The Design and Implementation of the FreeBSD Operating System, Second Edition
Now available: The Design and Implementation of the FreeBSD Operating System (Second Edition)


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FreeBSD/Linux Kernel Cross Reference
sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c

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    1 /*-
    2  * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
    3  * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
    4  * All rights reserved.
    5  *
    6  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Network
    7  * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
    8  * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
    9  * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
   10  *
   11  * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
   12  * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
   13  *
   14  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   15  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   16  * are met:
   17  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   18  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   19  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   20  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   21  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   22  *
   23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
   24  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   25  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   26  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   27  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   28  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   29  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   30  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   31  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   32  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   33  * SUCH DAMAGE.
   34  *
   35  * $FreeBSD: releng/10.1/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c 227309 2011-11-07 15:43:11Z ed $
   36  */
   37 
   38 /*
   39  * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
   40  *
   41  * Administratively limit access to local UDP/TCP ports for binding purposes.
   42  * Intended to be combined with net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh to allow
   43  * specific uids and gids to bind specific ports for specific purposes,
   44  * while not opening the door to any user replacing an "official" service
   45  * while you're restarting it.  This only affects ports explicitly bound by
   46  * the user process (either for listen/outgoing socket for TCP, or send/
   47  * receive for UDP).  This module will not limit ports bound implicitly for
   48  * out-going connections where the process hasn't explicitly selected a port:
   49  * these are automatically selected by the IP stack.
   50  *
   51  * To use this module, security.mac.enforce_socket must be enabled, and you
   52  * will probably want to twiddle the net.inet sysctl listed above.  Then use
   53  * sysctl(8) to modify the rules string:
   54  *
   55  * # sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules="uid:425:tcp:80,uid:425:tcp:79"
   56  *
   57  * This ruleset, for example, permits uid 425 to bind TCP ports 80 (http) and
   58  * 79 (finger).  User names and group names can't be used directly because
   59  * the kernel only knows about uids and gids.
   60  */
   61 
   62 #include <sys/param.h>
   63 #include <sys/domain.h>
   64 #include <sys/kernel.h>
   65 #include <sys/lock.h>
   66 #include <sys/malloc.h>
   67 #include <sys/module.h>
   68 #include <sys/mutex.h>
   69 #include <sys/priv.h>
   70 #include <sys/proc.h>
   71 #include <sys/protosw.h>
   72 #include <sys/queue.h>
   73 #include <sys/systm.h>
   74 #include <sys/sbuf.h>
   75 #include <sys/socket.h>
   76 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
   77 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
   78 
   79 #include <netinet/in.h>
   80 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
   81 
   82 #include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
   83 
   84 SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
   85 
   86 static SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, portacl, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
   87     "TrustedBSD mac_portacl policy controls");
   88 
   89 static int      portacl_enabled = 1;
   90 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
   91     &portacl_enabled, 0, "Enforce portacl policy");
   92 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.enabled", &portacl_enabled);
   93 
   94 static int      portacl_suser_exempt = 1;
   95 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, suser_exempt, CTLFLAG_RW,
   96     &portacl_suser_exempt, 0, "Privilege permits binding of any port");
   97 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt",
   98     &portacl_suser_exempt);
   99 
  100 static int      portacl_autoport_exempt = 1;
  101 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, autoport_exempt, CTLFLAG_RW,
  102     &portacl_autoport_exempt, 0, "Allow automatic allocation through "
  103     "binding port 0 if not IP_PORTRANGELOW");
  104 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.autoport_exempt",
  105     &portacl_autoport_exempt);
  106 
  107 static int      portacl_port_high = 1023;
  108 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, port_high, CTLFLAG_RW,
  109     &portacl_port_high, 0, "Highest port to enforce for");
  110 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.port_high", &portacl_port_high);
  111 
  112 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PORTACL, "portacl_rule", "Rules for mac_portacl");
  113 
  114 #define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN     1024
  115 
  116 #define RULE_GID        1
  117 #define RULE_UID        2
  118 #define RULE_PROTO_TCP  1
  119 #define RULE_PROTO_UDP  2
  120 struct rule {
  121         id_t                    r_id;
  122         int                     r_idtype;
  123         u_int16_t               r_port;
  124         int                     r_protocol;
  125 
  126         TAILQ_ENTRY(rule)       r_entries;
  127 };
  128 
  129 #define GID_STRING      "gid"
  130 #define TCP_STRING      "tcp"
  131 #define UID_STRING      "uid"
  132 #define UDP_STRING      "udp"
  133 
  134 /*
  135  * Text format for the rule string is that a rule consists of a
  136  * comma-separated list of elements.  Each element is in the form
  137  * idtype:id:protocol:portnumber, and constitutes granting of permission
  138  * for the specified binding.
  139  */
  140 
  141 static struct mtx                       rule_mtx;
  142 static TAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, rule)       rule_head;
  143 static char                             rule_string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN];
  144 
  145 static void
  146 toast_rules(struct rulehead *head)
  147 {
  148         struct rule *rule;
  149 
  150         while ((rule = TAILQ_FIRST(head)) != NULL) {
  151                 TAILQ_REMOVE(head, rule, r_entries);
  152                 free(rule, M_PORTACL);
  153         }
  154 }
  155 
  156 /*
  157  * Note that there is an inherent race condition in the unload of modules
  158  * and access via sysctl.
  159  */
  160 static void
  161 destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
  162 {
  163 
  164         mtx_destroy(&rule_mtx);
  165         toast_rules(&rule_head);
  166 }
  167 
  168 static void
  169 init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
  170 {
  171 
  172         mtx_init(&rule_mtx, "rule_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
  173         TAILQ_INIT(&rule_head);
  174 }
  175 
  176 /*
  177  * Note: parsing routines are destructive on the passed string.
  178  */
  179 static int
  180 parse_rule_element(char *element, struct rule **rule)
  181 {
  182         char *idtype, *id, *protocol, *portnumber, *p;
  183         struct rule *new;
  184         int error;
  185 
  186         error = 0;
  187         new = malloc(sizeof(*new), M_PORTACL, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
  188 
  189         idtype = strsep(&element, ":");
  190         if (idtype == NULL) {
  191                 error = EINVAL;
  192                 goto out;
  193         }
  194         id = strsep(&element, ":");
  195         if (id == NULL) {
  196                 error = EINVAL;
  197                 goto out;
  198         }
  199         new->r_id = strtol(id, &p, 10);
  200         if (*p != '\0') {
  201                 error = EINVAL;
  202                 goto out;
  203         }
  204         if (strcmp(idtype, UID_STRING) == 0)
  205                 new->r_idtype = RULE_UID;
  206         else if (strcmp(idtype, GID_STRING) == 0)
  207                 new->r_idtype = RULE_GID;
  208         else {
  209                 error = EINVAL;
  210                 goto out;
  211         }
  212         protocol = strsep(&element, ":");
  213         if (protocol == NULL) {
  214                 error = EINVAL;
  215                 goto out;
  216         }
  217         if (strcmp(protocol, TCP_STRING) == 0)
  218                 new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_TCP;
  219         else if (strcmp(protocol, UDP_STRING) == 0)
  220                 new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_UDP;
  221         else {
  222                 error = EINVAL;
  223                 goto out;
  224         }
  225         portnumber = element;
  226         if (portnumber == NULL) {
  227                 error = EINVAL;
  228                 goto out;
  229         }
  230         new->r_port = strtol(portnumber, &p, 10);
  231         if (*p != '\0') {
  232                 error = EINVAL;
  233                 goto out;
  234         }
  235 
  236 out:
  237         if (error != 0) {
  238                 free(new, M_PORTACL);
  239                 *rule = NULL;
  240         } else
  241                 *rule = new;
  242         return (error);
  243 }
  244 
  245 static int
  246 parse_rules(char *string, struct rulehead *head)
  247 {
  248         struct rule *new;
  249         char *element;
  250         int error;
  251 
  252         error = 0;
  253         while ((element = strsep(&string, ",")) != NULL) {
  254                 if (strlen(element) == 0)
  255                         continue;
  256                 error = parse_rule_element(element, &new);
  257                 if (error)
  258                         goto out;
  259                 TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, new, r_entries);
  260         }
  261 out:
  262         if (error != 0)
  263                 toast_rules(head);
  264         return (error);
  265 }
  266 
  267 /*
  268  * rule_printf() and rules_to_string() are unused currently because they rely
  269  * on sbufs with auto-extension, which may sleep while holding a mutex.
  270  * Instead, the non-canonical user-generated rule string is returned to the
  271  * user when the rules are queried, which is faster anyway.
  272  */
  273 #if 0
  274 static void
  275 rule_printf(struct sbuf *sb, struct rule *rule)
  276 {
  277         const char *idtype, *protocol;
  278 
  279         switch(rule->r_idtype) {
  280         case RULE_GID:
  281                 idtype = GID_STRING;
  282                 break;
  283         case RULE_UID:
  284                 idtype = UID_STRING;
  285                 break;
  286         default:
  287                 panic("rule_printf: unknown idtype (%d)\n", rule->r_idtype);
  288         }
  289 
  290         switch (rule->r_protocol) {
  291         case RULE_PROTO_TCP:
  292                 protocol = TCP_STRING;
  293                 break;
  294         case RULE_PROTO_UDP:
  295                 protocol = UDP_STRING;
  296                 break;
  297         default:
  298                 panic("rule_printf: unknown protocol (%d)\n",
  299                     rule->r_protocol);
  300         }
  301         sbuf_printf(sb, "%s:%jd:%s:%d", idtype, (intmax_t)rule->r_id,
  302             protocol, rule->r_port);
  303 }
  304 
  305 static char *
  306 rules_to_string(void)
  307 {
  308         struct rule *rule;
  309         struct sbuf *sb;
  310         int needcomma;
  311         char *temp;
  312 
  313         sb = sbuf_new_auto();
  314         needcomma = 0;
  315         mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
  316         for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head); rule != NULL;
  317             rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) {
  318                 if (!needcomma)
  319                         needcomma = 1;
  320                 else
  321                         sbuf_printf(sb, ",");
  322                 rule_printf(sb, rule);
  323         }
  324         mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
  325         sbuf_finish(sb);
  326         temp = strdup(sbuf_data(sb), M_PORTACL);
  327         sbuf_delete(sb);
  328         return (temp);
  329 }
  330 #endif
  331 
  332 /*
  333  * Note: due to races, there is not a single serializable order
  334  * between parallel calls to the sysctl.
  335  */
  336 static int
  337 sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
  338 {
  339         char *string, *copy_string, *new_string;
  340         struct rulehead head, save_head;
  341         int error;
  342 
  343         new_string = NULL;
  344         if (req->newptr != NULL) {
  345                 new_string = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_PORTACL,
  346                     M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
  347                 mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
  348                 strcpy(new_string, rule_string);
  349                 mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
  350                 string = new_string;
  351         } else
  352                 string = rule_string;
  353 
  354         error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req);
  355         if (error)
  356                 goto out;
  357 
  358         if (req->newptr != NULL) {
  359                 copy_string = strdup(string, M_PORTACL);
  360                 TAILQ_INIT(&head);
  361                 error = parse_rules(copy_string, &head);
  362                 free(copy_string, M_PORTACL);
  363                 if (error)
  364                         goto out;
  365 
  366                 TAILQ_INIT(&save_head);
  367                 mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
  368                 TAILQ_CONCAT(&save_head, &rule_head, r_entries);
  369                 TAILQ_CONCAT(&rule_head, &head, r_entries);
  370                 strcpy(rule_string, string);
  371                 mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
  372                 toast_rules(&save_head);
  373         }
  374 out:
  375         if (new_string != NULL)
  376                 free(new_string, M_PORTACL);
  377         return (error);
  378 }
  379 
  380 SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, rules,
  381        CTLTYPE_STRING|CTLFLAG_RW, 0, 0, sysctl_rules, "A", "Rules");
  382 
  383 static int
  384 rules_check(struct ucred *cred, int family, int type, u_int16_t port)
  385 {
  386         struct rule *rule;
  387         int error;
  388 
  389 #if 0
  390         printf("Check requested for euid %d, family %d, type %d, port %d\n",
  391             cred->cr_uid, family, type, port);
  392 #endif
  393 
  394         if (port > portacl_port_high)
  395                 return (0);
  396 
  397         error = EPERM;
  398         mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
  399         for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head);
  400             rule != NULL;
  401             rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) {
  402                 if (type == SOCK_DGRAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_UDP)
  403                         continue;
  404                 if (type == SOCK_STREAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_TCP)
  405                         continue;
  406                 if (port != rule->r_port)
  407                         continue;
  408                 if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_UID) {
  409                         if (cred->cr_uid == rule->r_id) {
  410                                 error = 0;
  411                                 break;
  412                         }
  413                 } else if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_GID) {
  414                         if (cred->cr_gid == rule->r_id) {
  415                                 error = 0;
  416                                 break;
  417                         } else if (groupmember(rule->r_id, cred)) {
  418                                 error = 0;
  419                                 break;
  420                         }
  421                 } else
  422                         panic("rules_check: unknown rule type %d",
  423                             rule->r_idtype);
  424         }
  425         mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
  426 
  427         if (error != 0 && portacl_suser_exempt != 0)
  428                 error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, 0);
  429 
  430         return (error);
  431 }
  432 
  433 /*
  434  * Note, this only limits the ability to explicitly bind a port, it
  435  * doesn't limit implicitly bound ports for outgoing connections where
  436  * the source port is left up to the IP stack to determine automatically.
  437  */
  438 static int
  439 socket_check_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
  440     struct label *solabel, struct sockaddr *sa)
  441 {
  442         struct sockaddr_in *sin;
  443         struct inpcb *inp;
  444         int family, type;
  445         u_int16_t port;
  446 
  447         /* Only run if we are enabled. */
  448         if (portacl_enabled == 0)
  449                 return (0);
  450 
  451         /* Only interested in IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. */
  452         if (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET &&
  453             so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET6)
  454                 return (0);
  455 
  456         /* Currently, we don't attempt to deal with SOCK_RAW, etc. */
  457         if (so->so_type != SOCK_DGRAM &&
  458             so->so_type != SOCK_STREAM)
  459                 return (0);
  460 
  461         /* Reject addresses we don't understand; fail closed. */
  462         if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET && sa->sa_family != AF_INET6)
  463                 return (EINVAL);
  464 
  465         family = so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family;
  466         type = so->so_type;
  467         sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;
  468         port = ntohs(sin->sin_port);
  469 
  470         /*
  471          * Sockets are frequently bound with a specific IP address but a port
  472          * number of '' to request automatic port allocation.  This is often
  473          * desirable as long as IP_PORTRANGELOW isn't set, which might permit
  474          * automatic allocation of a "privileged" port.  The autoport exempt
  475          * flag exempts port 0 allocation from rule checking as long as a low
  476          * port isn't required.
  477          */
  478         if (portacl_autoport_exempt && port == 0) {
  479                 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
  480                 if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) == 0)
  481                         return (0);
  482         }
  483 
  484         return (rules_check(cred, family, type, port));
  485 }
  486 
  487 static struct mac_policy_ops portacl_ops =
  488 {
  489         .mpo_destroy = destroy,
  490         .mpo_init = init,
  491         .mpo_socket_check_bind = socket_check_bind,
  492 };
  493 
  494 MAC_POLICY_SET(&portacl_ops, mac_portacl, "TrustedBSD MAC/portacl",
  495     MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);

Cache object: b4c619058b0df9c7326959222365c9cd


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