; 786 } 787 788 /* 789 * update sequence number. 790 */ 791 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { 792 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) { 793 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++; 794 goto fail; 795 } 796 } 797 798 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ 799 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { 800 /* RFC 1826 */ 801 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1; 802 } else { 803 /* RFC 2402 */ 804 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1; 805 } 806 if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) { 807 /* 808 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH. 809 * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload 810 * 811 * XXX more sanity checks 812 * XXX relationship with gif? 813 */ 814 u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */ 815 816 flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow; 817 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz); 818 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) { 819 /* 820 * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing 821 * but there's no other way! 822 */ 823 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6)); 824 if (!m) { 825 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 826 goto fail; 827 } 828 } 829 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); 830 /* ECN consideration. */ 831 ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow); 832 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6, 833 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) { 834 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " 835 "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", 836 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), 837 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 838 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 839 goto fail; 840 } 841 842 #if 1 843 /* 844 * should the inner packet be considered authentic? 845 * see comment in ah4_input(). 846 */ 847 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; 848 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; 849 #endif 850 851 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); 852 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 || 853 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) { 854 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; 855 goto fail; 856 } 857 858 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m)) { 859 ipsec6stat.in_inval++; 860 m = NULL; 861 goto fail; 862 } 863 864 nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; 865 } else { 866 /* 867 * strip off AH. 868 */ 869 char *prvnxtp; 870 871 /* 872 * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the 873 * next header field of the previous header. 874 * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below. 875 */ 876 prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */ 877 *prvnxtp = nxt; 878 879 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); 880 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST 881 /* 882 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that 883 * the packet is placed in a single mbuf. 884 */ 885 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off); 886 m->m_data += stripsiz; 887 m->m_len -= stripsiz; 888 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; 889 #else 890 /* 891 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that 892 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly. 893 */ 894 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) { 895 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off); 896 m->m_data += stripsiz; 897 m->m_len -= stripsiz; 898 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; 899 } else { 900 /* 901 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on 902 * cluster 903 */ 904 struct mbuf *n; 905 906 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT); 907 if (n == NULL) { 908 /* m is retained by m_split */ 909 goto fail; 910 } 911 m_adj(n, stripsiz); 912 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */ 913 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len; 914 m_cat(m, n); 915 } 916 #endif 917 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); 918 /* XXX jumbogram */ 919 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz); 920 921 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); 922 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) { 923 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; 924 goto fail; 925 } 926 } 927 928 *offp = off; 929 *mp = m; 930 931 if (sav) { 932 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, 933 kprintf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); 934 key_freesav(sav); 935 } 936 ipsec6stat.in_success++; 937 return nxt; 938 939 fail: 940 if (sav) { 941 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, 942 kprintf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); 943 key_freesav(sav); 944 } 945 if (m) 946 m_freem(m); 947 return IPPROTO_DONE; 948 } 949 950 void 951 ah6_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *d) 952 { 953 const struct newah *ahp; 954 struct newah ah; 955 struct secasvar *sav; 956 struct ip6_hdr *ip6; 957 struct mbuf *m; 958 struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL; 959 int off; 960 struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src, *sa6_dst; 961 962 if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 || 963 sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) 964 return; 965 if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS) 966 return; 967 968 /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */ 969 if (d != NULL) { 970 ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d; 971 m = ip6cp->ip6c_m; 972 ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6; 973 off = ip6cp->ip6c_off; 974 } else { 975 m = NULL; 976 ip6 = NULL; 977 off = 0; /* fix warning */ 978 } 979 980 if (ip6) { 981 /* 982 * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL, 983 * M and OFF are valid. 984 */ 985 986 /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */ 987 if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah)) 988 return; 989 990 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) { 991 /* 992 * this should be rare case, 993 * so we compromise on this copy... 994 */ 995 m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah); 996 ahp = &ah; 997 } else 998 ahp = (struct newah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); 999 1000 if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) { 1001 int valid = 0; 1002 1003 /* 1004 * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to 1005 * the address in the ICMP message payload. 1006 */ 1007 sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src; 1008 sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; 1009 sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, 1010 (caddr_t)&sa6_src->sin6_addr, 1011 (caddr_t)&sa6_dst->sin6_addr, 1012 IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi); 1013 if (sav) { 1014 if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE || 1015 sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING) 1016 valid++; 1017 key_freesav(sav); 1018 } 1019 1020 /* XXX Further validation? */ 1021 1022 /* 1023 * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table 1024 * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will: 1025 * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the 1026 * corresponding routing entry, or 1027 * - ignore the MTU change notification. 1028 */ 1029 icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid); 1030 } 1031 1032 /* we normally notify single pcb here */ 1033 } else { 1034 /* we normally notify any pcb here */ 1035 } 1036 } 1037 #endif /* INET6 */
Cache object: 376d06a6c905098e890204bcb8e4f690
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