The Design and Implementation of the FreeBSD Operating System, Second Edition
Now available: The Design and Implementation of the FreeBSD Operating System (Second Edition)


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FreeBSD/Linux Kernel Cross Reference
sys/security/mac_process.c

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    1 /*
    2  * Copyright (c) 2007-2010 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
    3  *
    4  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
    5  * 
    6  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
    7  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
    8  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
    9  * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
   10  * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
   11  * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
   12  * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
   13  * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
   14  * 
   15  * Please obtain a copy of the License at
   16  * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
   17  * 
   18  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
   19  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
   20  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
   21  * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
   22  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
   23  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
   24  * limitations under the License.
   25  * 
   26  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
   27  */
   28 
   29 /*-
   30  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
   31  * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
   32  * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
   33  *
   34  * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
   35  * TrustedBSD Project.
   36  *
   37  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
   38  * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
   39  * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
   40  * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
   41  *
   42  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   43  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   44  * are met:
   45  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   46  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
   47  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   48  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   49  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
   50  *
   51  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
   52  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
   53  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
   54  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
   55  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
   56  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
   57  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
   58  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
   59  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
   60  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
   61  * SUCH DAMAGE.
   62  *
   63  */
   64 
   65 #include <string.h>
   66 #include <sys/param.h>
   67 #include <sys/ucred.h>
   68 #include <sys/malloc.h>
   69 #include <sys/sbuf.h>
   70 #include <sys/vnode.h>
   71 #include <sys/proc.h>
   72 #include <sys/proc_internal.h>
   73 #include <sys/kauth.h>
   74 #include <sys/imgact.h>
   75 
   76 #include <security/mac_internal.h>
   77 
   78 #include <bsd/security/audit/audit.h>
   79 
   80 struct label *
   81 mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
   82 {
   83         struct label *label;
   84 
   85         label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
   86         if (label == NULL)
   87                 return (NULL);
   88         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_init, label);
   89         return (label);
   90 }
   91 
   92 void
   93 mac_cred_label_init(struct ucred *cred)
   94 {
   95         cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
   96 }
   97 
   98 void
   99 mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
  100 {
  101         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_destroy, label);
  102         mac_labelzone_free(label);
  103 }
  104 
  105 int
  106 mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(struct proc *p, struct mac *mac)
  107 {
  108         kauth_cred_t cr;
  109         int error;
  110 
  111         cr = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
  112 
  113         error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE_AUDIT(cred, cr->cr_label,
  114             mac->m_string, mac->m_buflen);
  115 
  116         kauth_cred_unref(&cr);
  117         return (error);
  118 }
  119 
  120 void
  121 mac_cred_label_destroy(kauth_cred_t cred)
  122 {
  123 
  124         mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
  125         cred->cr_label = NULL;
  126 }
  127 
  128 int
  129 mac_cred_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
  130     char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags __unused)
  131 {
  132         int error = 0;
  133 
  134         error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
  135 
  136         return (error);
  137 }
  138 
  139 int
  140 mac_cred_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
  141 {
  142         int error;
  143 
  144         error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
  145 
  146         return (error);
  147 }
  148 
  149 /*
  150  * By default, fork just adds a reference to the parent
  151  * credential.  Policies may need to know about this reference
  152  * if they are tracking exit calls to know when to free the
  153  * label.
  154  */
  155 void
  156 mac_cred_label_associate_fork(kauth_cred_t cred, proc_t proc)
  157 {
  158         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_fork, cred, proc);
  159 }
  160         
  161 /*
  162  * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other
  163  * kernel processes and threads are spawned.
  164  */
  165 void
  166 mac_cred_label_associate_kernel(kauth_cred_t cred)
  167 {
  168 
  169         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_kernel, cred);
  170 }
  171 
  172 /*
  173  * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
  174  * userland processes and threads are spawned.
  175  */
  176 void
  177 mac_cred_label_associate_user(kauth_cred_t cred)
  178 {
  179 
  180         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_user, cred);
  181 }
  182 
  183 /*
  184  * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized.  Generally,
  185  * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible
  186  * deltas.  This function allows that processing to take place.
  187  */
  188 void
  189 mac_cred_label_associate(struct ucred *parent_cred, struct ucred *child_cred)
  190 {
  191 
  192         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate, parent_cred, child_cred);
  193 }
  194 
  195 int
  196 mac_execve_enter(user_addr_t mac_p, struct image_params *imgp)
  197 {
  198         struct user_mac mac;
  199         struct label *execlabel;
  200         char *buffer;
  201         int error;
  202         size_t ulen;
  203 
  204         if (mac_p == USER_ADDR_NULL)
  205                 return (0);
  206 
  207         if (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(current_proc())) {
  208                 struct user64_mac mac64;
  209                 error = copyin(mac_p, &mac64, sizeof(mac64));
  210                 mac.m_buflen = mac64.m_buflen;
  211                 mac.m_string = mac64.m_string;
  212         } else {
  213                 struct user32_mac mac32;
  214                 error = copyin(mac_p, &mac32, sizeof(mac32));
  215                 mac.m_buflen = mac32.m_buflen;
  216                 mac.m_string = mac32.m_string;
  217         }
  218         if (error)
  219                 return (error);
  220 
  221         error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
  222         if (error)
  223                 return (error);
  224 
  225         execlabel = mac_cred_label_alloc();
  226         MALLOC(buffer, char *, mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
  227         error = copyinstr(CAST_USER_ADDR_T(mac.m_string), buffer, mac.m_buflen, &ulen);
  228         if (error)
  229                 goto out;
  230         AUDIT_ARG(mac_string, buffer);
  231 
  232         error = mac_cred_label_internalize(execlabel, buffer);
  233 out:
  234         if (error) {
  235                 mac_cred_label_free(execlabel);
  236                 execlabel = NULL;
  237         }
  238         imgp->ip_execlabelp = execlabel;
  239         FREE(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
  240         return (error);
  241 }
  242 
  243 /*
  244  * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
  245  * to mapped objects.  This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
  246  * buffer cache.
  247  *
  248  * XXX:         CRF_MAC_ENFORCE should be in a kauth_cred_t field, rather
  249  * XXX:         than a posix_cred_t field.
  250  */
  251 void
  252 mac_cred_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
  253 {
  254         posix_cred_t pcred = posix_cred_get(cred);
  255 
  256         /* force label to be part of "matching" for credential */
  257         pcred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE;
  258 
  259         /* inform the policies of the update */
  260         MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_update, cred, newlabel);
  261 }
  262 
  263 int
  264 mac_cred_check_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
  265 {
  266         int error;
  267 
  268         if (!mac_proc_enforce)
  269                 return (0);
  270 
  271         MAC_CHECK(cred_check_label_update, cred, newlabel);
  272 
  273         return (error);
  274 }
  275 
  276 int
  277 mac_cred_check_visible(kauth_cred_t u1, kauth_cred_t u2)
  278 {
  279         int error;
  280 
  281 
  282 
  283         if (!mac_proc_enforce)
  284                 return (0);
  285 
  286 
  287 
  288         MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, u1, u2);
  289 
  290 
  291         return (error);
  292 }
  293 
  294 /*                                                                                                    
  295  * called with process locked.                                                                        
  296  */
  297 void mac_proc_set_enforce(proc_t p, int enforce_flags)
  298 {
  299         p->p_mac_enforce |= enforce_flags;
  300 }
  301 
  302 int
  303 mac_proc_check_debug(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
  304 {
  305         kauth_cred_t cred;
  306         int error;
  307 
  308 
  309 
  310         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  311             !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  312                 return (0);
  313 
  314         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
  315         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, cred, proc);
  316         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  317 
  318         return (error);
  319 }
  320 
  321 int
  322 mac_proc_check_fork(proc_t curp)
  323 {
  324         kauth_cred_t cred;
  325         int error;
  326 
  327         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  328             !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  329                 return (0);
  330 
  331         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
  332         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_fork, cred, curp);
  333         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  334 
  335         return (error);
  336 }
  337 
  338 int
  339 mac_proc_check_get_task_name(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
  340 {
  341         int error;
  342 
  343         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task_name, cred, p);
  344 
  345         return (error);
  346 }
  347 
  348 int
  349 mac_proc_check_get_task(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
  350 {
  351         int error;
  352 
  353         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task, cred, p);
  354 
  355         return (error);
  356 }
  357 
  358 /*
  359  * The type of maxprot in proc_check_map_anon must be equivalent to vm_prot_t
  360  * (defined in <mach/vm_prot.h>). mac_policy.h does not include any header
  361  * files, so cannot use the typedef itself.
  362  */
  363 int
  364 mac_proc_check_map_anon(proc_t proc, user_addr_t u_addr,
  365     user_size_t u_size, int prot, int flags, int *maxprot)
  366 {
  367         kauth_cred_t cred;
  368         int error;
  369 
  370         if (!mac_vm_enforce ||
  371             !mac_proc_check_enforce(proc, MAC_VM_ENFORCE))
  372                 return (0);
  373 
  374         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
  375         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_map_anon, proc, cred, u_addr, u_size, prot, flags, maxprot);
  376         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  377 
  378         return (error);
  379 }
  380 
  381 int
  382 mac_proc_check_mprotect(proc_t proc,
  383     user_addr_t addr, user_size_t size, int prot)
  384 {
  385         kauth_cred_t cred;
  386         int error;
  387 
  388         if (!mac_vm_enforce ||
  389             !mac_proc_check_enforce(proc, MAC_VM_ENFORCE))
  390                 return (0);
  391 
  392         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
  393         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_mprotect, cred, proc, addr, size, prot);
  394         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  395 
  396         return (error);
  397 }
  398 
  399 int
  400 mac_proc_check_run_cs_invalid(proc_t proc)
  401 {
  402         int error;
  403         
  404         if (!mac_vm_enforce) return (0);
  405         
  406         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_run_cs_invalid, proc);
  407         
  408         return (error);
  409 }
  410                                    
  411 int
  412 mac_proc_check_sched(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
  413 {
  414         kauth_cred_t cred;
  415         int error;
  416 
  417 
  418 
  419         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  420             !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  421                 return (0);
  422 
  423         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
  424         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, proc);
  425         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  426 
  427         return (error);
  428 }
  429 
  430 int
  431 mac_proc_check_signal(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc, int signum)
  432 {
  433         kauth_cred_t cred;
  434         int error;
  435 
  436 
  437 
  438         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  439             !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  440                 return (0);
  441 
  442         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
  443         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, proc, signum);
  444         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  445 
  446         return (error);
  447 }
  448 
  449 int
  450 mac_proc_check_wait(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
  451 {
  452         kauth_cred_t cred;
  453         int error;
  454 
  455 
  456 
  457         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  458             !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  459                 return (0);
  460 
  461         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
  462         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, proc);
  463         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  464 
  465         return (error);
  466 }
  467 
  468 #if CONFIG_LCTX
  469 /*
  470  * Login Context
  471  */
  472 
  473 int
  474 mac_proc_check_setlcid (struct proc *p0, struct proc *p,
  475                         pid_t pid, pid_t lcid)
  476 {
  477         int error;
  478 
  479         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  480             !mac_proc_check_enforce(p0, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  481                 return (0);
  482 
  483         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setlcid, p0, p, pid, lcid);
  484         return (error);
  485 }
  486 
  487 int
  488 mac_proc_check_getlcid (struct proc *p0, struct proc *p, pid_t pid)
  489 {
  490         int error;
  491 
  492         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  493             !mac_proc_check_enforce(p0, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  494                 return (0);
  495 
  496         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_getlcid, p0, p, pid);
  497         return (error);
  498 }
  499 
  500 void
  501 mac_lctx_notify_create (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l)
  502 {
  503         MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_create, p, l);
  504 }
  505 
  506 void
  507 mac_lctx_notify_join (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l)
  508 {
  509         MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_join, p, l);
  510 }
  511 
  512 void
  513 mac_lctx_notify_leave (struct proc *p, struct lctx *l)
  514 {
  515         MAC_PERFORM(lctx_notify_leave, p, l);
  516 }
  517 
  518 struct label *
  519 mac_lctx_label_alloc(void)
  520 {
  521         struct label *label;
  522 
  523         label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
  524         if (label == NULL)
  525                 return (NULL);
  526         MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_init, label);
  527         return (label);
  528 }
  529 
  530 void
  531 mac_lctx_label_free(struct label *label)
  532 {
  533 
  534         MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_destroy, label);
  535         mac_labelzone_free(label);
  536 }
  537 
  538 int
  539 mac_lctx_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
  540     char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
  541 {
  542         int error;
  543 
  544         error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(lctx, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
  545 
  546         return (error);
  547 }
  548 
  549 int
  550 mac_lctx_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
  551 {
  552         int error;
  553 
  554         error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(lctx, label, string);
  555 
  556         return (error);
  557 }
  558 
  559 void
  560 mac_lctx_label_update(struct lctx *l, struct label *newlabel)
  561 {
  562 
  563         MAC_PERFORM(lctx_label_update, l, newlabel);
  564 }
  565 
  566 int
  567 mac_lctx_check_label_update(struct lctx *l, struct label *newlabel)
  568 {
  569         int error;
  570 
  571         MAC_CHECK(lctx_check_label_update, l, newlabel);
  572 
  573         return (error);
  574 }
  575 #endif  /* LCTX */
  576 
  577 int
  578 mac_proc_check_suspend_resume(proc_t curp, int sr)
  579 {
  580         kauth_cred_t cred;
  581         int error;
  582 
  583         if (!mac_proc_enforce ||
  584             !mac_proc_check_enforce(curp, MAC_PROC_ENFORCE))
  585                 return (0);
  586 
  587         cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
  588         MAC_CHECK(proc_check_suspend_resume, cred, curp, sr);
  589         kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
  590 
  591         return (error);
  592 }

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