1 /* $FreeBSD$ */
2 /* $OpenBSD: ip_esp.c,v 1.69 2001/06/26 06:18:59 angelos Exp $ */
3 /*-
4 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
5 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
6 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
7 *
8 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
9 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
10 *
11 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
12 * by Angelos D. Keromytis.
13 *
14 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
15 * and Niels Provos.
16 *
17 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis.
18 *
19 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
20 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
21 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
22 *
23 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
24 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
25 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
26 * modification of this software.
27 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
28 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
29 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
30 * all.
31 *
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
34 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
35 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
36 * PURPOSE.
37 */
38 #include "opt_inet.h"
39 #include "opt_inet6.h"
40 #include "opt_ipsec.h"
41
42 #include <sys/param.h>
43 #include <sys/systm.h>
44 #include <sys/malloc.h>
45 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
46 #include <sys/socket.h>
47 #include <sys/syslog.h>
48 #include <sys/kernel.h>
49 #include <sys/lock.h>
50 #include <sys/random.h>
51 #include <sys/mutex.h>
52 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
53 #include <sys/mutex.h>
54 #include <machine/atomic.h>
55
56 #include <net/if.h>
57 #include <net/vnet.h>
58
59 #include <netinet/in.h>
60 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
61 #include <netinet/ip.h>
62 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
63 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
64
65 #include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
66 #include <netipsec/ah.h>
67 #include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
68 #include <netipsec/esp.h>
69 #include <netipsec/esp_var.h>
70 #include <netipsec/xform.h>
71
72 #ifdef INET6
73 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
74 #include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
75 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
76 #endif
77
78 #include <netipsec/key.h>
79 #include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
80
81 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
82 #include <opencrypto/xform.h>
83
84 #define SPI_SIZE 4
85
86 VNET_DEFINE(int, esp_enable) = 1;
87 VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(int, esp_ctr_compatibility) = 1;
88 #define V_esp_ctr_compatibility VNET(esp_ctr_compatibility)
89 VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct espstat, espstat);
90 VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(espstat);
91
92 #ifdef VIMAGE
93 VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(espstat);
94 #endif /* VIMAGE */
95
96 SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_esp);
97 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_esp, OID_AUTO, esp_enable,
98 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(esp_enable), 0, "");
99 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_esp, OID_AUTO, ctr_compatibility,
100 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(esp_ctr_compatibility), 0,
101 "Align AES-CTR encrypted transmitted frames to blocksize");
102 SYSCTL_VNET_PCPUSTAT(_net_inet_esp, IPSECCTL_STATS, stats,
103 struct espstat, espstat,
104 "ESP statistics (struct espstat, netipsec/esp_var.h");
105
106 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ESP, "esp", "IPsec ESP");
107
108 static int esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *op);
109 static int esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp);
110
111 size_t
112 esp_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
113 {
114 size_t size;
115
116 if (sav != NULL) {
117 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
118 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL,
119 ("SA with null xform"));
120 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
121 size = sizeof (struct esp);
122 else
123 size = sizeof (struct newesp);
124 size += sav->tdb_encalgxform->blocksize + 9;
125 /*XXX need alg check???*/
126 if (sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL && sav->replay)
127 size += ah_hdrsiz(sav);
128 } else {
129 /*
130 * base header size
131 * + max iv length for CBC mode
132 * + max pad length
133 * + sizeof (pad length field)
134 * + sizeof (next header field)
135 * + max icv supported.
136 */
137 size = sizeof (struct newesp) + EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN + 9 + 16;
138 }
139 return size;
140 }
141
142 /*
143 * esp_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
144 */
145 static int
146 esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
147 {
148 const struct enc_xform *txform;
149 struct crypto_session_params csp;
150 int keylen;
151 int error;
152
153 txform = enc_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc);
154 if (txform == NULL) {
155 DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported encryption algorithm %d\n",
156 __func__, sav->alg_enc));
157 return EINVAL;
158 }
159 if (sav->key_enc == NULL) {
160 DPRINTF(("%s: no encoding key for %s algorithm\n",
161 __func__, txform->name));
162 return EINVAL;
163 }
164 if ((sav->flags & (SADB_X_EXT_OLD | SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) ==
165 SADB_X_EXT_IV4B) {
166 DPRINTF(("%s: 4-byte IV not supported with protocol\n",
167 __func__));
168 return EINVAL;
169 }
170
171 /* subtract off the salt, RFC4106, 8.1 and RFC3686, 5.1 */
172 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) * 4 -
173 SAV_ISCHACHA(sav) * 4;
174 if (txform->minkey > keylen || keylen > txform->maxkey) {
175 DPRINTF(("%s: invalid key length %u, must be in the range "
176 "[%u..%u] for algorithm %s\n", __func__,
177 keylen, txform->minkey, txform->maxkey,
178 txform->name));
179 return EINVAL;
180 }
181
182 if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) || SAV_ISCHACHA(sav))
183 sav->ivlen = 8; /* RFC4106 3.1 and RFC3686 3.1 */
184 else
185 sav->ivlen = txform->ivsize;
186
187 memset(&csp, 0, sizeof(csp));
188
189 /*
190 * Setup AH-related state.
191 */
192 if (sav->alg_auth != 0) {
193 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &csp);
194 if (error)
195 return error;
196 }
197
198 /* NB: override anything set in ah_init0 */
199 sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
200 sav->tdb_encalgxform = txform;
201
202 /*
203 * Whenever AES-GCM is used for encryption, one
204 * of the AES authentication algorithms is chosen
205 * as well, based on the key size.
206 */
207 if (sav->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16) {
208 switch (keylen) {
209 case AES_128_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
210 sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC;
211 sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
212 break;
213 case AES_192_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
214 sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC;
215 sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
216 break;
217 case AES_256_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
218 sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC;
219 sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
220 break;
221 default:
222 DPRINTF(("%s: invalid key length %u"
223 "for algorithm %s\n", __func__,
224 keylen, txform->name));
225 return EINVAL;
226 }
227 csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_AEAD;
228 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_SAFLAGS_ESN)
229 csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD;
230 } else if (sav->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
231 sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_CHACHA20POLY1305;
232 sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_poly1305;
233 csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_AEAD;
234 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_SAFLAGS_ESN)
235 csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD;
236 } else if (sav->alg_auth != 0) {
237 csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_ETA;
238 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_SAFLAGS_ESN)
239 csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_ESN;
240 } else
241 csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_CIPHER;
242
243 /* Initialize crypto session. */
244 csp.csp_cipher_alg = sav->tdb_encalgxform->type;
245 if (csp.csp_cipher_alg != CRYPTO_NULL_CBC) {
246 csp.csp_cipher_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
247 csp.csp_cipher_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) / 8 -
248 SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) * 4 - SAV_ISCHACHA(sav) * 4;
249 };
250 csp.csp_ivlen = txform->ivsize;
251
252 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &csp, V_crypto_support);
253 return error;
254 }
255
256 static void
257 esp_cleanup(struct secasvar *sav)
258 {
259
260 crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
261 sav->tdb_cryptoid = NULL;
262 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
263 sav->tdb_encalgxform = NULL;
264 }
265
266 /*
267 * ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch.
268 */
269 static int
270 esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
271 {
272 IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[128]);
273 const struct auth_hash *esph;
274 const struct enc_xform *espx;
275 struct xform_data *xd;
276 struct cryptop *crp;
277 struct newesp *esp;
278 uint8_t *ivp;
279 crypto_session_t cryptoid;
280 int alen, error, hlen, plen;
281 uint32_t seqh;
282 const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
283
284 SECASVAR_RLOCK_TRACKER;
285
286 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
287 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL, ("null encoding xform"));
288
289 error = EINVAL;
290 /* Valid IP Packet length ? */
291 if ( (skip&3) || (m->m_pkthdr.len&3) ){
292 DPRINTF(("%s: misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u",
293 __func__, skip, m->m_pkthdr.len));
294 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
295 goto bad;
296 }
297
298 if (m->m_len < skip + sizeof(*esp)) {
299 m = m_pullup(m, skip + sizeof(*esp));
300 if (m == NULL) {
301 DPRINTF(("%s: cannot pullup header\n", __func__));
302 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hdrops); /*XXX*/
303 error = ENOBUFS;
304 goto bad;
305 }
306 }
307 esp = (struct newesp *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + skip);
308
309 esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
310 espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
311
312 /* Determine the ESP header and auth length */
313 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
314 hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
315 else
316 hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
317
318 alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
319
320 /*
321 * Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm
322 * block size.
323 *
324 * NB: This works for the null algorithm because the blocksize
325 * is 4 and all packets must be 4-byte aligned regardless
326 * of the algorithm.
327 */
328 plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
329 if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) {
330 DPRINTF(("%s: payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets,"
331 " SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, plen, espx->blocksize,
332 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
333 (u_long)ntohl(sav->spi)));
334 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
335 goto bad;
336 }
337
338 /*
339 * Check sequence number.
340 */
341 SECASVAR_RLOCK(sav);
342 if (esph != NULL && sav->replay != NULL && sav->replay->wsize != 0) {
343 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(esp->esp_seq), &seqh, sav) == 0) {
344 SECASVAR_RUNLOCK(sav);
345 DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
346 ipsec_sa2str(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
347 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
348 error = EACCES;
349 goto bad;
350 }
351 seqh = htonl(seqh);
352 }
353 cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
354 SECASVAR_RUNLOCK(sav);
355
356 /* Update the counters */
357 ESPSTAT_ADD(esps_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen));
358
359 /* Get crypto descriptors */
360 crp = crypto_getreq(cryptoid, M_NOWAIT);
361 if (crp == NULL) {
362 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
363 __func__));
364 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
365 error = ENOBUFS;
366 goto bad;
367 }
368
369 /* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */
370 xd = malloc(sizeof(*xd), M_ESP, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
371 if (xd == NULL) {
372 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__));
373 goto xd_fail;
374 }
375
376 if (esph != NULL) {
377 crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST;
378 if (SAV_ISGCM(sav) || SAV_ISCHACHA(sav))
379 crp->crp_aad_length = 8; /* RFC4106 5, SPI + SN */
380 else
381 crp->crp_aad_length = hlen;
382
383 csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
384 if ((csp->csp_flags & CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD) &&
385 (sav->replay != NULL) && (sav->replay->wsize != 0)) {
386 int aad_skip;
387
388 crp->crp_aad_length += sizeof(seqh);
389 crp->crp_aad = malloc(crp->crp_aad_length, M_ESP, M_NOWAIT);
390 if (crp->crp_aad == NULL) {
391 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n",
392 __func__));
393 goto crp_aad_fail;
394 }
395
396 /* SPI */
397 m_copydata(m, skip, SPI_SIZE, crp->crp_aad);
398 aad_skip = SPI_SIZE;
399
400 /* ESN */
401 bcopy(&seqh, (char *)crp->crp_aad + aad_skip, sizeof(seqh));
402 aad_skip += sizeof(seqh);
403
404 /* Rest of aad */
405 if (crp->crp_aad_length - aad_skip > 0)
406 m_copydata(m, skip + SPI_SIZE,
407 crp->crp_aad_length - aad_skip,
408 (char *)crp->crp_aad + aad_skip);
409 } else
410 crp->crp_aad_start = skip;
411
412 if (csp->csp_flags & CSP_F_ESN &&
413 sav->replay != NULL && sav->replay->wsize != 0)
414 memcpy(crp->crp_esn, &seqh, sizeof(seqh));
415
416 crp->crp_digest_start = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
417 }
418
419 /* Crypto operation descriptor */
420 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
421 crypto_use_mbuf(crp, m);
422 crp->crp_callback = esp_input_cb;
423 crp->crp_opaque = xd;
424
425 /* These are passed as-is to the callback */
426 xd->sav = sav;
427 xd->protoff = protoff;
428 xd->skip = skip;
429 xd->cryptoid = cryptoid;
430 xd->vnet = curvnet;
431
432 /* Decryption descriptor */
433 crp->crp_op |= CRYPTO_OP_DECRYPT;
434 crp->crp_payload_start = skip + hlen;
435 crp->crp_payload_length = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
436
437 /* Generate or read cipher IV. */
438 if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) || SAV_ISCHACHA(sav)) {
439 ivp = &crp->crp_iv[0];
440
441 /*
442 * AES-GCM and AES-CTR use similar cipher IV formats
443 * defined in RFC 4106 section 4 and RFC 3686 section
444 * 4, respectively.
445 *
446 * The first 4 bytes of the cipher IV contain an
447 * implicit salt, or nonce, obtained from the last 4
448 * bytes of the encryption key. The next 8 bytes hold
449 * an explicit IV unique to each packet. This
450 * explicit IV is used as the ESP IV for the packet.
451 * The last 4 bytes hold a big-endian block counter
452 * incremented for each block. For AES-GCM, the block
453 * counter's initial value is defined as part of the
454 * algorithm. For AES-CTR, the block counter's
455 * initial value for each packet is defined as 1 by
456 * RFC 3686.
457 *
458 * ------------------------------------------
459 * | Salt | Explicit ESP IV | Block Counter |
460 * ------------------------------------------
461 * 4 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes
462 */
463 memcpy(ivp, sav->key_enc->key_data +
464 _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - 4, 4);
465 m_copydata(m, skip + hlen - sav->ivlen, sav->ivlen, &ivp[4]);
466 if (SAV_ISCTR(sav)) {
467 be32enc(&ivp[sav->ivlen + 4], 1);
468 }
469 crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
470 } else if (sav->ivlen != 0)
471 crp->crp_iv_start = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
472
473 if (V_async_crypto)
474 return (crypto_dispatch_async(crp, CRYPTO_ASYNC_ORDERED));
475 else
476 return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
477
478 crp_aad_fail:
479 free(xd, M_ESP);
480 xd_fail:
481 crypto_freereq(crp);
482 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
483 error = ENOBUFS;
484 bad:
485 m_freem(m);
486 key_freesav(&sav);
487 return (error);
488 }
489
490 /*
491 * ESP input callback from the crypto driver.
492 */
493 static int
494 esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
495 {
496 IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[128]);
497 uint8_t lastthree[3];
498 const struct auth_hash *esph;
499 struct mbuf *m;
500 struct xform_data *xd;
501 struct secasvar *sav;
502 struct secasindex *saidx;
503 crypto_session_t cryptoid;
504 int hlen, skip, protoff, error, alen;
505
506 SECASVAR_RLOCK_TRACKER;
507
508 m = crp->crp_buf.cb_mbuf;
509 xd = crp->crp_opaque;
510 CURVNET_SET(xd->vnet);
511 sav = xd->sav;
512 skip = xd->skip;
513 protoff = xd->protoff;
514 cryptoid = xd->cryptoid;
515 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
516 esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
517
518 /* Check for crypto errors */
519 if (crp->crp_etype) {
520 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
521 /* Reset the session ID */
522 if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_session, &cryptoid) != 0)
523 crypto_freesession(cryptoid);
524 xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_session;
525 CURVNET_RESTORE();
526 return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
527 }
528
529 /* EBADMSG indicates authentication failure. */
530 if (!(crp->crp_etype == EBADMSG && esph != NULL)) {
531 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_noxform);
532 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__,
533 crp->crp_etype));
534 error = crp->crp_etype;
535 goto bad;
536 }
537 }
538
539 /* Shouldn't happen... */
540 if (m == NULL) {
541 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
542 DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
543 error = EINVAL;
544 goto bad;
545 }
546 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]);
547
548 /* If authentication was performed, check now. */
549 if (esph != NULL) {
550 alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
551 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
552 if (crp->crp_etype == EBADMSG) {
553 DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for "
554 "packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
555 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
556 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
557 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badauth);
558 error = EACCES;
559 goto bad;
560 }
561 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
562 /* Remove trailing authenticator */
563 m_adj(m, -alen);
564 }
565
566 /* Release the crypto descriptors */
567 free(xd, M_ESP), xd = NULL;
568 free(crp->crp_aad, M_ESP), crp->crp_aad = NULL;
569 crypto_freereq(crp), crp = NULL;
570
571 /*
572 * Packet is now decrypted.
573 */
574 m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED;
575
576 /*
577 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
578 */
579 if (sav->replay) {
580 u_int32_t seq;
581
582 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newesp, esp_seq),
583 sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
584 SECASVAR_RLOCK(sav);
585 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
586 SECASVAR_RUNLOCK(sav);
587 DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
588 ipsec_sa2str(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
589 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
590 error = EACCES;
591 goto bad;
592 }
593 SECASVAR_RUNLOCK(sav);
594 }
595
596 /* Determine the ESP header length */
597 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
598 hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
599 else
600 hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
601
602 /* Remove the ESP header and IV from the mbuf. */
603 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, hlen);
604 if (error) {
605 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hdrops);
606 DPRINTF(("%s: bad mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
607 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
608 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
609 goto bad;
610 }
611
612 /* Save the last three bytes of decrypted data */
613 m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - 3, 3, lastthree);
614
615 /* Verify pad length */
616 if (lastthree[1] + 2 > m->m_pkthdr.len - skip) {
617 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
618 DPRINTF(("%s: invalid padding length %d for %u byte packet "
619 "in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, lastthree[1],
620 m->m_pkthdr.len - skip,
621 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
622 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
623 error = EINVAL;
624 goto bad;
625 }
626
627 /* Verify correct decryption by checking the last padding bytes */
628 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) != SADB_X_EXT_PRAND) {
629 if (lastthree[1] != lastthree[0] && lastthree[1] != 0) {
630 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badenc);
631 DPRINTF(("%s: decryption failed for packet in "
632 "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, ipsec_address(
633 &sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
634 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
635 error = EINVAL;
636 goto bad;
637 }
638 }
639
640 /*
641 * RFC4303 2.6:
642 * Silently drop packet if next header field is IPPROTO_NONE.
643 */
644 if (lastthree[2] == IPPROTO_NONE)
645 goto bad;
646
647 /* Trim the mbuf chain to remove trailing authenticator and padding */
648 m_adj(m, -(lastthree[1] + 2));
649
650 /* Restore the Next Protocol field */
651 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof (u_int8_t), lastthree + 2);
652
653 switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
654 #ifdef INET6
655 case AF_INET6:
656 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
657 break;
658 #endif
659 #ifdef INET
660 case AF_INET:
661 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
662 break;
663 #endif
664 default:
665 panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__,
666 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx);
667 }
668 CURVNET_RESTORE();
669 return error;
670 bad:
671 if (sav != NULL)
672 key_freesav(&sav);
673 if (m != NULL)
674 m_freem(m);
675 if (xd != NULL)
676 free(xd, M_ESP);
677 if (crp != NULL) {
678 free(crp->crp_aad, M_ESP);
679 crypto_freereq(crp);
680 }
681 CURVNET_RESTORE();
682 return error;
683 }
684 /*
685 * ESP output routine, called by ipsec[46]_perform_request().
686 */
687 static int
688 esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, struct secasvar *sav,
689 u_int idx, int skip, int protoff)
690 {
691 IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]);
692 struct cryptop *crp;
693 const struct auth_hash *esph;
694 const struct enc_xform *espx;
695 struct mbuf *mo = NULL;
696 struct xform_data *xd;
697 struct secasindex *saidx;
698 unsigned char *pad;
699 uint8_t *ivp;
700 uint64_t cntr;
701 crypto_session_t cryptoid;
702 int hlen, rlen, padding, blks, alen, i, roff;
703 int error, maxpacketsize;
704 uint8_t prot;
705 uint32_t seqh;
706 const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
707
708 SECASVAR_RLOCK_TRACKER;
709
710 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
711 esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
712 espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
713 IPSEC_ASSERT(espx != NULL, ("null encoding xform"));
714
715 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
716 hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
717 else
718 hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
719
720 rlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - skip; /* Raw payload length. */
721 /*
722 * RFC4303 2.4 Requires 4 byte alignment.
723 * Old versions of FreeBSD can't decrypt partial blocks encrypted
724 * with AES-CTR. Align payload to native_blocksize (16 bytes)
725 * in order to preserve compatibility.
726 */
727 if (SAV_ISCTR(sav) && V_esp_ctr_compatibility)
728 blks = MAX(4, espx->native_blocksize); /* Cipher blocksize */
729 else
730 blks = MAX(4, espx->blocksize);
731
732 /* XXX clamp padding length a la KAME??? */
733 padding = ((blks - ((rlen + 2) % blks)) % blks) + 2;
734
735 alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
736
737 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_output);
738
739 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
740 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
741 switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
742 #ifdef INET
743 case AF_INET:
744 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
745 break;
746 #endif /* INET */
747 #ifdef INET6
748 case AF_INET6:
749 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
750 break;
751 #endif /* INET6 */
752 default:
753 DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol "
754 "family %d, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
755 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst,
756 buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
757 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_nopf);
758 error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
759 goto bad;
760 }
761 /*
762 DPRINTF(("%s: skip %d hlen %d rlen %d padding %d alen %d blksd %d\n",
763 __func__, skip, hlen, rlen, padding, alen, blks)); */
764 if (skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen > maxpacketsize) {
765 DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
766 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
767 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
768 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
769 skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen, maxpacketsize));
770 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_toobig);
771 error = EMSGSIZE;
772 goto bad;
773 }
774
775 /* Update the counters. */
776 ESPSTAT_ADD(esps_obytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip);
777
778 m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
779 if (m == NULL) {
780 DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
781 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
782 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
783 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hdrops);
784 error = ENOBUFS;
785 goto bad;
786 }
787
788 /* Inject ESP header. */
789 mo = m_makespace(m, skip, hlen, &roff);
790 if (mo == NULL) {
791 DPRINTF(("%s: %u byte ESP hdr inject failed for SA %s/%08lx\n",
792 __func__, hlen, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf,
793 sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
794 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hdrops); /* XXX diffs from openbsd */
795 error = ENOBUFS;
796 goto bad;
797 }
798
799 /* Initialize ESP header. */
800 bcopy((caddr_t) &sav->spi, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff,
801 sizeof(uint32_t));
802 SECASVAR_RLOCK(sav);
803 if (sav->replay) {
804 uint32_t replay;
805
806 SECREPLAY_LOCK(sav->replay);
807 #ifdef REGRESSION
808 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
809 if (!V_ipsec_replay)
810 #endif
811 sav->replay->count++;
812 replay = htonl((uint32_t)sav->replay->count);
813
814 bcopy((caddr_t) &replay, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff +
815 sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(uint32_t));
816
817 seqh = htonl((uint32_t)(sav->replay->count >> IPSEC_SEQH_SHIFT));
818 SECREPLAY_UNLOCK(sav->replay);
819 }
820 cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
821 if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) || SAV_ISCHACHA(sav))
822 cntr = sav->cntr++;
823 SECASVAR_RUNLOCK(sav);
824
825 /*
826 * Add padding -- better to do it ourselves than use the crypto engine,
827 * although if/when we support compression, we'd have to do that.
828 */
829 pad = (u_char *) m_pad(m, padding + alen);
830 if (pad == NULL) {
831 DPRINTF(("%s: m_pad failed for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
832 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
833 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
834 m = NULL; /* NB: free'd by m_pad */
835 error = ENOBUFS;
836 goto bad;
837 }
838
839 /*
840 * Add padding: random, zero, or self-describing.
841 * XXX catch unexpected setting
842 */
843 switch (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) {
844 case SADB_X_EXT_PRAND:
845 arc4random_buf(pad, padding - 2);
846 break;
847 case SADB_X_EXT_PZERO:
848 bzero(pad, padding - 2);
849 break;
850 case SADB_X_EXT_PSEQ:
851 for (i = 0; i < padding - 2; i++)
852 pad[i] = i+1;
853 break;
854 }
855
856 /* Fix padding length and Next Protocol in padding itself. */
857 pad[padding - 2] = padding - 2;
858 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), pad + padding - 1);
859
860 /* Fix Next Protocol in IPv4/IPv6 header. */
861 prot = IPPROTO_ESP;
862 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (u_char *) &prot);
863
864 /* Get crypto descriptor. */
865 crp = crypto_getreq(cryptoid, M_NOWAIT);
866 if (crp == NULL) {
867 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",
868 __func__));
869 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
870 error = ENOBUFS;
871 goto bad;
872 }
873
874 /* IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
875 xd = malloc(sizeof(struct xform_data), M_ESP, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
876 if (xd == NULL) {
877 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__));
878 goto xd_fail;
879 }
880
881 /* Encryption descriptor. */
882 crp->crp_payload_start = skip + hlen;
883 crp->crp_payload_length = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
884 crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_ENCRYPT;
885
886 /* Generate cipher and ESP IVs. */
887 ivp = &crp->crp_iv[0];
888 if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) || SAV_ISCHACHA(sav)) {
889 /*
890 * See comment in esp_input() for details on the
891 * cipher IV. A simple per-SA counter stored in
892 * 'cntr' is used as the explicit ESP IV.
893 */
894 memcpy(ivp, sav->key_enc->key_data +
895 _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - 4, 4);
896 be64enc(&ivp[4], cntr);
897 if (SAV_ISCTR(sav)) {
898 be32enc(&ivp[sav->ivlen + 4], 1);
899 }
900 m_copyback(m, skip + hlen - sav->ivlen, sav->ivlen, &ivp[4]);
901 crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
902 } else if (sav->ivlen != 0) {
903 arc4rand(ivp, sav->ivlen, 0);
904 crp->crp_iv_start = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
905 m_copyback(m, crp->crp_iv_start, sav->ivlen, ivp);
906 }
907
908 /* Callback parameters */
909 xd->sp = sp;
910 xd->sav = sav;
911 xd->idx = idx;
912 xd->cryptoid = cryptoid;
913 xd->vnet = curvnet;
914
915 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */
916 crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
917 crypto_use_mbuf(crp, m);
918 crp->crp_callback = esp_output_cb;
919 crp->crp_opaque = xd;
920
921 if (esph) {
922 /* Authentication descriptor. */
923 crp->crp_op |= CRYPTO_OP_COMPUTE_DIGEST;
924 if (SAV_ISGCM(sav) || SAV_ISCHACHA(sav))
925 crp->crp_aad_length = 8; /* RFC4106 5, SPI + SN */
926 else
927 crp->crp_aad_length = hlen;
928
929 csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
930 if (csp->csp_flags & CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD &&
931 sav->replay != NULL) {
932 int aad_skip;
933
934 crp->crp_aad_length += sizeof(seqh);
935 crp->crp_aad = malloc(crp->crp_aad_length, M_ESP, M_NOWAIT);
936 if (crp->crp_aad == NULL) {
937 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n",
938 __func__));
939 goto crp_aad_fail;
940 }
941
942 /* SPI */
943 m_copydata(m, skip, SPI_SIZE, crp->crp_aad);
944 aad_skip = SPI_SIZE;
945
946 /* ESN */
947 bcopy(&seqh, (char *)crp->crp_aad + aad_skip, sizeof(seqh));
948 aad_skip += sizeof(seqh);
949
950 /* Rest of aad */
951 if (crp->crp_aad_length - aad_skip > 0)
952 m_copydata(m, skip + SPI_SIZE,
953 crp->crp_aad_length - aad_skip,
954 (char *)crp->crp_aad + aad_skip);
955 } else
956 crp->crp_aad_start = skip;
957
958 if (csp->csp_flags & CSP_F_ESN && sav->replay != NULL)
959 memcpy(crp->crp_esn, &seqh, sizeof(seqh));
960
961 crp->crp_digest_start = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
962 }
963
964 if (V_async_crypto)
965 return (crypto_dispatch_async(crp, CRYPTO_ASYNC_ORDERED));
966 else
967 return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
968
969 crp_aad_fail:
970 free(xd, M_ESP);
971 xd_fail:
972 crypto_freereq(crp);
973 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
974 error = ENOBUFS;
975 bad:
976 if (m)
977 m_freem(m);
978 key_freesav(&sav);
979 key_freesp(&sp);
980 return (error);
981 }
982 /*
983 * ESP output callback from the crypto driver.
984 */
985 static int
986 esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
987 {
988 struct xform_data *xd;
989 struct secpolicy *sp;
990 struct secasvar *sav;
991 struct mbuf *m;
992 crypto_session_t cryptoid;
993 u_int idx;
994 int error;
995
996 xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque;
997 CURVNET_SET(xd->vnet);
998 m = crp->crp_buf.cb_mbuf;
999 sp = xd->sp;
1000 sav = xd->sav;
1001 idx = xd->idx;
1002 cryptoid = xd->cryptoid;
1003
1004 /* Check for crypto errors. */
1005 if (crp->crp_etype) {
1006 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
1007 /* Reset the session ID */
1008 if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_session, &cryptoid) != 0)
1009 crypto_freesession(cryptoid);
1010 xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_session;
1011 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1012 return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
1013 }
1014 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_noxform);
1015 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
1016 error = crp->crp_etype;
1017 m_freem(m);
1018 goto bad;
1019 }
1020
1021 /* Shouldn't happen... */
1022 if (m == NULL) {
1023 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
1024 DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
1025 error = EINVAL;
1026 goto bad;
1027 }
1028 free(xd, M_ESP);
1029 free(crp->crp_aad, M_ESP);
1030 crypto_freereq(crp);
1031 ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]);
1032 if (sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL)
1033 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
1034
1035 #ifdef REGRESSION
1036 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
1037 if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
1038 static unsigned char ipseczeroes[AH_HMAC_MAXHASHLEN];
1039 const struct auth_hash *esph;
1040
1041 /*
1042 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
1043 * the other side.
1044 */
1045 esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
1046 if (esph != NULL) {
1047 int alen;
1048
1049 alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
1050 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen,
1051 alen, ipseczeroes);
1052 }
1053 }
1054 #endif
1055
1056 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
1057 error = ipsec_process_done(m, sp, sav, idx);
1058 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1059 return (error);
1060 bad:
1061 free(xd, M_ESP);
1062 free(crp->crp_aad, M_ESP);
1063 crypto_freereq(crp);
1064 key_freesav(&sav);
1065 key_freesp(&sp);
1066 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1067 return (error);
1068 }
1069
1070 static struct xformsw esp_xformsw = {
1071 .xf_type = XF_ESP,
1072 .xf_name = "IPsec ESP",
1073 .xf_init = esp_init,
1074 .xf_cleanup = esp_cleanup,
1075 .xf_input = esp_input,
1076 .xf_output = esp_output,
1077 };
1078
1079 SYSINIT(esp_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE,
1080 xform_attach, &esp_xformsw);
1081 SYSUNINIT(esp_xform_uninit, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE,
1082 xform_detach, &esp_xformsw);
Cache object: 33ab0de27546dd699234bd23df6394b1
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