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sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c
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1 /* $FreeBSD: releng/11.1/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c 331985 2018-04-04 05:37:52Z gordon $ */ 2 /* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 3 /*- 4 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 5 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 6 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 7 * 8 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 9 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 10 * 11 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 12 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 13 * 14 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 15 * and Niels Provos. 16 * 17 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 18 * 19 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 20 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 21 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 22 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 23 * 24 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 25 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 26 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 27 * modification of this software. 28 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 29 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 30 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 31 * all. 32 * 33 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 34 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 35 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 36 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 37 * PURPOSE. 38 */ 39 #include "opt_inet.h" 40 #include "opt_inet6.h" 41 42 #include <sys/param.h> 43 #include <sys/systm.h> 44 #include <sys/mbuf.h> 45 #include <sys/socket.h> 46 #include <sys/syslog.h> 47 #include <sys/kernel.h> 48 #include <sys/lock.h> 49 #include <sys/mutex.h> 50 #include <sys/sysctl.h> 51 52 #include <net/if.h> 53 #include <net/vnet.h> 54 55 #include <netinet/in.h> 56 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> 57 #include <netinet/ip.h> 58 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 59 #include <netinet/ip6.h> 60 61 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 62 #include <netipsec/ah.h> 63 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 64 #include <netipsec/xform.h> 65 66 #ifdef INET6 67 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 68 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 69 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 70 #endif 71 72 #include <netipsec/key.h> 73 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 74 75 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 76 77 /* 78 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 79 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 80 */ 81 #define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 82 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 83 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 84 /* 85 * Return authenticator size in bytes, based on a field in the 86 * algorithm descriptor. 87 */ 88 #define AUTHSIZE(sav) ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : \ 89 xform_ah_authsize((sav)->tdb_authalgxform)) 90 91 VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 92 VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 93 VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct ahstat, ahstat); 94 VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(ahstat); 95 96 #ifdef VIMAGE 97 VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(ahstat); 98 #endif /* VIMAGE */ 99 100 #ifdef INET 101 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 102 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_enable, 103 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_enable), 0, ""); 104 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_cleartos, 105 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_cleartos), 0, ""); 106 SYSCTL_VNET_PCPUSTAT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, stats, struct ahstat, 107 ahstat, "AH statistics (struct ahstat, netipsec/ah_var.h)"); 108 #endif 109 110 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 111 112 static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 113 static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 114 115 int 116 xform_ah_authsize(const struct auth_hash *esph) 117 { 118 int alen; 119 120 if (esph == NULL) 121 return 0; 122 123 switch (esph->type) { 124 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: 125 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: 126 case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: 127 alen = esph->hashsize / 2; /* RFC4868 2.3 */ 128 break; 129 130 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC: 131 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC: 132 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC: 133 alen = esph->hashsize; 134 break; 135 136 default: 137 alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN; 138 break; 139 } 140 141 return alen; 142 } 143 144 size_t 145 ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav) 146 { 147 size_t size; 148 149 if (sav != NULL) { 150 int authsize; 151 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform")); 152 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 153 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 154 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 155 } else { 156 /* default guess */ 157 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 158 } 159 return size; 160 } 161 162 /* 163 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 164 */ 165 int 166 ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria) 167 { 168 const struct auth_hash *thash; 169 int keylen; 170 171 thash = auth_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 172 if (thash == NULL) { 173 DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 174 __func__, sav->alg_auth)); 175 return EINVAL; 176 } 177 /* 178 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 179 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 180 * later during protocol processing. 181 */ 182 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 183 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 184 DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, " 185 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__, 186 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 187 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 188 return EINVAL; 189 } 190 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 191 DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n", 192 __func__, thash->name)); 193 return EINVAL; 194 } 195 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 196 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 197 DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires " 198 "keysize %d\n", __func__, 199 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 200 return EINVAL; 201 } 202 203 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 204 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 205 206 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 207 bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria)); 208 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 209 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 210 cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data; 211 cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 212 213 return 0; 214 } 215 216 /* 217 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 218 */ 219 static int 220 ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp) 221 { 222 struct cryptoini cria; 223 int error; 224 225 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 226 return error ? error : 227 crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support); 228 } 229 230 /* 231 * Paranoia. 232 * 233 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 234 */ 235 int 236 ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 237 { 238 int err; 239 240 if (sav->key_auth) 241 bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 242 243 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 244 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 245 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 246 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 247 return err; 248 } 249 250 /* 251 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 252 */ 253 static int 254 ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 255 { 256 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 257 unsigned char *ptr; 258 int off, count; 259 260 #ifdef INET 261 struct ip *ip; 262 #endif /* INET */ 263 264 #ifdef INET6 265 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 266 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 267 int ad, alloc, nxt, noff; 268 #endif /* INET6 */ 269 270 switch (proto) { 271 #ifdef INET 272 case AF_INET: 273 /* 274 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 275 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 276 * contiguous memory. 277 */ 278 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 279 if (m == NULL) { 280 DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__)); 281 return ENOBUFS; 282 } 283 284 /* Fix the IP header */ 285 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 286 if (V_ah_cleartos) 287 ip->ip_tos = 0; 288 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 289 ip->ip_sum = 0; 290 291 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 292 ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF); 293 else 294 ip->ip_off = htons(0); 295 296 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *); 297 298 /* IPv4 option processing */ 299 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 300 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 301 off + 1 < skip) 302 ; 303 else { 304 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for " 305 "option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off])); 306 307 m_freem(m); 308 return EINVAL; 309 } 310 311 switch (ptr[off]) { 312 case IPOPT_EOL: 313 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 314 break; 315 316 case IPOPT_NOP: 317 off++; 318 break; 319 320 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 321 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 322 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 323 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 324 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 325 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 326 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 327 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 328 "length for option %d\n", 329 __func__, ptr[off])); 330 331 m_freem(m); 332 return EINVAL; 333 } 334 335 off += ptr[off + 1]; 336 break; 337 338 case IPOPT_LSRR: 339 case IPOPT_SSRR: 340 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 341 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 342 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 343 "length for option %d\n", 344 __func__, ptr[off])); 345 346 m_freem(m); 347 return EINVAL; 348 } 349 350 /* 351 * On output, if we have either of the 352 * source routing options, we should 353 * swap the destination address of the 354 * IP header with the last address 355 * specified in the option, as that is 356 * what the destination's IP header 357 * will look like. 358 */ 359 if (out) 360 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 361 sizeof(struct in_addr), 362 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 363 364 /* Fall through */ 365 default: 366 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 367 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 368 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 369 "length for option %d\n", 370 __func__, ptr[off])); 371 m_freem(m); 372 return EINVAL; 373 } 374 375 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 376 count = ptr[off + 1]; 377 bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + off, count); 378 off += count; 379 break; 380 } 381 382 /* Sanity check. */ 383 if (off > skip) { 384 DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n", 385 __func__)); 386 387 m_freem(m); 388 return EINVAL; 389 } 390 } 391 392 break; 393 #endif /* INET */ 394 395 #ifdef INET6 396 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 397 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 398 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6); 399 400 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 401 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 402 DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__)); 403 m_freem(m); 404 return EMSGSIZE; 405 } 406 407 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 408 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 409 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 410 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 411 412 /* Scoped address handling. */ 413 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 414 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 415 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 416 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 417 418 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 419 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6); 420 421 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 422 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 423 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 424 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 425 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 426 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 427 if (ptr == NULL) { 428 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory" 429 "for IPv6 headers\n",__func__)); 430 m_freem(m); 431 return ENOBUFS; 432 } 433 434 /* 435 * Copy all the protocol headers after 436 * the IPv6 header. 437 */ 438 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 439 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 440 alloc = 1; 441 } else { 442 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 443 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 444 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 445 alloc = 0; 446 } 447 } else 448 break; 449 450 nxt = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 451 452 for (off = 0; off < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 453 switch (nxt) { 454 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 455 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 456 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *)(ptr + off); 457 noff = off + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 458 459 /* Sanity check. */ 460 if (noff > skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) 461 goto error6; 462 463 /* 464 * Zero out mutable options. 465 */ 466 for (count = off + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 467 count < noff;) { 468 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 469 count++; 470 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 471 } 472 473 ad = ptr[count + 1] + 2; 474 if (count + ad > noff) 475 goto error6; 476 477 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 478 memset(ptr + count, 0, ad); 479 count += ad; 480 } 481 482 if (count != noff) 483 goto error6; 484 485 /* Advance. */ 486 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 487 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 488 break; 489 490 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 491 /* 492 * Always include routing headers in 493 * computation. 494 */ 495 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + off); 496 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 497 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 498 break; 499 500 default: 501 DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d", 502 __func__, off)); 503 error6: 504 if (alloc) 505 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 506 m_freem(m); 507 return EINVAL; 508 } 509 510 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 511 if (alloc) { 512 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 513 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 514 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 515 } 516 517 break; 518 #endif /* INET6 */ 519 } 520 521 return 0; 522 } 523 524 /* 525 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 526 * passes authentication. 527 */ 528 static int 529 ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 530 { 531 IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[128]); 532 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 533 struct cryptodesc *crda; 534 struct cryptop *crp; 535 struct xform_data *xd; 536 struct newah *ah; 537 uint64_t cryptoid; 538 int hl, rplen, authsize, error; 539 540 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA")); 541 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key")); 542 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 543 ("null authentication xform")); 544 545 /* Figure out header size. */ 546 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 547 548 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 549 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 550 if (ah == NULL) { 551 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 552 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX*/ 553 error = ENOBUFS; 554 goto bad; 555 } 556 557 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 558 SECASVAR_LOCK(sav); 559 if (sav->replay != NULL && sav->replay->wsize != 0 && 560 ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav) == 0) { 561 SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav); 562 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay); 563 DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__, 564 ipsec_sa2str(sav, buf, sizeof(buf)))); 565 error = EACCES; 566 goto bad; 567 } 568 cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 569 SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav); 570 571 /* Verify AH header length. */ 572 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 573 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 574 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 575 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 576 DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 577 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, hl, 578 (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 579 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 580 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 581 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauthl); 582 error = EACCES; 583 goto bad; 584 } 585 if (skip + authsize + rplen > m->m_pkthdr.len) { 586 DPRINTF(("%s: bad mbuf length %u (expecting %lu)" 587 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 588 m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_long) (skip + authsize + rplen), 589 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 590 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 591 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauthl); 592 error = EACCES; 593 goto bad; 594 } 595 AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 596 597 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 598 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 599 if (crp == NULL) { 600 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n", 601 __func__)); 602 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 603 error = ENOBUFS; 604 goto bad; 605 } 606 607 crda = crp->crp_desc; 608 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor")); 609 610 crda->crd_skip = 0; 611 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 612 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 613 614 /* Authentication operation. */ 615 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 616 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 617 crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data; 618 619 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 620 xd = malloc(sizeof(*xd) + skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, 621 M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); 622 if (xd == NULL) { 623 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__)); 624 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 625 crypto_freereq(crp); 626 error = ENOBUFS; 627 goto bad; 628 } 629 630 /* 631 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 632 * and the AH header. 633 */ 634 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(xd + 1)); 635 636 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 637 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 638 639 /* Save ah_nxt, since ah pointer can become invalid after "massage" */ 640 hl = ah->ah_nxt; 641 642 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 643 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 644 skip, ahx->type, 0); 645 if (error != 0) { 646 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 647 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); 648 free(xd, M_XDATA); 649 crypto_freereq(crp); 650 key_freesav(&sav); 651 return (error); 652 } 653 654 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 655 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 656 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC; 657 crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m; 658 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 659 crp->crp_sid = cryptoid; 660 crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) xd; 661 662 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 663 xd->sav = sav; 664 xd->nxt = hl; 665 xd->protoff = protoff; 666 xd->skip = skip; 667 xd->cryptoid = cryptoid; 668 return (crypto_dispatch(crp)); 669 bad: 670 m_freem(m); 671 key_freesav(&sav); 672 return (error); 673 } 674 675 /* 676 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 677 */ 678 static int 679 ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 680 { 681 IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]); 682 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 683 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 684 struct mbuf *m; 685 struct cryptodesc *crd; 686 struct xform_data *xd; 687 struct secasvar *sav; 688 struct secasindex *saidx; 689 caddr_t ptr; 690 uint64_t cryptoid; 691 int authsize, rplen, error, skip, protoff; 692 uint8_t nxt; 693 694 crd = crp->crp_desc; 695 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 696 xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque; 697 sav = xd->sav; 698 skip = xd->skip; 699 nxt = xd->nxt; 700 protoff = xd->protoff; 701 cryptoid = xd->cryptoid; 702 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 703 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 704 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 705 ("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 706 707 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 708 709 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 710 if (crp->crp_etype) { 711 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 712 /* Reset the session ID */ 713 if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_sid, &cryptoid) != 0) 714 crypto_freesession(cryptoid); 715 xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 716 return (crypto_dispatch(crp)); 717 } 718 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform); 719 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype)); 720 error = crp->crp_etype; 721 goto bad; 722 } else { 723 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]); 724 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 725 crp = NULL; 726 } 727 728 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 729 if (m == NULL) { 730 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 731 DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__)); 732 error = EINVAL; 733 goto bad; 734 } 735 736 /* Figure out header size. */ 737 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 738 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 739 740 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 741 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 742 743 /* Verify authenticator. */ 744 ptr = (caddr_t) (xd + 1); 745 if (timingsafe_bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 746 DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet " 747 "in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 748 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 749 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 750 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauth); 751 error = EACCES; 752 goto bad; 753 } 754 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 755 ((uint8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 756 757 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 758 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 759 free(xd, M_XDATA), xd = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 760 761 /* 762 * Header is now authenticated. 763 */ 764 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 765 766 /* 767 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 768 */ 769 if (sav->replay) { 770 u_int32_t seq; 771 772 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 773 sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq); 774 SECASVAR_LOCK(sav); 775 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 776 SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav); 777 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay); 778 error = EACCES; 779 goto bad; 780 } 781 SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav); 782 } 783 784 /* 785 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 786 */ 787 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 788 if (error) { 789 DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 790 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 791 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 792 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); 793 goto bad; 794 } 795 796 switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) { 797 #ifdef INET6 798 case AF_INET6: 799 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); 800 break; 801 #endif 802 #ifdef INET 803 case AF_INET: 804 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); 805 break; 806 #endif 807 default: 808 panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__, 809 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx); 810 } 811 return error; 812 bad: 813 if (sav) 814 key_freesav(&sav); 815 if (m != NULL) 816 m_freem(m); 817 if (xd != NULL) 818 free(xd, M_XDATA); 819 if (crp != NULL) 820 crypto_freereq(crp); 821 return error; 822 } 823 824 /* 825 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_perform_request(). 826 */ 827 static int 828 ah_output(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, struct secasvar *sav, 829 u_int idx, int skip, int protoff) 830 { 831 IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]); 832 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 833 struct cryptodesc *crda; 834 struct xform_data *xd; 835 struct mbuf *mi; 836 struct cryptop *crp; 837 struct newah *ah; 838 uint64_t cryptoid; 839 uint16_t iplen; 840 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 841 uint8_t prot; 842 843 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA")); 844 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 845 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform")); 846 847 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_output); 848 849 /* Figure out header size. */ 850 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 851 852 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 853 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 854 #ifdef INET 855 case AF_INET: 856 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 857 break; 858 #endif /* INET */ 859 #ifdef INET6 860 case AF_INET6: 861 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 862 break; 863 #endif /* INET6 */ 864 default: 865 DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, " 866 "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 867 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 868 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 869 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 870 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_nopf); 871 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 872 goto bad; 873 } 874 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 875 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 876 DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 877 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__, 878 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 879 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 880 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 881 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_toobig); 882 error = EMSGSIZE; 883 goto bad; 884 } 885 886 /* Update the counters. */ 887 AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_obytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 888 889 m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT); 890 if (m == NULL) { 891 DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 892 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 893 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 894 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); 895 error = ENOBUFS; 896 goto bad; 897 } 898 899 /* Inject AH header. */ 900 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 901 if (mi == NULL) { 902 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 903 "%s/%08lx\n", __func__, 904 rplen + authsize, 905 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 906 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 907 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 908 error = ENOBUFS; 909 goto bad; 910 } 911 912 /* 913 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 914 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 915 */ 916 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff); 917 918 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 919 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt); 920 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 921 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 922 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 923 924 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 925 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 926 927 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 928 SECASVAR_LOCK(sav); 929 if (sav->replay) { 930 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 931 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 932 SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav); 933 DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n", 934 __func__, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, 935 sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 936 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_wrap); 937 error = EACCES; 938 goto bad; 939 } 940 #ifdef REGRESSION 941 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 942 if (!V_ipsec_replay) 943 #endif 944 sav->replay->count++; 945 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 946 } 947 cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 948 SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav); 949 950 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 951 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 952 if (crp == NULL) { 953 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n", 954 __func__)); 955 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 956 error = ENOBUFS; 957 goto bad; 958 } 959 960 crda = crp->crp_desc; 961 crda->crd_skip = 0; 962 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 963 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 964 965 /* Authentication operation. */ 966 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 967 crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data; 968 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 969 970 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 971 xd = malloc(sizeof(struct xform_data) + skip, M_XDATA, 972 M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); 973 if (xd == NULL) { 974 crypto_freereq(crp); 975 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__)); 976 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 977 error = ENOBUFS; 978 goto bad; 979 } 980 981 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 982 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (xd + 1)); 983 984 /* 985 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 986 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 987 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 988 */ 989 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 990 #ifdef INET 991 case AF_INET: 992 bcopy(((caddr_t)(xd + 1)) + 993 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 994 (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 995 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 996 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 997 sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen); 998 break; 999 #endif /* INET */ 1000 1001 #ifdef INET6 1002 case AF_INET6: 1003 bcopy(((caddr_t)(xd + 1)) + 1004 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1005 (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(uint16_t)); 1006 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1007 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1008 sizeof(uint16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen); 1009 break; 1010 #endif /* INET6 */ 1011 } 1012 1013 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1014 ((uint8_t *) (xd + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1015 1016 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1017 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1018 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(uint8_t), (caddr_t) &prot); 1019 1020 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1021 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1022 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1023 if (error != 0) { 1024 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1025 free(xd, M_XDATA); 1026 crypto_freereq(crp); 1027 goto bad; 1028 } 1029 1030 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1031 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1032 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC; 1033 crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m; 1034 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1035 crp->crp_sid = cryptoid; 1036 crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) xd; 1037 1038 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1039 xd->sp = sp; 1040 xd->sav = sav; 1041 xd->skip = skip; 1042 xd->idx = idx; 1043 xd->cryptoid = cryptoid; 1044 1045 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1046 bad: 1047 if (m) 1048 m_freem(m); 1049 key_freesav(&sav); 1050 key_freesp(&sp); 1051 return (error); 1052 } 1053 1054 /* 1055 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1056 */ 1057 static int 1058 ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1059 { 1060 struct xform_data *xd; 1061 struct secpolicy *sp; 1062 struct secasvar *sav; 1063 struct mbuf *m; 1064 uint64_t cryptoid; 1065 caddr_t ptr; 1066 u_int idx; 1067 int skip, error; 1068 1069 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1070 xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque; 1071 sp = xd->sp; 1072 sav = xd->sav; 1073 skip = xd->skip; 1074 idx = xd->idx; 1075 cryptoid = xd->cryptoid; 1076 ptr = (caddr_t) (xd + 1); 1077 1078 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1079 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1080 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1081 /* Reset the session ID */ 1082 if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_sid, &cryptoid) != 0) 1083 crypto_freesession(cryptoid); 1084 xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1085 return (crypto_dispatch(crp)); 1086 } 1087 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform); 1088 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype)); 1089 error = crp->crp_etype; 1090 m_freem(m); 1091 goto bad; 1092 } 1093 1094 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1095 if (m == NULL) { 1096 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 1097 DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__)); 1098 error = EINVAL; 1099 goto bad; 1100 } 1101 /* 1102 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1103 * in place. 1104 */ 1105 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1106 1107 free(xd, M_XDATA); 1108 crypto_freereq(crp); 1109 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]); 1110 #ifdef REGRESSION 1111 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1112 if (V_ipsec_integrity) { 1113 int alen; 1114 1115 /* 1116 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1117 * the other side. 1118 */ 1119 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1120 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1121 } 1122 #endif 1123 1124 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1125 error = ipsec_process_done(m, sp, sav, idx); 1126 return (error); 1127 bad: 1128 free(xd, M_XDATA); 1129 crypto_freereq(crp); 1130 key_freesav(&sav); 1131 key_freesp(&sp); 1132 return (error); 1133 } 1134 1135 static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1136 .xf_type = XF_AH, 1137 .xf_name = "IPsec AH", 1138 .xf_init = ah_init, 1139 .xf_zeroize = ah_zeroize, 1140 .xf_input = ah_input, 1141 .xf_output = ah_output, 1142 }; 1143 1144 SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, 1145 xform_attach, &ah_xformsw); 1146 SYSUNINIT(ah_xform_uninit, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, 1147 xform_detach, &ah_xformsw);
Cache object: 40e16f2797bb90afacfeee528b5e7e48
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