The Design and Implementation of the FreeBSD Operating System, Second Edition
Now available: The Design and Implementation of the FreeBSD Operating System (Second Edition)


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FreeBSD/Linux Kernel Cross Reference
sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c

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    1 /*-
    2  * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
    3  * All rights reserved.
    4  *
    5  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Network
    6  * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
    7  * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
    8  * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
    9  *
   10  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   11  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   12  * are met:
   13  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   15  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   16  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   17  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   18  *
   19  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
   20  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   21  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   22  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   23  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   24  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   25  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   26  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   27  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   28  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   29  * SUCH DAMAGE.
   30  *
   31  * $FreeBSD: releng/6.2/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c 163363 2006-10-15 07:02:26Z rwatson $
   32  */
   33 
   34 /*
   35  * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
   36  *
   37  * Administratively limit access to local UDP/TCP ports for binding purposes.
   38  * Intended to be combined with net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh to allow
   39  * specific uids and gids to bind specific ports for specific purposes,
   40  * while not opening the door to any user replacing an "official" service
   41  * while you're restarting it.  This only affects ports explicitly bound by
   42  * the user process (either for listen/outgoing socket for TCP, or send/
   43  * receive for UDP).  This module will not limit ports bound implicitly for
   44  * out-going connections where the process hasn't explicitly selected a port:
   45  * these are automatically selected by the IP stack.
   46  *
   47  * To use this module, security.mac.enforce_socket must be enabled, and
   48  * you will probably want to twiddle the net.inet sysctl listed above.
   49  * Then use sysctl(8) to modify the rules string:
   50  *
   51  * # sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules="uid:425:tcp:80,uid:425:tcp:79"
   52  *
   53  * This ruleset, for example, permits uid 425 to bind TCP ports 80 (http)
   54  * and 79 (finger).  User names and group names can't be used directly
   55  * because the kernel only knows about uids and gids.
   56  */
   57 
   58 #include <sys/types.h>
   59 #include <sys/param.h>
   60 #include <sys/conf.h>
   61 #include <sys/domain.h>
   62 #include <sys/kernel.h>
   63 #include <sys/libkern.h>
   64 #include <sys/lock.h>
   65 #include <sys/mac.h>
   66 #include <sys/malloc.h>
   67 #include <sys/mount.h>
   68 #include <sys/mutex.h>
   69 #include <sys/proc.h>
   70 #include <sys/protosw.h>
   71 #include <sys/queue.h>
   72 #include <sys/systm.h>
   73 #include <sys/sysproto.h>
   74 #include <sys/sysent.h>
   75 #include <sys/file.h>
   76 #include <sys/sbuf.h>
   77 #include <sys/socket.h>
   78 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
   79 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
   80 
   81 #include <netinet/in.h>
   82 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
   83 
   84 #include <vm/vm.h>
   85 
   86 #include <sys/mac_policy.h>
   87 
   88 SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
   89 
   90 SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, portacl, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
   91     "TrustedBSD mac_portacl policy controls");
   92 
   93 static int      mac_portacl_enabled = 1;
   94 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
   95     &mac_portacl_enabled, 0, "Enforce portacl policy");
   96 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.enabled", &mac_portacl_enabled);
   97 
   98 static int      mac_portacl_suser_exempt = 1;
   99 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, suser_exempt, CTLFLAG_RW,
  100     &mac_portacl_suser_exempt, 0, "Privilege permits binding of any port");
  101 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt",
  102     &mac_portacl_suser_exempt);
  103 
  104 static int      mac_portacl_autoport_exempt = 1;
  105 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, autoport_exempt, CTLFLAG_RW,
  106     &mac_portacl_autoport_exempt, 0, "Allow automatic allocation through "
  107     "binding port 0 if not IP_PORTRANGELOW");
  108 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.autoport_exempt",
  109     &mac_portacl_autoport_exempt);
  110 
  111 static int      mac_portacl_port_high = 1023;
  112 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, port_high, CTLFLAG_RW,
  113     &mac_portacl_port_high, 0, "Highest port to enforce for");
  114 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.port_high", &mac_portacl_port_high);
  115 
  116 MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PORTACL, "portacl rule", "Rules for mac_portacl");
  117 
  118 #define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN     1024
  119 
  120 #define RULE_GID        1
  121 #define RULE_UID        2
  122 #define RULE_PROTO_TCP  1
  123 #define RULE_PROTO_UDP  2
  124 struct rule {
  125         id_t                    r_id;
  126         int                     r_idtype;
  127         u_int16_t               r_port;
  128         int                     r_protocol;
  129 
  130         TAILQ_ENTRY(rule)       r_entries;
  131 };
  132 
  133 #define GID_STRING      "gid"
  134 #define TCP_STRING      "tcp"
  135 #define UID_STRING      "uid"
  136 #define UDP_STRING      "udp"
  137 
  138 /*
  139  * Text format for the rule string is that a rule consists of a
  140  * comma-seperated list of elements.  Each element is in the form
  141  * idtype:id:protocol:portnumber, and constitutes granting of permission
  142  * for the specified binding.
  143  */
  144 
  145 static struct mtx                       rule_mtx;
  146 static TAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, rule)       rule_head;
  147 static char                             rule_string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN];
  148 
  149 static void
  150 toast_rules(struct rulehead *head)
  151 {
  152         struct rule *rule;
  153 
  154         while ((rule = TAILQ_FIRST(head)) != NULL) {
  155                 TAILQ_REMOVE(head, rule, r_entries);
  156                 free(rule, M_PORTACL);
  157         }
  158 }
  159 
  160 /*
  161  * Note that there is an inherent race condition in the unload of modules
  162  * and access via sysctl.
  163  */
  164 static void
  165 destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
  166 {
  167 
  168         mtx_destroy(&rule_mtx);
  169         toast_rules(&rule_head);
  170 }
  171 
  172 static void
  173 init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
  174 {
  175 
  176         mtx_init(&rule_mtx, "rule_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
  177         TAILQ_INIT(&rule_head);
  178 }
  179 
  180 /*
  181  * Note: parsing routines are destructive on the passed string.
  182  */
  183 static int
  184 parse_rule_element(char *element, struct rule **rule)
  185 {
  186         char *idtype, *id, *protocol, *portnumber, *p;
  187         struct rule *new;
  188         int error;
  189 
  190         error = 0;
  191         new = malloc(sizeof(*new), M_PORTACL, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
  192 
  193         idtype = strsep(&element, ":");
  194         if (idtype == NULL) {
  195                 error = EINVAL;
  196                 goto out;
  197         }
  198         id = strsep(&element, ":");
  199         if (id == NULL) {
  200                 error = EINVAL;
  201                 goto out;
  202         }
  203         new->r_id = strtol(id, &p, 10);
  204         if (*p != '\0') {
  205                 error = EINVAL;
  206                 goto out;
  207         }
  208         if (strcmp(idtype, UID_STRING) == 0)
  209                 new->r_idtype = RULE_UID;
  210         else if (strcmp(idtype, GID_STRING) == 0)
  211                 new->r_idtype = RULE_GID;
  212         else {
  213                 error = EINVAL;
  214                 goto out;
  215         }
  216         protocol = strsep(&element, ":");
  217         if (protocol == NULL) {
  218                 error = EINVAL;
  219                 goto out;
  220         }
  221         if (strcmp(protocol, TCP_STRING) == 0)
  222                 new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_TCP;
  223         else if (strcmp(protocol, UDP_STRING) == 0)
  224                 new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_UDP;
  225         else {
  226                 error = EINVAL;
  227                 goto out;
  228         }
  229         portnumber = element;
  230         if (portnumber == NULL) {
  231                 error = EINVAL;
  232                 goto out;
  233         }
  234         new->r_port = strtol(portnumber, &p, 10);
  235         if (*p != '\0') {
  236                 error = EINVAL;
  237                 goto out;
  238         }
  239 
  240 out:
  241         if (error != 0) {
  242                 free(new, M_PORTACL);
  243                 *rule = NULL;
  244         } else
  245                 *rule = new;
  246         return (error);
  247 }
  248 
  249 static int
  250 parse_rules(char *string, struct rulehead *head)
  251 {
  252         struct rule *new;
  253         char *element;
  254         int error;
  255 
  256         error = 0;
  257         while ((element = strsep(&string, ",")) != NULL) {
  258                 if (strlen(element) == 0)
  259                         continue;
  260                 error = parse_rule_element(element, &new);
  261                 if (error)
  262                         goto out;
  263                 TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, new, r_entries);
  264         }
  265 out:
  266         if (error != 0)
  267                 toast_rules(head);
  268         return (error);
  269 }
  270 
  271 /*
  272  * rule_printf() and rules_to_string() are unused currently because they rely
  273  * on sbufs with auto-extension, which may sleep while holding a mutex.
  274  * Instead, the non-canonical user-generated rule string is returned to the
  275  * user when the rules are queried, which is faster anyway.
  276  */
  277 #if 0
  278 static void
  279 rule_printf(struct sbuf *sb, struct rule *rule)
  280 {
  281         const char *idtype, *protocol;
  282 
  283         switch(rule->r_idtype) {
  284         case RULE_GID:
  285                 idtype = GID_STRING;
  286                 break;
  287         case RULE_UID:
  288                 idtype = UID_STRING;
  289                 break;
  290         default:
  291                 panic("rule_printf: unknown idtype (%d)\n", rule->r_idtype);
  292         }
  293 
  294         switch (rule->r_protocol) {
  295         case RULE_PROTO_TCP:
  296                 protocol = TCP_STRING;
  297                 break;
  298         case RULE_PROTO_UDP:
  299                 protocol = UDP_STRING;
  300                 break;
  301         default:
  302                 panic("rule_printf: unknown protocol (%d)\n",
  303                     rule->r_protocol);
  304         }
  305         sbuf_printf(sb, "%s:%jd:%s:%d", idtype, (intmax_t)rule->r_id,
  306             protocol, rule->r_port);
  307 }
  308 
  309 static char *
  310 rules_to_string(void)
  311 {
  312         struct rule *rule;
  313         struct sbuf *sb;
  314         int needcomma;
  315         char *temp;
  316 
  317         sb = sbuf_new(NULL, NULL, 0, SBUF_AUTOEXTEND);
  318         needcomma = 0;
  319         mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
  320         for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head); rule != NULL;
  321             rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) {
  322                 if (!needcomma)
  323                         needcomma = 1;
  324                 else
  325                         sbuf_printf(sb, ",");
  326                 rule_printf(sb, rule);
  327         }
  328         mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
  329         sbuf_finish(sb);
  330         temp = strdup(sbuf_data(sb), M_PORTACL);
  331         sbuf_delete(sb);
  332         return (temp);
  333 }
  334 #endif
  335 
  336 /*
  337  * Note: due to races, there is not a single serializable order
  338  * between parallel calls to the sysctl.
  339  */
  340 static int
  341 sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
  342 {
  343         char *string, *copy_string, *new_string;
  344         struct rulehead head, save_head;
  345         int error;
  346 
  347         new_string = NULL;
  348         if (req->newptr == NULL) {
  349                 new_string = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_PORTACL,
  350                     M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
  351                 strcpy(new_string, rule_string);
  352                 string = new_string;
  353         } else
  354                 string = rule_string;
  355 
  356         error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req);
  357         if (error)
  358                 goto out;
  359 
  360         if (req->newptr != NULL) {
  361                 copy_string = strdup(string, M_PORTACL);
  362                 TAILQ_INIT(&head);
  363                 error = parse_rules(copy_string, &head);
  364                 free(copy_string, M_PORTACL);
  365                 if (error)
  366                         goto out;
  367 
  368                 TAILQ_INIT(&save_head);
  369                 mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
  370                 TAILQ_CONCAT(&save_head, &rule_head, r_entries);
  371                 TAILQ_CONCAT(&rule_head, &head, r_entries);
  372                 strcpy(rule_string, string);
  373                 mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
  374                 toast_rules(&save_head);
  375         }
  376 out:
  377         if (new_string != NULL)
  378                 free(new_string, M_PORTACL);
  379         return (error);
  380 }
  381 
  382 SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, rules,
  383        CTLTYPE_STRING|CTLFLAG_RW, 0, 0, sysctl_rules, "A", "Rules");
  384 
  385 static int
  386 rules_check(struct ucred *cred, int family, int type, u_int16_t port)
  387 {
  388         struct rule *rule;
  389         int error;
  390 
  391 #if 0
  392         printf("Check requested for euid %d, family %d, type %d, port %d\n",
  393             cred->cr_uid, family, type, port);
  394 #endif
  395 
  396         if (port > mac_portacl_port_high)
  397                 return (0);
  398 
  399         error = EPERM;
  400         mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
  401         for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head);
  402             rule != NULL;
  403             rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) {
  404                 if (type == SOCK_DGRAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_UDP)
  405                         continue;
  406                 if (type == SOCK_STREAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_TCP)
  407                         continue;
  408                 if (port != rule->r_port)
  409                         continue;
  410                 if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_UID) {
  411                         if (cred->cr_uid == rule->r_id) {
  412                                 error = 0;
  413                                 break;
  414                         }
  415                 } else if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_GID) {
  416                         if (cred->cr_gid == rule->r_id) {
  417                                 error = 0;
  418                                 break;
  419                         } else if (groupmember(rule->r_id, cred)) {
  420                                 error = 0;
  421                                 break;
  422                         }
  423                 } else
  424                         panic("rules_check: unknown rule type %d",
  425                             rule->r_idtype);
  426         }
  427         mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
  428 
  429         if (error != 0 && mac_portacl_suser_exempt != 0)
  430                 error = suser_cred(cred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
  431 
  432         return (error);
  433 }
  434 
  435 /*
  436  * Note, this only limits the ability to explicitly bind a port, it
  437  * doesn't limit implicitly bound ports for outgoing connections where
  438  * the source port is left up to the IP stack to determine automatically.
  439  */
  440 static int
  441 check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
  442     struct label *socketlabel, struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
  443 {
  444         struct sockaddr_in *sin;
  445         struct inpcb *inp;
  446         int family, type;
  447         u_int16_t port;
  448 
  449         /* Only run if we are enabled. */
  450         if (mac_portacl_enabled == 0)
  451                 return (0);
  452 
  453         /* Only interested in IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. */
  454         if (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET &&
  455             so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET6)
  456                 return (0);
  457 
  458         /* Currently, we don't attempt to deal with SOCK_RAW, etc. */
  459         if (so->so_type != SOCK_DGRAM &&
  460             so->so_type != SOCK_STREAM)
  461                 return (0);
  462 
  463         /* Reject addresses we don't understand; fail closed. */
  464         if (sockaddr->sa_family != AF_INET &&
  465             sockaddr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
  466                 return (EINVAL);
  467 
  468         family = so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family;
  469         type = so->so_type;
  470         sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sockaddr;
  471         port = ntohs(sin->sin_port);
  472 
  473         /*
  474          * Sockets are frequently bound with a specific IP address but a port
  475          * number of '' to request automatic port allocation.  This is often
  476          * desirable as long as IP_PORTRANGELOW isn't set, which might permit
  477          * automatic allocation of a "privileged" port.  The autoport exempt
  478          * flag exempts port 0 allocation from rule checking as long as a low
  479          * port isn't required.
  480          */
  481         if (mac_portacl_autoport_exempt && port == 0) {
  482                 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
  483                 if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) == 0)
  484                         return (0);
  485         }
  486 
  487         return (rules_check(cred, family, type, port));
  488 }
  489 
  490 static struct mac_policy_ops mac_portacl_ops =
  491 {
  492         .mpo_destroy = destroy,
  493         .mpo_init = init,
  494         .mpo_check_socket_bind = check_socket_bind,
  495 };
  496 
  497 MAC_POLICY_SET(&mac_portacl_ops, trustedbsd_mac_portacl,
  498     "TrustedBSD MAC/portacl", MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);

Cache object: 80c162d29f74b0c31294d45e0651fadf


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